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Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2) and 27, Appellant Kim Davis (“Davis”)
hereby moves this Court, on an emergency basis, for a stay pending appeal of the
district court’s August 12, 2015 order (D.E. 43)1 (hereinafter the “Injunction”).
INTRODUCTION
The Injunction enjoins Davis, the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky,
to immediately authorize and issue under her name marriage licenses to the samesex couples named in this lawsuit, in derogation of her conscience and religious
liberty. Despite acknowledging that this case presents a constitutional “conflict” and
“debate” between implicit and explicit rights, the district court has refused to grant
Davis a stay of the Injunction pending appeal, electing instead to grant a temporary
stay that expires on August 31, 2015. As it has already done in prior precedential
marriage cases, this Court should grant an immediate stay of the Injunction.
A same-sex “marriage” (“SSM”) license issued on Davis’ authorization and
bearing her name and imprimatur substantially and irreparably burdens Davis’
conscience and deeply-held, sincere religious beliefs, which dictate to Davis that
such unions are not and cannot be “marriage.” That searing act of personal validation
would forever echo in her conscience—and, if it happened, there is no absolution or
correction that any earthly court can provide to rectify it. A stay of the Injunction
will halt the irreversible implications on Davis’ conscience while this Court reviews
1

Citations to the district court record are indicated by this format: “D.E. __.”
1
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Davis’ appeal and the multiple less restrictive alternatives available that do not
substantially burden Davis (or the Plaintiffs).
This case is a matter of first impression, left unaddressed following the
nascent Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Over against its redefinition
of marriage, Obergefell unanimously held that First Amendment protections for
religious persons remain despite same-sex “marriage.” The district court has
acknowledged that “this civil action” presents a constitutional “debate,” “tension,”
and “conflict” between “two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence.”2 In the district court’s view, Plaintiffs’ rights trump Davis’ religious
rights. But, unlike Plaintiffs, Davis’ individual liberties are enumerated (not
emanations) in the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and the Kentucky
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and, moreover, they are natural liberties tied to
religious beliefs that are measured in millennia (not weeks). Such rights deserve a
full hearing in this Court. In light of the foregoing, this Court should stay the
Injunction pending final resolution of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 2, 2015, less than one week after the Supreme Court decided
Obergefell v. Hodges and the Kentucky Governor issued a directive ordering all
Justice Thomas expressly predicted this “inevitable” conflict as individuals
“are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between
same-sex couples.” Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2

2
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county clerks to personally authorize SSM licenses (the “SSM Mandate”), Plaintiffs
filed this lawsuit demanding that a particular person (Davis) in a particular county
(Rowan County) authorize and approve their Kentucky marriage licenses, despite
widespread availability of licenses and Davis’ undisputed religious conscience
objection to SSM.3 See D.E. 1. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary
injunction to bar Davis from “refusing to issue marriage licenses to any future
marriage license applications submitted by the Named Plaintiffs.” See D.E. 2-2.
Evidentiary hearings on this motion were held in Ashland, Kentucky (60 miles from
the Rowan County clerk’s office), and in Covington, Kentucky (100 miles away),
which were attended by multiple named Plaintiffs. See D.E. 21, 26.4
On August 4, 2015, Davis filed a verified third-party Complaint against
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky (“Gov. Beshear”), the issuer of the SSM
Mandate, and Wayne Onkst, Commissioner of Kentucky Department for Libraries
and Archives, the state agency responsible for designing Kentucky marriage license
forms. See D.E. 34 (attached hereto as Exhibit “F”).5 On August 7, 2015, Davis filed

3

Expressly to avoid disparate treatment of any couple, Davis discontinued the
issuance of all marriage licenses after Obergefell. Two plaintiff couples are different
sex couples, to whom Davis has no religious objection to issuing marriage licenses.
4
A copy of the July 13, 2015 and July 20, 2015 hearing transcripts are attached
hereto as Exhibits “D” and “E,” respectively.
5
On that same day, Davis filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its
entirety. See D.E. 32.
3
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a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of Gov. Beshear’s SSM
Mandate and obtain an exemption “from having to authorize the issuance of
Kentucky marriage licenses.” See D.E. 39-7. The grounds on which Davis seeks
relief from Gov. Beshear are intertwined with the grounds on which she opposed
Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against her. See D.E. 29, 39-1. Notwithstanding,
the district court entered its Injunction, rather than considering Davis’ and Plaintiffs’
requests together and allowing Davis to develop a further evidentiary record on her
own request for individual accommodation from Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate.
The Injunction enjoins Davis “from applying her ‘no marriage licenses’ policy
to future marriage license requests submitted by Plaintiffs.” See D.E. 43 at 28
(attached hereto as Exhibit “B”). The district court stated that “this civil action
presents a conflict between two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence,” thereby conceding that Davis’ religious rights are, in fact, being both
“threaten[ed]” and “infringe[d]” by Plaintiffs’ demands for her approval of their
proposed unions, and by Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate to provide exactly that or
resign. Id. at 2. Notwithstanding, without giving full consideration to Davis’ own
motion for injunctive relief and further development of an evidentiary record, the
district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
Even though Plaintiffs indisputably are able to obtain a Kentucky marriage
license from more than 130 marriage licensing locations, including all nearby and
4
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surrounding counties, the district court held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
the merits of their purported right to marry claims and were being irreparably
harmed. See id. at 9-16. In reaching this decision, however, the district court
considered “other Rowan County residents” not before the court on the Plaintiffs’
motion (which was limited exclusively to the named Plaintiffs) and speculated about
religious accommodation requests that might be made at unspecified times in the
future by other county clerks also not before the court. Id. at 12.
The district court also rejected Davis’ claims under the Kentucky Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“Kentucky RFRA”), KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350, the Free
Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Religious Test Clause of the United
States Constitution, and similar Kentucky Constitution provisions. See D.E. 43 at
16-28. In rejecting Davis’ religious liberty, conscience, and speech claims, the
district court incorrectly concluded that the Kentucky marriage license form “does
not require the county clerk to condone or endorse same-sex marriage” and instead
merely “asks the county clerk to certify that the information provided is accurate and
that the couple is qualified to marry under Kentucky law.”6 According to the district
See D.E. 43 at 22; see also id. at 25 (“[T]he act of issuing a marriage license
to a same-sex couple merely signifies that the couple has met the legal requirements
to marry. It is not a sign of moral or religious approval.”) (emphasis in original); id.
at 27 (“Davis is simply being asked to signify that couples meet the legal
requirements to marry. The State is not asking her to condone same-sex unions on
moral or religious grounds, nor is it restricting her from engaging in a variety of
religious activities.”).
6

5
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court, the burden on Davis’ religious freedom is “more slight,” and she “remains
free to practice her Apostolic Christian beliefs” since she “may continue to attend
church twice a week, participate in Bible Study and minister to female inmates at
the Rowan County jail,” and “believe that marriage is a union between one man and
one woman.” Id. at 27. But, according to the district court, “her religious convictions
cannot excuse her” from authorizing SSM licenses. See id. at 27-28. Facing an order
enjoining her to authorize Kentucky marriage licenses in derogation of her religious
conscience, Davis filed an immediate notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a), see D.E. 44 (attached hereto as Exhibit “A”), and a motion to stay
pending appeal or, in the alternative, to grant a temporary stay so that Davis may
promptly apply to this Court for a stay pending appeal, see D.E. 45.
On August 17, 2015, the district court denied Davis’ motion to stay the
Injunction pending appeal, but granted a temporary stay pending this Court’s review
of a similar request. See D.E. 52 (attached hereto as Exhibit “C”). In denying this
stay request for the same reasons it granted a preliminary injunction, the district court
nonetheless recognized (again) that “constitutional issues” are involved in this
dispute and reiterated that a constitutional “debate” is present in the case at bar and
therefore granted a temporary stay instead. Id. at 1, 7. On August 19, 2015, the
district court ordered that its temporary stay will expire August 31, 2015 absent

6
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a contrary Order from this Court. See D.E. 55 (attached hereto as Exhibit “G”).
Davis now moves this Court to stay the Injunction pending her appeal to this Court.
ARGUMENT
In deciding a motion for stay pending appeal, this Court balances the same
four factors that are traditionally considered in evaluating a motion for preliminary
injunction: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the
merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably
harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants
the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.” Mich. Coal. of Radioactive
Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991).
In prior marriage cases arising from Sixth Circuit district courts, this Court
consistently entered stays pending a full appeal on the merits. For instance, in April
DeBoer, et al. v. Richard Snyder, et al., No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014), Judges
Rogers and White, joined by Eastern District of Kentucky Judge Caldwell, granted
an emergency motion to stay pending an appeal of the Eastern District of Michigan’s
marriage decision in that case. In Valeria Tanco, et al. v. William Haslam, et al., No.
14-5297 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2014), Judges Guy and Clay, joined by Eastern District
of Kentucky Judge Bertelsman, overturned the Middle District of Tennessee’s
refusal to grant a stay pending an appeal of the district court’s marriage decision.

7
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Not long before this Court entered the above rulings, Western District of
Kentucky Judge Heyburn in Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky.
2014), granted a stay of his opinion invalidating Kentucky’s democraticallyapproved and constitutionally-enacted natural definition of marriage, stating:
Perhaps it is difficult for Plaintiffs to understand how
rights won can be delayed. It is a truth that our judicial
system can act with stunning quickness, as this Court has;
and then with sometimes maddening slowness. One judge
may decide a case, but ultimately others have a final say.
It is the entire process, however, which gives our judicial
system and our judges such high credibility and
acceptance. This is the way of our Constitution.
Id. at 558. That conclusion is only further warranted on this appeal, to a court with
“final say” on the Constitutional “conflict” engendered herein.
In the foregoing marriage cases, the stays entered preserved natural marriage
laws upheld by this Court in DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), and
absolutely barred same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses (or having
marriage licenses recognized) until appeals were resolved. But here, the named
Plaintiffs can indisputably obtain a Kentucky marriage license even with this Court’s
stay of the Injunction pending appeal, from more than 130 marriage licensing
locations spread throughout Kentucky. Without dispute, nothing physically or
economically prevents these named Plaintiffs from obtaining a marriage license
from any of these locations. Moreover, Davis’ claims are based upon enumerated

8
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and individual Constitutional and statutory rights and protections that she holds as a
person, which predate and survive Obergefell.
I.

Davis has a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of her appeal to
warrant an immediate stay.
To support a motion for stay pending appeal, the moving party “need not

always establish a high probability of success on the merits.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d
at 153; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2001). Instead,
“[t]he probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to
the amount of irreparable injury [the moving party] will suffer absent the say. Simply
stated, more of one excuses less of the other.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 153 (internal
citation omitted). In other words, “a stay may be granted with either a high
probability of success and some injury or vice versa.” State of Ohio v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1987). The moving party must still
show “more than the mere ‘possibility’ of success on the merits,” which can be done
by identifying “serious questions going to the merits.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 15354 (internal quotations omitted). Critically, Davis “can satisfy this element where
substantial legal questions or matters of first impression are at issue and the equities
favor maintaining the status quo.” See, e.g., Simon Prop. Group, Inc. v. Taubman
Ctrs., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also United States v.
Coffman, No. 09-181, 2010 WL 4683761, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 12, 2010) (granting
motion to stay pending appeal after finding that “this case will present the Sixth
9
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Circuit with an issue of first impression”). Thus, to grant a stay, this Court need not
conclude, at this point, that the district court was wrong on the merits. Instead, this
Court need only conclude that this case raises “serious questions” going to the
merits, or a matter of first impression, left unanswered by Obergefell—which did
not overturn the First Amendment or overwrite other religious liberty protections.
This case presents substantial legal matters of first impression for this (or any
other) federal appeals court following Obergefell. As the district court concluded,
this case presents a constitutional “debate,” “conflict,” and “tension” between “two
individual liberties held sacrosanct in American jurisprudence”—one enumerated
and express (Davis’ religious freedom), and the other unenumerated (right to marry).
See D.E. 43 at 2, 16; D.E. 52 at 1 (reiterating the existence of a constitutional
“debate”); see also, e.g., D.E. 21, Hr’g Tr. (7/13/15), at 84:3-4, 85:20-22, 98:19-22,
99:19-21, 103:15-18, 104:8-9 (prior statements from district court acknowledging
that Davis’ fundamental rights are implicated in this case). The district court has now
rendered a decision on the constitutional “debate” at issue—but that answer should
not be forced upon Davis until her appeal is finally resolved. To ensure Davis’
fundamental and “sacrosanct” rights remain protected while this Court resolves the
“conflict” identified (but wrongly decided) by the district court, a stay of the
Injunction pending appeal is appropriate. This conclusion is only further compelled
here, where Davis’ own motion for injunctive relief—specifically requesting an
10

Case: 15-5880

Document: 15-1

Filed: 08/19/2015

Page: 12

(12 of 313)

accommodation from the SSM Mandate and a preliminary exemption “from having
to authorize the issuance of Kentucky marriage licenses” (see D.E. 39-7)—was
pending (but not decided) when the district court issued its Injunction.
Moreover, as will be further addressed in Davis’ subsequent appellate filings,
Davis’ inability to authorize and approve SSM licenses bearing her imprimatur
against her religious conscience is protected by the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions, along with the Kentucky RFRA. See U.S. CONST., amend I; KY.
CONST., §§ 1, 5; KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350. The Kentucky RFRA protects a person’s
“right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief,” and this religious freedom right “may not be substantially burdened unless
the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the
least restrictive means to further that interest.” KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350; see also
Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 427 (6th Cir. 2002) (Free Exercise
Clause “protects not only the right to hold a particular religious belief, but also the
right to engage in conduct motivated by that belief.”).7 As such, the Kentucky RFRA
protects not only a person’s beliefs but also a person’s actions (or non-actions) based

Because Davis’ free exercise claim is combined with a free speech claim, her
free exercise claim is also subject to strict scrutiny. See Employment Div., Dep’t of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
7

11
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thereon, and subjugates to the strictest scrutiny any governmental action infringing
religiously-motivated actions (or non-actions).
The Kentucky RFRA is similar to (but goes even further in protecting
religious liberties than) the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“Federal
RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) & (b), which was enacted to “provide very broad
protection for religious liberty,” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct.
2751, 2760 (2014), and imposes “the most demanding test known to constitutional
law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). Thus, Gov. Beshear’s SSM
Mandate—the state action here—must survive strict scrutiny, which the district
court acknowledged but failed to apply. See D.E. 43 at 18, 27.
Although the district court concluded that the burden on Davis is “more
slight,” see D.E. 43 at 27, that conclusion is out-of-step with Supreme Court
precedent analyzing substantial burdens on religious freedom under the analogous
Federal RFRA, and also reaches a different result than a proposed Kentucky
legislative act on what constitutes a substantial burden post-Obergefell.8 The
prescribed form under Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate provided no opportunity for
the religious objector Davis not to participate in endorsement and approval of SSM.

8

This bill would expressly protect clerks like Davis from having to issue SSM
licenses, amending the Kentucky RFRA to state expressly that “[i]ssuing or
recording” a SSM license can be considered a “substantial burden for which there is
no compelling government interest.” See D.E. 39-6, An Act Relating to Marriage,
Ky. House Bill 101 (2016 Reg. Sess.).
12
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Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the “authorization” or permission to
marry unmistakably comes from Davis. Davis is also required to put her name
and imprimatur no less than two times on each and every marriage license she
issues. But Davis cannot authorize a union of two persons which, in her sincerelyheld belief, is not marriage.9 In concluding that the act of issuing SSM licenses
would not severely burden Davis’ religious convictions because such act would not
implicate moral or religious approval of SSM, the district court essentially told Davis
what her religious convictions should be, instead of recognizing the undisputed fact
of what her religious convictions actually are, and that those convictions
unmistakably bar her from issuing SSM licenses with her name plastered on them.10
Under the required strict scrutiny analysis, only a compelling governmental
interest—in infringing upon Davis’ inability to authorize and approve SSM
licenses—which is “beyond broadly formulated interests” and shows harm in
granting a “specific exemption” to this “particular religious claimant” will suffice.
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirata Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
See D.E. 26, Hr’g Tr. (7/20/15), Davis Direct, at 31:7-14, 32:4-7, 38:9-17,
40:24-41:3, 41:24-42:1, 42:17-20 (“Because if I say that I authorize that, I’m saying
I agree with it, and I can’t.”); id. at 43:2-5; Hr’g Tr. (7/20/15), Davis Cross, at 61:1519, 62:10-12 (“[M]y religious beliefs can’t condone issuing and being a party to the
issuance of same-sex marriage licenses.”), 67:5-7; id., Davis Redirect, 75:16-19,
80:16-18; see also id., Blevins Cross, at 17:3-6 (“[Davis] did tell me early on, before
the decision was made, that if it was to allow same-sex marriage that she could not
do that in her moral judgment. She just could not do it.”).
10
See note 9, supra.
9
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430-31 (2006). But even if this showing can be made, the infringement upon Davis
must still satisfy the “exceptionally demanding” least-restrictive-means standard.
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2780. This test may “require the Government to
expend additional funds” to accommodate “religious beliefs.” Hobby Lobby, 134
S.Ct. at 2781. In this matter, even if the “desired goal” is providing Plaintiffs with
Kentucky marriage licenses in Rowan County11, see Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at
2780, numerous less restrictive means are available to accomplish it without
substantially burdening Davis’ religious freedom and conscience, such as:


Providing an opt-out or exemption to the Kentucky marriage licensing
scheme (as exists for the Kentucky fish and wildlife licensing scheme),
KY. REV. STAT. § 150.195, and as other states, such as North Carolina
have enacted, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 51-5.5;



Deputizing a neighboring county clerk (or some other person) to issue
Kentucky marriage licenses in Rowan County;



Modifying the prescribed Kentucky marriage license form to remove
the multiple references to Davis’ name, and thus to remove the personal
nature of the authorization that Davis must provide on the current form;



Deeming Davis “absent” for purposes of issuing SSM licenses, based
upon her moral and religious inability to issue them, and allowing those
licenses to be issued by the chief executive of Rowan County, as
specifically authorized by Kentucky law, see KY. REV. STAT. §
402.240;



Distributing Kentucky marriage licenses at the state-level through an
online or other state-wide licensing scheme; or

11

Nothing in Obergefell suggests that Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to
receive a marriage license from a particular clerk, in a particular county.
14
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Calling a special legislative session to address Kentucky’s entire
marriage licensing scheme post-Obergefell.

All of the foregoing options, and others, are available to avoid substantially
burdening Davis’ personal religious freedom in the wake of the redefinition of
marriage in Obergefell. The nature of Davis’ religious objection is more firmly
established in history than perhaps any other religious conscience objection because
the “meaning of marriage” as a union between one man and one woman “has
persisted in every culture,” “has formed the basis of human society for millennia,”
and has singularly “prevailed in the United States throughout our history.”
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612-13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In fact, the majority in
Obergefell conceded that the institution of marriage as exclusively a union between
a man and a woman “has existed for millennia and across civilizations” and this view
“long has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith by reasonable and
sincere people here and throughout the world.” Id. at 2594 (Kennedy, J.,
majority) (emphasis added). Thus, although the traditional view of marriage was
discarded by the majority in Obergefell, that long-held view of marriage provides
the historical underpinnings for a religious exemption and accommodation from the
redefinition of marriage under the First Amendment and Kentucky RFRA.
The mandate commanding Davis to affix her name to SSM licenses also
violates her fundamental free speech rights protected by the United States and
15
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Kentucky Constitutions. The Free Speech Clause protects “both what to say and
what not to say,” Riley v. Nat’l Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797
(1988) (emphasis added), and states may not “force[] an individual, as part of [their]
daily life” to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point
of view [he/she] finds unacceptable.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1976).
The Kentucky marriage form uses the word “marriage” at six different places on the
form (not including the reference to “join[ing] together in the state of matrimony”),
twice designates Davis as the person authorizing the marriage license, and requires
the stamping of her name and endorsement on the proposed union. See KY. REV.
STAT. § 402.100(3). For Gov. Beshear to state that Kentucky is issuing and
recognizing SSM licenses is one thing. But commanding Davis to be an “instrument”
for a message, view, and proposed union that she finds “morally objectionable” and
“repugnant to [her] moral and religious beliefs” is altogether different, and violates
not only her conscience, but also her free speech rights. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
Further, compelling Davis to authorize marriages against her sincerely held
religious beliefs about marriage constitutes an improper religious test for holding (or
maintaining) public office. Davis is being arm-twisted to either participate in the
issuance of SSM licenses (her conscience be damned) or resign, since holding public
office is her choice (her livelihood, qualifications, and public service be damned).
But the fact “that a person is not compelled to hold office” is not an excuse for Gov.
16
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Beshear to impose constitutionally-forbidden, conscience-violating criteria for
office. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961). Like a non-combatant
whose “religious scruples” prevent him from shouldering a rifle, Davis may still
“faithfully and devotedly” serve her county without approving SSM licenses. See
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946).
II.

Davis is more harmed than Plaintiffs absent a stay pending appeal.
In weighing the harm that will occur as a result of granting or denying a stay,

this Court generally considers three factors: “(1) the substantiality of the injury
alleged; (2) the likelihood of its occurrence; and (3) the adequacy of the proof
provided.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 154. The “key word” in this consideration is
“irreparable,” and the harm must be “both certain and immediate, rather than
speculative or theoretical.” Id. The impending harm to Davis satisfies this standard,
and outweighs any purported harm to Plaintiffs.
Nothing is physically or economically preventing the named Plaintiffs in this
case from obtaining a marriage license elsewhere in Kentucky. As a matter of
Kentucky law, individuals may obtain a marriage license from the county clerk in
any one of Kentucky’s 120 counties (and the more than 130 marriage licensing
locations), irrespective of their county of residence. See KY. REV. STAT. § 402.080.
Plaintiffs concede they can obtain Kentucky marriage licenses in another county and
from someone other than Davis. They simply chose (and choose) not to. As such,
17
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Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable and irreversible injury if resolution is postponed
to await this Court’s decision on the merits. This conclusion comports with the stay
orders pending appeal entered by this Court in DeBoer and Tanco, and by Western
District of Kentucky Judge Heyburn in Bourke. But, since those stay orders
prohibited the issuance of SSM licenses or recognition of same-sex “marriage” in
their entirety, the potential purported harm to Plaintiffs here is far less.
In stark contrast, Davis faces significant, irrevocable, and irreversible harm if
she is forced to authorize and approve even one SSM license with her name on it,
against her religious conscience, for “it is well-settled that ‘loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury.’” Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998)
(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). If such rights “are not jealously
safeguarded, persons will be deterred, even if imperceptibly, from exercising those
rights in the future.” Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 1989).
There is no “adequate compensatory or other corrective relief” that “will be
available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation” (including a permanent
injunction in her favor) if Davis is forced to violate her religious conscience now.
See Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 153. It is comparable to forcing the religious objecting
nurse to perform an abortion, the religious objecting company or non-profit to pay
for abortions or abortion-related insurance coverage, the religious objecting non18
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combatant to fire on an enemy soldier, or the religious objecting state official to
participate in or attend the execution of a convicted prisoner. Ordering Davis to
authorize and approve a SSM license is the act that violates her conscience and
substantially burdens her religious freedom – an act which cannot be undone.
Importantly, Davis is not claiming a substantial burden on her religious freedom if
someone else authorizes and approves a SSM license devoid of her name.
Finally, the harm to Davis is not speculative but imminent. The searing act of
her conscience is authorizing a SSM license bearing her imprimatur (see, e.g., D.E.
29 at 14-15, 18-20; D.E. 39-1 at 15-18, 21-25); Plaintiffs insist on having no one
other than Davis approve their proposed union (see D.E. 21, Hr’g Tr. (7/13/15),
Miller Direct, at 29:9-12; id., Spartman Direct, at 47:8-10; D.E. 46, 46-2); and the
district court has ordered Davis to approve SSM licenses (see D.E. 43). This
impending harm to Davis’ conscience outweighs any travel inconveniences on
Plaintiffs, who can obtain (or could have already obtained) a marriage license from
more than 130 licensing locations across Kentucky while the appeal is pending.
III.

The public interest favors granting a stay.
When it comes to the “protection of First Amendment liberties,” the public

has a “significant interest.” Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher,
70 F.3d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the Injunction significantly changes
the relative position of the parties and, in fact, completely alters (prematurely) the
19
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status quo existing between the parties at a time when there is ongoing public debate
in Kentucky between the SSM Mandate and religious liberty. See S. Milk Sales, Inc.
v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (an essential purpose of a preliminary
injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits
can be held”) (citation omitted). This Court will have a chance to review the district
court’s constitutional and statutory determinations. To ensure that Davis’ conscience
and rights are not forever and irreversibly violated, this Court should stay the
Injunction pending appeal.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Appellant Kim Davis respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant
immediate consideration and (2) enter an order staying the district court’s August
12, 2015 order pending final resolution of the appeal in this Court.
DATED: August 19, 2015

Respectfully submitted:

/s/ Jonathan D. Christman
A.C. Donahue
Horatio G. Mihet, Counsel of Record
Donahue Law Group, P.S.C.
Roger K. Gannam
P.O. Box 659
Jonathan D. Christman
Somerset, Kentucky 42502
Liberty Counsel, P.O. Box 540774
(606) 677-2741
Orlando, Florida 32854
ACDonahue@DonahueLawGroup.com (800) 671-1776
hmihet@lc.org / rgannam@lc.org /
jchristman@lc.org
Counsel for Appellant Kim Davis
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of August, 2015, I caused the foregoing
document to be filed electronically with the Court, where it is available for viewing
and downloading from the Court’s ECF system, and that such electronic filing
automatically generates a Notice of Electronic Filing constituting service of the filed
document upon the following:
William Ellis Sharp
ACLU of Kentucky
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40202
sharp@aclu-ky.org
Daniel J. Canon
Laura E. Landenwich
Clay Daniel Walton Adams, PLC
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101
Louisville, KY 40202
dan@justiceky.com
laura@justiceky.com
Counsel for Appellees

/s/ Jonathan D. Christman
Jonathan D. Christman
Liberty Counsel
P.O. Box 540774
Orlando, Florida 32854
(800) 671-1776
jchristman@lc.org
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
ASHLAND DIVISION
APRIL MILLER, ET AL.,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiffs,
v.
KIM DAVIS, ET AL.,
Defendants.

KIM DAVIS,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN L. BESHEAR, in his official
capacity as Governor of Kentucky, and
WAYNE ONKST, in his official capacity
as State Librarian and Commissioner,
Kentucky Department for Libraries and
Archives,
Third-Party Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION
0:15-CV-00044-DLB
DISTRICT JUDGE
DAVID L. BUNNING

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Kim Davis (“Davis”), by and
through her undersigned counsel, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit from the August 12, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (D.E. 43).
A copy of the August 12, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order from which Davis appeals
is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”
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Davis has paid by ECF online payment in the amount of $505.00 for the notice of appeal
fee specified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Fee
Schedule.
The parties to the order appealed from and the names and addresses of their attorneys are
as follows:
Plaintiffs: April Miller, Karen Ann Roberts, Shantel Burke, Stephen Napier, Jody
Fernandez, Kevin Holloway, L. Aaron Skaggs, and Barry Spartman
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Daniel J. Canon
L. Joe Dunman
Laura E. Landenwich
CLAY DANIEL WALTON ADAMS, PLC
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101
Louisville, KY 40202
William Ellis Sharp
ACLU OF KENTUCKY
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40202
Defendant: Rowan County
Attorneys for Rowan County:
Jeffrey C. Mando
Claire Parsons
ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & DUSING, PLLC
40 West Pike Street
Covington, KY 41011
Third-Party Defendants: Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky and Wayne Onkst,
Commissioner of Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives
Attorneys for Gov. Beshear and Commr. Onkst:
No appearances have yet been filed.
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DATED: August 12, 2015
A.C. Donahue
Donahue Law Group, P.S.C.
P.O. Box 659
Somerset, Kentucky 42502
Tel: (606) 677-2741
Fax: (606) 678-2977
ACDonahue@DonahueLawGroup.com

Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Jonathan D. Christman
Roger K. Gannam
Jonathan D. Christman
Liberty Counsel
P.O. Box 540774
Orlando, Florida 32854
Tel: (800) 671-1776
Fax: (407) 875-0770
rgannam@lc.org
jchristman@lc.org
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff
Kim Davis
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed via the Court’s ECF
filing system and therefore service will be effectuated by the Court’s electronic notification system
upon all counsel or parties of record:
Daniel J. Canon
L. Joe Dunman
Laura E. Landenwich
CLAY DANIEL WALTON ADAMS, PLC
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101
Louisville, KY 40202
dan@justiceky.com
joe@justiceky.com
laura@justiceky.com

Jeffrey C. Mando
Claire Parsons
ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN &
DUSING, PLLC
40 West Pike Street
Covington, KY 41011
jmando@aswdlaw.com
cparsons@aswdlaw.com
Attorneys for Rowan County

William Ellis Sharp
ACLU OF KENTUCKY
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40202
sharp@aclu-ky.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

I also hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing will be sent via
U.S.P.S. first class mail to the Attorney General of Kentucky on behalf of Third-Party Defendants
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, and Wayne Onkst, Commissioner of the Kentucky
Department for Libraries and Archives, at the following location:
Attorney General Jack Conway
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 118
Frankfort, KY 40601-3449

DATED: August 12, 2015

/s/ Jonathan D. Christman_______
Jonathan D. Christman
Attorney for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff
Kim Davis
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-44-DLB
APRIL MILLER, et al.

vs.

PLAINTIFFS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KIM DAVIS, individually and in her official capacity, et al.

DEFENDANTS

***********************
I.

Introduction
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc.

# 2). Plaintiffs are two same-sex and two opposite-sex couples seeking to enjoin Rowan
County Clerk Kim Davis from enforcing her own marriage licensing policy. On June 26,
2015, just hours after the U.S. Supreme Court held that states are constitutionally required
to recognize same-sex marriage, Davis announced that the Rowan County Clerk’s Office
would no longer issue marriage licenses to any couples. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Davis, an Apostolic Christian with a sincere religious objection to
same-sex marriage, specifically sought to avoid issuing licenses to same-sex couples
without discriminating against them. Plaintiffs now allege that this “no marriage licenses”
policy substantially interferes with their right to marry because it effectively forecloses them
from obtaining a license in their home county. Davis insists that her policy poses only an
incidental burden on Plaintiffs’ right to marry, which is justified by the need to protect her
own free exercise rights.
1
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The Court held preliminary injunction hearings on July 13, 2015 and July 20, 2015.
Plaintiffs April Miller, Karen Roberts, Jody Fernandez, Kevin Holloway, Barry Spartman,
Aaron Skaggs, Shantel Burke and Stephen Napier were represented by William Sharp of
the Americans for Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and Daniel Canon. Jonathan Christman
and Roger Gannam, both of the Liberty Counsel, and A.C. Donahue appeared on behalf
of Defendant Kim Davis.

Rowan County Attorney Cecil Watkins and Jeff Mando

represented Defendant Rowan County. Official Court Reporters Peggy Weber and Lisa
Wiesman recorded the proceedings. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the Court
submitted the Motion pending receipt of the parties’ response and reply briefs. The Court
having received those filings (Docs. # 28, 29 and 36), this matter is now ripe for review.
At its core, this civil action presents a conflict between two individual liberties held
sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. One is the fundamental right to marry implicitly
recognized in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The other is the
right to free exercise of religion explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment. Each party
seeks to exercise one of these rights, but in doing so, they threaten to infringe upon the
opposing party’s rights. The tension between these constitutional concerns can be
resolved by answering one simple question: Does the Free Exercise Clause likely excuse
Kim Davis from issuing marriage licenses because she has a religious objection to samesex marriage? For reasons stated herein, the Court answers this question in the negative.
II.

Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs April Miller and Karen Roberts have been in a committed same-sex

relationship for eleven years. (Doc. # 21 at 25). After hearing about the Obergefell
decision, they went to the Rowan County Clerk’s Office and requested a marriage license
2
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from one of the deputy clerks. (Id. at 25-26). The clerk immediately excused herself and
went to speak with Kim Davis. (Id. at 28). When she returned, she informed the couple
that the Rowan County Clerk’s Office was not issuing any marriage licenses. (Id.).
Plaintiffs Kevin Holloway and Jody Fernandez, a committed opposite-sex couple, had a
similar experience when they tried to obtain a marriage license from the Rowan County
Clerk’s Office. (Id. at 36).
Both couples went straight to Rowan County Judge Executive Walter Blevins and
asked him to issue their marriage licenses. (Id. at 30-32, 36). Blevins explained that,
under Kentucky law, a county judge executive can only issue licenses when the elected
county clerk is absent. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.240. Because Davis continued to
perform her other duties as Rowan County Clerk, Blevins concluded that she was not
“absent” within the meaning of the statute. (Id.). Therefore, he did not believe that he had
the authority to issue their marriage licenses. (Id.).
Plaintiffs Barry Spartman and Aaron Skaggs also planned to solemnize their longterm relationship post-Obergefell. (Id. at 42-44). Before going to the Rowan County
Clerk’s Office, they phoned ahead and asked for information about the marriage licensing
process. (Id.). They wanted to make sure that they brought all necessary documentation
with them. (Id.). One of the deputy clerks told the couple “not to bother coming down”
because they would not be issued a license. (Id.).
Seven neighboring counties (Bath, Fleming, Lewis, Carter, Elliott, Morgan and
Menifee) are currently issuing marriage licenses. (Doc. # 26 at 53). All are less than an
hour away from the Rowan County seat of Morehead. (Id.). While Plaintiffs have the
means to travel to any one of these counties, they have admittedly chosen not to do so.
3
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(Doc. # 21 at 38, 48). They strongly prefer to have their licenses issued in Rowan County
because they have significant ties to that community. (Id. at 28-29, 47). They live, work,
socialize, vote, pay taxes and conduct other business in and around Morehead. (Id.).
Quite simply, Rowan County is their home.
According to Kim Davis, the Rowan County Clerk’s Office serves as a “pass through
collection agency” for the State of Kentucky. (Doc. # 26 at 24-25). She and her six deputy
clerks regularly handle delinquent taxes, oversee elections, manage voter registration and
issue hunting and fishing licenses. (Id.). A portion of the fees collected in exchange for
these services is used to fund the Office’s activities throughout the year. (Id.). The
remainder is remitted to the State. (Id.).
Under Kentucky law, county clerks are also responsible for issuing marriage
licenses.1 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.080. The process is quite simple. The couple
must first go to the county clerk’s office and provide their biographical information to one
of the clerks. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.100. The clerk then enters the information into
a computer-generated form, prints it and signs it. Id. This form signifies that the couple is
licensed, or legally qualified, to marry.2 Id. At the appropriate time, the couple presents
this form to their officiant, who must certify that he or she performed a valid marriage
ceremony. Id. The couple then has thirty days to return the form to the clerk’s office for

1) This task requires relatively few resources, at least in Rowan County. (Doc. # 26 at 24-30). Davis testified
that her Office issued 212 marriage licenses in 2014. Marriage licenses cost $35.50. (Id.). Of that sum, the
Office retains $21.17, and remits the remaining $14.33 to the State. (Id.). Thus, Rowan County Clerk’s Office
made about $4,500, or roughly 0.1% of its annual budget, from issuing marriage licenses in 2014. (Id.). Davis
also estimated that the task of issuing marriage licenses occupies one hour of one deputy clerk’s time per
week. (Id.).
2) A couple is “legally qualified” to marry if both individuals are over the age of eighteen, mentally competent,
unrelated to each other and currently unmarried. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.010, 402.020(a)-(d), (f).
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recording. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.220, 402.230. The State will not recognize
marriages entered into without a valid license therefor. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.080.
The Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives (“KDLA”) prescribes the abovementioned form, which must be used by all county clerks in issuing marriage licenses.3 Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.100, 402.110. It is composed of three sections, which correspond
to the steps detailed above: (1) a marriage license, to be completed by a county or deputy
clerk; (2) a marriage certificate, to be completed by a qualified officiant; and (3) a recording
statement, to be completed by a county or deputy clerk. The marriage license section has
the following components:
(a)

An authorization statement of the county clerk issuing the
license for any person or religious society authorized to
perform marriage ceremonies to unite in marriage the persons
named;

(b)

Vital information for each party, including the full name, date of
birth, place of birth, race, condition (single, widowed, or
divorced), number of previous marriages, occupation, current
residence, relationship to the other party, and full names of
parents; and

(c)

The date and place the license is issued, and the signature of
the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.100(1) (emphasis added).
Davis does not want to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples because they
will bear the above-mentioned authorization statement. She sees it as an endorsement of
same-sex marriage, which runs contrary to her Apostolic Christian beliefs. (Id. at 42). Four
of Davis’ deputy clerks share her religious objection to same-sex marriage, and another is

3) Only one aspect of the form has changed since Obergefell–whereas the marriage applicants were once
referred to as “Bride” and “Groom,” they are now identified as “First Party” and “Second Party.”
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undecided on the subject. (Id. at 49). The final deputy clerk is willing to issue the licenses,
but Davis will not allow it because her name and title still appear twice on licenses that she
does not personally sign. (Doc. # 29-3 at 7).
In the wake of Obergefell, Governor Beshear issued the following directive to all
county clerks:
Effective today, Kentucky will recognize as valid all same sex marriages
performed in other states and in Kentucky. In accordance with my
instruction, all executive branch agencies are already working to make any
operational changes that will be necessary to implement the Supreme Court
decision. Now that same-sex couples are entitled to the issuance of a
marriage license, the Department of Libraries and Archives will be sending
a gender-neutral form to you today, along with instructions for its use.
(Doc. # 29-3 at 11). He has since addressed some of the religious concerns expressed by
some county clerks:
You can continue to have your own personal beliefs but, you’re also taking
an oath to fulfill the duties prescribed by law, and if you are at that point to
where your personal convictions tell you that you simply cannot fulfill your
duties that you were elected to do, th[e]n obviously an honorable course to
take is to resign and let someone else step in who feels that they can fulfill
those duties.
(Doc. # 29-11). Davis is well aware of these directives. Nevertheless, she plans to
implement her “no marriage licenses” policy for the remaining three and a half years of her
term as Rowan County Clerk. (Doc. # 26 at 67).
III.

Standard of Review
A district court must consider four factors when entertaining a motion for preliminary

injunction:
(1)

whether the movant has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success
on the merits;

(2)

whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm;
6
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(3)

whether an injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and

(4)

whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of such
an injunction.

See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir. 1998). These “are factors to be
balanced, and not prerequisites that must be met.” In re Eagle Picher Indus., Inc., 963 F.3d
855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating further that these factors “simply guide the discretion of
the court”).
IV.

Analysis
A.

Defendant Kim Davis in her official capacity

Plaintiffs are pursuing this civil rights action against Defendants Rowan County and
Kim Davis, in her individual and official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . .
This statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
(internal quotations omitted).
At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs seek to vindicate their constitutional rights by
obtaining injunctive relief against Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as Rowan
County Clerk. Because official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,” one might assume that
Plaintiffs are effectively pursuing injunctive relief against Rowan County. Monell v. New
7
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York City Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). However, Rowan County
can only be held liable under § 1983 if its policy or custom caused the constitutional
deprivation. Id. at 694.
A single decision made by an official with final policymaking authority in the relevant
area may qualify as a policy attributable to the entity. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 482-83 (1986). Whether an official acted as a final policymaker is a question of
state or local law. Id. However, courts must avoid categorizing an official as a state or
municipal actor “in some categorical, ‘all or nothing’ manner.” McMillian v. Monroe Cnty.,
Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997).

They key inquiry is whether an official is a “final

policymaker [ ] for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court will focus on whether Davis likely acted as a final policymaker for
Rowan County regarding the issuance of marriage licenses.
While Davis is the elected Rowan County Clerk, subject to very little oversight by the
Rowan County Fiscal Court, there are no other facts in the record to suggest that she set
marriage policy for Rowan County.

After all, the State of Kentucky has “absolute

jurisdiction over the regulation of the institution of marriage.” Pinkhasov v. Petocz, 331
S.W.3d 285, 291 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011). The State not only enacts marriage laws, it
prescribes procedures for county clerks to follow when carrying out those laws, right down
to the form they must use in issuing marriage licenses. Id.; see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 402.080, 402.100. Thus, Davis likely acts for the State of Kentucky, and not as a final
policymaker for Rowan County, when issuing marriage licenses.
This preliminary finding does not necessarily foreclose Plaintiffs from obtaining
injunctive relief against Davis. While the Eleventh Amendment typically bars Plaintiffs from
8
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bringing suit against a state or its officials, “official-capacity actions for prospective relief are
not treated as actions against the state.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14
(1985). This narrow exception, known as the Ex Parte Young doctrine, permits a federal
court to “enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal
law.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908)). “It rests on the premise–less delicately called a ‘fiction,’–that when a federal court
commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is
not the State for sovereign immunity purposes.” Va. Office for Prot. and Advocacy v.
Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011). Because Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Davis from
violating their federal constitutional rights, this Court has the power to grant relief under Ex
Parte Young.4
B.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
1.

Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits
a.

The fundamental right to marry

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This “due
process” clause has both a procedural component and a substantive component. See EJS
Prop., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 2012). Procedural due process
simply requires that the government provide a fair procedure when depriving an individual
of life, liberty or property. Id. By contrast, substantive due process “protects a narrow class

4) In their reply brief, Plaintiffs argued that the Court need not decide whether Davis is a state actor or
municipal policymaker in order to grant injunctive relief. The Court’s preliminary finding on this matter does
not necessarily foreclose Plaintiffs from arguing the “municipal policymaker” theory in the future. The Court
simply seeks to ensure that it is indeed able to grant injunctive relief against Kim Davis in her official capacity.
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of interests, including those enumerated in the Constitution, those so rooted in the
traditions of the people as to be ranked fundamental, and the interest in freedom from
government actions that ‘shock the conscience.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588 (6th
Cir. 2014).
Although the Constitution makes no mention of the right to marry, the U.S. Supreme
Court has identified it as a fundamental interest subject to Fourteenth Amendment
protection.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s anti-

miscegenation statutes as violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment). After all, “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
Id. This right applies with equal force to different-sex and same-sex couples. Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment same-sex couples may not be deprived of that right
and that liberty.”).
If a state law or policy “significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right[, it] cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and
is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388
(1978). A state substantially interferes with the right to marry when some members of the
affected class “are absolutely prevented from getting married” and “[m]any others, able in
theory to satisfy the statute’s requirements[,] will be sufficiently burdened by having to do
so that they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry.” Id. at 387
(invalidating a Wisconsin statute that required individuals with child support obligations to
10
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obtain a court order before marrying).
However, “not every state action, ‘which relates in any way to the incidents of or the
prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.’” Wright v. MetroHealth
Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386). States
may impose “reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marital relationship.” Id. at 1135. If the statute does not create a “direct legal
obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married” or significantly discourage marriage,
then it will be upheld so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Id. (quoting Zablocki 434 U.S. at 387-88 n. 12); see also Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54
n.11 (1977) (upholding a Social Security provision that terminated secondary benefits
received by the disabled dependent child of a covered wage earner if that child married an
individual who was not entitled to benefits).
The state action at issue in this case is Defendant Davis’ refusal to issue any
marriage licenses. Plaintiffs contend that Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy significantly
interferes with their right to marry because they are unable to obtain a license in their home
county. Davis insists that her policy does not significantly discourage Plaintiffs from
marrying because they have several other options for obtaining licenses: (1) they may go
to one of the seven neighboring counties that are issuing marriage licenses; (2) they may
obtain licenses from Rowan County Judge Executive Walter Blevins; or (3) they may avail
themselves of other alternatives being considered post-Obergefell.
Davis is correct in stating that Plaintiffs can obtain marriage licenses from one of the
surrounding counties; thus, they are not totally precluded from marrying in Kentucky.
However, this argument ignores the fact that Plaintiffs have strong ties to Rowan County.
11

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 43 Filed:
15-3
08/12/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 12 of 28Page:
- Page
13ID#: 1157
(40 of 313)

They are long-time residents who live, work, pay taxes, vote and conduct other business
in Morehead. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Plaintiffs would prefer
to obtain their marriage licenses in their home county. And for other Rowan County
residents, it may be more than a preference. The surrounding counties are only thirty
minutes to an hour away, but there are individuals in this rural region of the state who
simply do not have the physical, financial or practical means to travel.5
This argument also presupposes that Rowan County will be the only Kentucky
county not issuing marriage licenses. While Davis may be the only clerk currently turning
away eligible couples, 57 of the state’s 120 elected county clerks have asked Governor
Beshear to call a special session of the state legislature to address religious concerns
related to same-sex marriage licenses.6 (Doc. # 29-9). If this Court were to hold that
Davis’ policy did not significantly interfere with the right to marry, what would stop the other
56 clerks from following Davis’ approach? What might be viewed as an inconvenience for
residents of one or two counties quickly becomes a substantial interference when
applicable to approximately half of the state.
As for her assertion that Judge Blevins may issue marriage licenses, Davis is only
partially correct. KRS § 402.240 provides that, “[i]n the absence of the county clerk, or

5) The median household income in Rowan County is $35,236 and 28.6% of the population lives below the
poverty line. See United States Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21205.html. For
the entire state of Kentucky, the median household income is $43,036 and 18.8% of the population lives below
the poverty line. Id.
6) See also Jack Brammer, 57 County Clerks Ask Governor for Special Session on Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses, The Lexington Herald Leader (July 8, 2015),
http://www.kentucky.com/2015/07/08/3936545_57-kentucky-county-clerks-ask.html?rh=1; Terry DeMio,
Boone, Ky. Clerks Want Same-Sex License Law, Cincinnati Enquirer (July 9, 2015),
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/local/northern-ky/2015/07/09/boone-clerk-wants-special-legislative-s
ession-address-sex-marriage-issues-clerks/29919103/.

12
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during a vacancy in the office, the county judge/executive may issue the license and, in so
doing, he shall perform the duties and incur all the responsibilities of the clerk.” The statute
does not explicitly define “absence,” suggesting that a traditional interpretation of the term
is

appropriate.

See

Merriam-Webster

Online

Dictionary,

2015,

http://www.merriam-webster.com/, (describing “absence” as “a period of time when
someone is not present at a place, job, etc.”). However, Davis asks the Court to deem her
“absent,” for purposes of this statute, because she has a religious objection to issuing the
licenses. While this is certainly a creative interpretation, Davis offers no legal precedent
to support it.
This proposal also has adverse consequences for Judge Blevins. If he began
issuing marriage licenses while Davis continued to perform her other duties as Rowan
County Clerk, he would likely be exceeding the scope of his office. After all, KRS § 402.240
only authorizes him to issue marriage licenses when Davis is unable to do so; it does not
permit him to assume responsibility for duties that Davis does not wish to perform. Such
an arrangement not only has the potential to create tension between the next judge
executive and county clerk, it sets the stage for further manipulation of statutorily defined
duties.7 Under these circumstances, the Court simply cannot count this as a viable option
for Plaintiffs to obtain their marriage licenses.

7) Even if the Court were inclined to accept Davis’ interpretation of the term “absence,” it would have doubts
about the practicality of this approach. Judge Blevins is the highest elected official in Rowan County. (Doc.
# 26 at 7). He is frequently out of the office on official business. (Id.). While Judge Blevins would not have
to process a large number of marriage requests, he might not be regularly available for couples seeking
licenses. Thus, the Court would be concerned about Judge Blevins’ ability to perform this function as efficiently
as Davis and her six deputy clerks.

13
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Davis finally suggests that Plaintiffs will have other avenues for obtaining marriage
licenses in the future. For example, county clerks have urged Governor Beshear to create
an online marriage licensing system, which would be managed by the State of Kentucky.
While these options may be available someday, they are not feasible alternatives at
present. Thus, they have no impact on the Court’s “substantial interference” analysis.
Having considered Davis’ arguments in depth, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
one feasible avenue for obtaining their marriage licenses–they must go to another county.
Davis makes much of the fact that Plaintiffs are able to travel, but she fails to address the
one question that lingers in the Court’s mind. Even if Plaintiffs are able to obtain licenses
elsewhere, why should they be required to? The state has long entrusted county clerks
with the task of issuing marriage licenses. It does not seem unreasonable for Plaintiffs, as
Rowan County voters, to expect their elected official to perform her statutorily assigned
duties. And yet, that is precisely what Davis is refusing to do. Much like the statutes at
issue in Loving and Zablocki, Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy significantly discourages
many Rowan County residents from exercising their right to marry and effectively
disqualifies others from doing so. The Court must subject this policy apply heightened
scrutiny.
b.

The absence of a compelling state interest

When pressed to articulate a compelling state interest served by her “no marriage
licenses” policy, Davis responded that it serves the State’s interest in protecting her
religious freedom. The State certainly has an obligation to “observe the basic free exercise
rights of its employees,” but this is not the extent of its concerns. Marchi v. Bd. of Coop.
Educ. Serv. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 476 (2d. Cir. 1999). In fact, the State has some
14
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priorities that run contrary to Davis’ proffered state interest. Chief among these is its
interest in preventing Establishment Clause violations. See U.S. Const. amend. I (declaring
that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion”). Davis has
arguably committed such a violation by openly adopting a policy that promotes her own
religious convictions at the expenses of others.8 In such situations, “the scope of the
employees’ rights must [ ] yield to the legitimate interest of governmental employer in
avoiding litigation.” Marchi, 173 F.3d at 476.
The State also has a countervailing interest in upholding the rule of law. See
generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (“The rule of law,
evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, . . . is the great mucilage that holds
society together.”). Our form of government will not survive unless we, as a society, agree
to respect the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions, regardless of our personal opinions. Davis
is certainly free to disagree with the Court’s opinion, as many Americans likely do, but that
does not excuse her from complying with it. To hold otherwise would set a dangerous
precedent.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy
likely infringes upon Plaintiffs’ rights without serving a compelling state interest. Because
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, this
first factor weighs in favor of granting their request for relief.
2.

Potential for irreparable harm to Plaintiffs

When a plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of a

8) Although it is not the focus of this opinion, Plaintiffs have already asserted such an Establishment Clause
claim against Kim Davis in her official capacity. (Doc. # 1 at 13).

15
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constitutional deprivation claim, it follows that he or she will suffer irreparable injury absent
injunctive relief. See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578
(6th Cir. 2002) (“Courts have also held that a plaintiff can demonstrate that a denial of an
injunction will cause irreparable harm if the claim is based upon a violation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.”); see also Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th
Cir .1998) (finding that the loss of First Amendment rights for a minimal period of time
results in irreparable harm); Ohio St. Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808,
851 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (recognizing that a restriction on the fundamental right to vote
constitutes irreparable injury).
The Court is not aware of any Sixth Circuit case law explicitly stating that a denial
of the fundamental right to marry constitutes irreparable harm. However, the case law cited
above suggests that the denial of constitutional rights, enumerated or unenumerated,
results in irreparable harm. It follows that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm from Davis’
“no marriage licenses” rule, absent injunctive relief. Therefore, this second factor also
weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ Motion.
3.

Potential for substantial harm to Kim Davis
a.

The right to free exercise of religion

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

See Cantwell v.

Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the First Amendment to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment). This Free Exercise Clause “embraces two concepts,–freedom
to believe and freedom to act.” Id. at 304. “The first is absolute but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.” Id. Therefore, “[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the
16
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protection of society.” Id.
Traditionally, a free exercise challenge to a particular law triggered strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). A statute would only be upheld
if it served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to effectuate that
interest. Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has retreated slightly from this approach.
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). While laws targeting
religious conduct remain subject to strict scrutiny, “[a] law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has
the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Babalu, 508 U.S. at 532;
see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 880 (stating further that an individual’s religious beliefs do not
“excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State
is free to regulate”).
“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.” Babalu, 508 U.S.
at 532. A law is not neutral if its object “is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation.” Id. at 533 (finding that a local ordinance forbidding animal
sacrifice was not neutral because it focused on “rituals” and had built-in exemptions for
most other animal killings). The Court has not yet “defined with precision the standard used
to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application.” Id. at 543. However, it has
observed that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal
treatment,’ and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests
it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious
17
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motivation.” Id. at 542.
While Smith and Babalu do not explicitly mention the term “rational basis,” lower
courts have interpreted them as imposing a similar standard of review on neutral laws of
general applicability. See, e.g., Seger v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 453 F. App’s 630,
634 (2011). Under rational basis review, laws will be upheld if they are “rationally related
to furthering a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 635 (noting that “[a] law or regulation subject
to rational basis review is accorded a strong presumption of validity”); see also F.C.C. v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (stating generally that laws subject to
rational basis review must be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification”).
In response to Smith and Babalu, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. It prohibits the government from
“substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability,” except when the government demonstrates that the burden
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means
of furthering that interest. Id. Although Congress intended RFRA to apply to the states as
well as the federal government, the Court held that this was an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress’ powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997). Free exercise challenges to federal laws remain subject
to RFRA, while similar challenges to state policies are governed by Smith. See, e.g.,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
For purposes of this inquiry, the state action at issue is Governor Beshear’s postObergefell directive, which explicitly instructs county clerks to issue marriage licenses to
18
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same-sex couples. Davis argues that the Beshear directive not only substantially burdens
her free exercise rights by requiring her to disregard sincerely-held religious beliefs, it does
not serve a compelling state interest. She further insists that Governor Beshear could
easily grant her a religious exemption without adversely affecting Kentucky’s marriage
licensing scheme, as there are readily available alternatives for obtaining licenses in and
around Rowan County.9
This argument proceeds on the assumption that Governor Beshear’s policy is not
neutral or generally applicable, and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.10 However, the
text itself supports a contrary inference. Governor Beshear first describes the legal impact
of the Court’s decision in Obergefell, then provides guidance for all county clerks in
implementing this new law.

His goal is simply to ensure that the activities of the

Commonwealth are consistent with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
While facial neutrality is not dispositive, Davis has done little to convince the Court
that Governor Beshear’s directive aims to suppress religious practice. She has only one
piece of anecdotal evidence to demonstrate that Governor Beshear “is picking and
choosing the conscience-based exemptions to marriage that he deems acceptable.” (Doc.
# 29 at 24). In 2014, Attorney General Jack Conway declined to appeal a federal district

9) Davis further develops this argument in her own Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 39) against
Governor Beshear and KDLA Librarian Wayne Onkst. That Motion is not yet ripe for review.
10) In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that free exercise claims involving neutral and generally
applicable laws may still be subject to heightened scrutiny if asserted alongside another constitutional right.
If the Court concludes that the Beshear directive is neutral and generally applicable, Davis argues that strict
scrutiny must still apply because her free exercise claim is coupled with a free speech claim. (Doc. # 29 at
23). However, this proposal fails because Davis’ free speech rights are qualified by virtue of her public
employment. See Draper v. Logan Cnty. Pub. Library, 403 F. Supp. 2d 608, 621-22 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (applying
the Pickering balancing test to a combined free exercise and free speech claim asserted by a public
employee). The Court will discuss this concept further in the next section.
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court decision striking down Kentucky’s constitutional and statutory prohibitions on samesex marriage. (Doc. # 29-12). He openly stated that he could not, in good conscience,
defend discrimination and waste public resources on a weak case.11 (Id.). Instead of
directing Attorney General Conway to pursue the appeal, regardless of his religious beliefs,
Governor Beshear hired private attorneys for that purpose. (Doc. # 29-13). He has so far
refused to extend such an “exemption” to county clerks with religious objections to samesex marriage. (Doc. # 29-11).
However, Davis fails to establish that her current situation is comparable to Attorney
General Conway’s position in 2014. Both are elected officials who have voiced strong
opinions about same-sex marriage, but the comparison ends there. Governor Beshear did
not actually “exempt” Attorney General Conway from pursuing the same-sex marriage
appeal. Attorney General Conway’s decision stands as an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion on an unsettled legal question. By contrast, Davis is refusing to recognize the
legal force of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in performing her duties as Rowan County
Clerk. Because the two are not similarly situated, the Court simply cannot conclude that
Governor Beshear treated them differently based upon their religious convictions. There
being no other evidence in the record to suggest that the Beshear directive is anything but
neutral and generally applicable, it will likely be upheld if it is rationally related to a

11) Davis refers to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky’s decisions in Bourke v.
Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 (W.D. Ky. 2014), and Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (W.D.
Ky. 2014). Judge John Heyburn held that Kentucky’s constitutional and statutory prohibitions on same-sex
marriages “violate[ ] the United States Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law, even under
the most deferential standard of review.” Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 544. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
consolidated these cases with several similar matters originating from Ohio, Michigan and Tennessee and
reversed them. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court of the United States
then granted certiorari on these cases, now collectively known as Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039
(2015).
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legitimate government purpose.
The Beshear directive certainly serves the State’s interest in upholding the rule of
law. However, it also rationally relates to several narrower interests identified in Obergefell.
By issuing licenses to same-sex couples, the State allows them to enjoy “the right to
personal choice regarding marriage [that] is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”
and enter into “a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.” 135 S. Ct. at 2599-2600. It also allows same-sex couples to take advantage
of the many societal benefits and fosters stability for their children. Id. at 2600-01.
Therefore, the Court concludes that it likely does not infringe upon Davis’ free exercise
rights.
b.

The right to free speech

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.” Under the Free Speech Clause, an individual has the “right to utter
or print, [as well as] the right to distribute, the right to receive and the right to read.”
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)(citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943)). An individual also has the “right to refrain from speaking at all.”
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (invalidating a state law that required New
Hampshire drivers to display the state motto on their license plates). After all, “[a] system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.” Id.
While the Free Speech Clause protects citizens’ speech rights from government
intrusion, it does not stretch so far as to bar the government “from determining the content
of what it says.” Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
21
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2245-46 (2015). “[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to
promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its
citizens and carries out its duties on their behalf.” Id. That being said, the government’s
ability to express itself is not unlimited. Id. “[T]he Free Speech Clause itself may constrain
the government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private persons
to convey the government’s speech.” Id. (stating further that “[c]onstitutional and statutory
provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may [also] limit government speech”).
This claim also implicates the Beshear directive. Davis contends that this directive
violates her free speech rights by compelling her to express a message she finds
objectionable. Specifically, Davis must issue marriage licenses bearing her “imprimatur
and authority” as Rowan County Clerk to same-sex couples . Doc. # 29 at 27). Davis
views such an act as an endorsement of same-sex marriage, which conflicts with her
sincerely-held religious beliefs.
As a preliminary matter, the Court questions whether the act of issuing a marriage
license constitutes speech. Davis repeatedly states that the act of issuing these licenses
requires her to “authorize” same-sex marriage. A close inspection of the KDLA marriage
licensing form refutes this assertion. The form does not require the county clerk to
condone or endorse same-sex marriage on religious or moral grounds. It simply asks the
county clerk to certify that the information provided is accurate and that the couple is
qualified to marry under Kentucky law. Davis’ religious convictions have no bearing on this
purely legal inquiry.
The Court must also acknowledge the possibility that any such speech is attributable
to the government, rather than Davis. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (finding that
22
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specialty license plates are government speech because the government has exercised
final approval over the designs, and thus, chosen “how to present itself and its
constituency”). The State prescribes the form that Davis must use in issuing marriage
licenses. She plays no role in composing the form, and she has no discretion to alter it.
Moreover, county clerks’ offices issue marriage licenses on behalf of the State, not on
behalf of a particular elected clerk.
Assuming arguendo that the act of issuing a marriage license is speech by Davis,
the Court must further consider whether the State is infringing upon her free speech rights
by compelling her to convey a message she finds disagreeable. However, the seminal
“compelled speech” cases provide little guidance because they focus on private individuals
who are forced to communicate a particular message on behalf of the government. See,
e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down a state law that
required schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag). Davis is a
public employee, and therefore, her speech rights are different than those of a private
citizen.12 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
“[T]he government may not constitutionally compel persons to relinquish their First
Amendment rights as a condition of public employment,” but it does have “a freer hand in
regulating the speech of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at
large.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (1983); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671

12) Most free speech cases involving public employees center on compelled silence rather than compelled
speech. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (focusing on a district attorney’s claim that she was fired in
retaliation for exercising her free speech rights). “[I]n the context of protected speech, the difference is without
constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 796-97.
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(1994). Accordingly, “[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity
must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418; see also
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, (1973)
(stating that “neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution”
invalidates the Hatch Act’s bar on partisan political conduct by federal employees).
“[T]wo inquiries [ ] guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to
public employee speech.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 563 (1968)). First, a court must
determine “whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Id.
(explaining further that this question often depends upon whether the employee’s speech
was made pursuant to his or her official duties). Id. at 421. If the answer is no, then the
employee’s speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 421 (“Restricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”). If the answer
is yes, a court must then consider “whether the relevant government entity had an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
general public.” Id. (stating further that the government’s restrictions “must be directed at
speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations”).
The Court must adapt this test slightly because Davis’ claim focuses on her right not
to speak. In this context, the first inquiry is whether Davis refused to speak (i.e. refused to
issue marriage licenses) as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The logical answer to
this question is no, as the average citizen has no authority to issue marriage licenses.
Davis is only able to issue these licenses, or refuse to issue them, because she is the
24
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Rowan County Clerk. Because her speech (in the form of her refusal to issue marriage
licenses) is a product of her official duties, it likely is not entitled to First Amendment
protection. The Court therefore concludes that Davis is unlikely to succeed on her
compelled speech claim.
c.

The prohibition on religious tests

Article VI, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.
Under this Clause, “[t]he fact [ ] that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot
possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the
Constitution.” Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (striking down a state requirement
that an individual declare his belief in God in order to become a notary public); see also
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a state law that prevented religious
officials from serving in the state legislature).
Davis contends that “[c]ompelling all individuals who have any connection with the
issuance of marriage licenses . . . to authorize, approve, and participate in that act against
their sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage, without providing accommodation,
amounts to an improper religious test for holding (or maintaining) public office.” (Doc. # 29
at 20). The Court must again point out that the act of issuing a marriage license to a samesex couple merely signifies that the couple has met the legal requirements to marry. It is
not a sign of moral or religious approval. The State is not requiring Davis to express a
25
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particular religious belief as a condition of public employment, nor is it forcing her to
surrender her free exercise rights in order to perform her duties. Thus, it seems unlikely
that Davis will be able to establish a violation of the Religious Test Clause.
Although Davis focuses on the Religious Test Clause, the Court must draw her
attention to the first half of Article VI, Clause § 3. It requires all state officials to swear an
oath to defend the U.S. Constitution. Davis swore such an oath when she took office on
January 1, 2015. However, her actions have not been consistent with her words. Davis
has refused to comply with binding legal jurisprudence, and in doing so, she has likely
violated the constitutional rights of her constituents.

When such “sincere, personal

opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put
the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those
whose own liberty is then denied. “ Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. Such policies simply
cannot endure.
d.

The Kentucky Religious Freedom Act

Kentucky Constitution § 1 broadly declares that “[a]ll men are, by nature, free and
equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned .
. . [t]he right of worshiping Almighty God according to the dictates of their consciences.”
Kentucky Constitution § 5 gives content to this guarantee:
No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or
denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place
of worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such place,
or to the salary or support of any minister of religion; nor shall any man be
compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously
opposed; and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall be
taken away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief or
disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or teaching. No human authority shall,
26
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in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.
Kentucky courts have held that Kentucky Constitution § 5 does not grant more
protection to religious practice than the First Amendment. Gingerich v. Commonwealth,
382 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Ky. 2012). Such a finding would normally permit the Court to
collapse its analysis of state and federal constitutional provisions. However, the Kentucky
Religious Freedom Act, patterned after the federal RFRA, subjects state free exercise
challenges to heightened scrutiny:
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of religion.
The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held
religious belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government
proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has
used the least restrictive means to further that interest. A “burden” shall
include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties,
or an exclusion from programs or access to facilities.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.350.
Davis again argues that the Beshear directive substantially burdens her religious
freedom without serving a compelling state interest. The record in this case suggests that
the burden is more slight. As the Court has already pointed out, Davis is simply being
asked to signify that couples meet the legal requirements to marry. The State is not asking
her to condone same-sex unions on moral or religious grounds, nor is it restricting her from
engaging in a variety of religious activities. Davis remains free to practice her Apostolic
Christian beliefs. She may continue to attend church twice a week, participate in Bible
Study and minister to female inmates at the Rowan County Jail. She is even free to believe
that marriage is a union between one man and one woman, as many Americans do.
However, her religious convictions cannot excuse her from performing the duties that she
27
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took an oath to perform as Rowan County Clerk. The Court therefore concludes that Davis
is unlikely to suffer a violation of her free exercise rights under Kentucky Constitution § 5.
4.

Public interest

“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional
rights.” G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F. 3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir.
1994). Because Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy likely infringes upon Plaintiffs’
fundamental right to marry, and because Davis herself is unlikely to suffer a violation of her
free speech or free exercise rights if an injunction is issued, this fourth and final factor
weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ Motion.
V.

Conclusion
District courts are directed to balance four factors when analyzing a motion for

preliminary injunction. In this case, all four factors weigh in favor of granting the requested
relief. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 2) against
Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as Rowan County Clerk, is hereby granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as
Rowan County Clerk, is hereby preliminarily enjoined from applying her “no marriage
licenses” policy to future marriage license requests submitted by Plaintiffs.
This 12th day of August, 2015.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-44-DLB
APRIL MILLER, et al.

PLAINTIFFS

vs.

ORDER

KIM DAVIS, both individually
and in her official capacity, et al.

DEFENDANTS

***********************
I.

Introduction

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc. # 45)
the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of August 12, 2015 (Doc. # 43), in which it
enjoined her from enforcing her “no marriage licenses” policy against Plaintiffs. Davis
argues that a stay is necessary to protect her constitutional rights while the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals entertains her interlocutory appeal of the Court’s decision (Doc. # 44).
Plaintiffs having submitted a Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. # 46), and Davis
having filed her Reply (Doc. # 51), this matter is now ripe for the Court’s review. After
considering the record, the controlling law, and the parties' arguments, the Court concludes
that a stay pending appeal is not warranted. Defendant Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc.
# 45) is therefore denied.
However, in recognition of the constitutional issues involved, and realizing that
emotions are running high on both sides of the debate, the Court finds it appropriate to

1
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temporarily stay this Order pending review of Defendant Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc. #
45) by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
II.

Analysis

“While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants,
dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an
injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 62(c); see also Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1) (providing that “[a] party must ordinarily
move first in the district court for . . . an order suspending modifying, restoring, or granting
an injunction while an appeal is pending). To determine whether a stay is warranted,
district courts must consider the following four factors: (1) the likelihood that the party
seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving
party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed
if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay. Mich. Coalition
of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991)
(noting that “the factors to be considered are the same for both a preliminary injunction and
a stay pending appeal”).
A movant “need not always establish a high probability of success on the merits” to
justify the granting of a stay. Id.
The probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely
proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiffs will suffer absent the
stay. Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other. This relationship
however, is not without its limits; the movant is always required to
demonstrate more than the mere “possibility” of success on the merits. For
example, even if a movant demonstrates irreparable harm that decidedly
outweighs any potential harm to the defendant if a stay is granted, he is still
required to show, at a minium, “serious questions going to the merits.”
2
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Id. at 153-54 (internal citations omitted).
Courts generally look to three factors in evaluating the harm that will occur absent
a stay: (1) the substantiality of the injury alleged; (2) the likelihood of its occurrence; and
(3) the adequacy of the proof provided. Id. at 154. A movant must not only demonstrate
that the harm alleged is “both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical,”
he or she “must provide some evidence that the harm has occurred in the past and is likely
to occur again.” Id.
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court held that Davis’ “no marriage
licenses” policy likely infringed upon Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry, thus warranting
injunctive relief. (Doc. # 43 at 28). The Court further found that Davis was unlikely to suffer
a violation of her free exercise rights if an injunction was issued. (Id.). Although these
findings suggest that Davis is unlikely to prevail on appeal, she insists that “[t]his case
presents substantial legal matters of first impression for this (or any other) federal appeals
court following the Obergefell decision from the United States Supreme Court.” (Doc. # 451 at 10).
Davis cites to United States v. Coffman for the proposition that matters of first
impression create serious questions going to the merits. See Civ. A. No. 5:09-181-KKC,
2010 WL 4683761 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 12, 2010). In that case, the Government moved the court
to stay its previous order, which “requir[ed] the Government to remove lis pendens notices
it placed on property listed in the superseding indictment as substitute assets, pending an
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.” Id. at *1. Because the
court was not aware of any precedent addressing “whether the Government has authority
under Kentucky law to place lis pendens notices on a criminal defendant’s substitute assets
3
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prior to trial,” it determined that the Government had more than a mere possibility of
success on the merits on appeal. Id. at *2.
In this case, by contrast, the Court is not tasked with resolving an unsettled issue
of state law. It is being asked to apply clearly established federal law, as enunciated in
Obergefell. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not consider the
more narrow issue before this Court–whether requiring a county clerk to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples violates her free exercise rights–it was not silent as to the
likely impact of its holding on religious freedom.
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but
rights come not from ancient sources alone. The rise, too, from a better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that
remains urgent in our own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be
wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged
here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and
public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the
State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose
own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek
in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would
disparage their choice and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.
*

*

*

*

*

[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by
divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and
so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to
continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of
those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who
believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether
as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who
disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution,
however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage
on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.
4
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Id. at 2602-03, 2607. These passages strongly suggest that Davis’ “religious convictions
cannot excuse her from performing the duties that she took an oath to perform as Rowan
County Clerk.” (Doc. # 43 at 27-28). With this guidance at hand, the Court finds that Davis
has not established a likelihood of success on the merits on appeal. This factor weighs
against staying the case.
Davis next argues that she is highly likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a stay,
which compensates for the low likelihood of her success on appeal. Specifically, Davis
contends that she will incur “significant, irrevocable, and irreversible harm if she is forced
to authorize and approve a [same-sex marriage] license against her religious conscience.”
(Doc. # 45-1 at 12). She also points out that “[n]o one, and not even a permanent
injunction in her favor, can reverse that action if she is compelled to violate her
conscience.” (Id. at 13).
While Davis is correct in stating that a violation of her free exercise rights would
constitute irreparable harm, she has failed to show that she is likely to suffer a violation of
her free exercise rights in the first place. See Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d
281, 288 (6th Cir .1998). As the Court pointed out in its Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Davis is only being required to certify that couples meet the legal requirements to marry.
She does not have to authorize or approve any unions on moral or religious grounds.
Absent a likely constitutional violation, Davis is unlikely to suffer irreparable harm absent
a stay.
The Court having found that Davis is unlikely to prevail on appeal or suffer
irreparable harm absent a stay, it follows that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer harm if a stay is
granted. The Court has already held that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of
5
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their claim and enjoined Davis from enforcing her “no marriage licenses” policy against
them. If the Court decided to delay enforcement of its Order while Davis pursues an
unpromising appeal, it would essentially give Plaintiffs a favorable legal ruling with no teeth
and prolong the likely violation of their constitutional rights. Thus, this third factor also
weighs against staying the Order.
Finally, the Court notes that it is in the public interest to prevent the violation of a
party’s constitutional rights. G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F. 3d
1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). Because Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy likely infringes
upon Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry, and because Davis herself is unlikely to suffer
a violation of her free exercise rights if compelled to issue marriage licenses, the Court
concludes that the public interest is not served by granting a stay.
III.

Conclusion

District courts are directed to balance four factors when analyzing a motion to stay.
In this case, all four factors weigh in favor of denying the requested relief. Accordingly, for
the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc. # 45) be, and is,
hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order denying Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay
be, and is, hereby TEMPORARILY STAYED pending review of Defendant Davis’ Motion
to Stay (Doc. # 45) by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

6

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 52 Filed:
15-408/17/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 7 of 7 -Page:
Page ID#:
8
1270(64 of 313)

This 17th day of August, 2015.
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1

(Whereupon, the Preliminary Injunction Hearing

2

proceedings commenced on Monday, July 13, 2015, at

3

12:00 p.m., on the record in open court, as follows.)

4
5

THE COURT:

All right.

Madam Clerk, if you

could call the case set for noon, please.

6

THE CLERK:

Yes, Your Honor.

7

Ashland Civil Action 15cv44, April Miller,

8

et al., versus Kim Davis, et al., this being called for a

9

preliminary injunction hearing.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

If we could start with

11

entries of appearance, please, and if you'd identify who

12

you're here representing.

13

We'll start over here.

14

MR. WATKINS:

15

Cecil Watkins on behalf of

Rowan County, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

17

MR. MANDO:

Jeff Mando on behalf of

18

Rowan County, Your Honor.

19

MR. DONAHUE:

20

Kim Davis by special appearance.

21
22
23
24
25

A.C. Donahue on behalf of

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Jonathan Christman also on

behalf of Kim Davis by special appearance.
MR. GANNAM:

Roger Gannam on behalf of

Kim Davis by special appearance.
MR. SHARP:

Good morning, Your Honor.
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1
2

Bill Sharp on behalf of Ms. April Miller and
the other plaintiffs.

3
4

MR. CANON:
plaintiffs.

5
6

Dan Canon on behalf of the

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm glad to see we have

someone representing the county.

7

Did you enter your appearance today, Mr. Mando?

8

MR. MANDO:

9

served the end of last week.

10

MR. WATKINS:

11

THE COURT:

12

Yeah, Your Honor, we were just

Thursday, Your Honor.
Okay.

And, Mr. Watkins, you're

with whom?

13

MR. WATKINS:

14

THE COURT:

15

That's what I thought.

16

MR. WATKINS:

17

THE COURT:

18

Okay.

I'm the Rowan County attorney.
You are the county attorney.

Yes.
I just wanted to make sure.

Well, as you know, this matter is set

19

for a preliminary injunction hearing.

20

Answers haven't been filed.

21

there's been an answer prepared.

22

to the motion.

23

time to respond.

24
25

I don't know if

You haven't responded

I know by local rule you have a certain

My hope today is to take whatever evidence
you-all want to submit on either side for purposes of the
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1

preliminary injunction motion.

2

This was filed as a motion for preliminary

3

injunction, not a motion for TRO, so that told me when it

4

was filed that I would be able to allow for written

5

response.

6

so that was your decision.

7

And you chose to file it the way you wanted to

I hope to allow for proof to be put on today,

8

and then, if necessary, I'll -- well, not if necessary, I

9

do plan on hearing argument.

10

I have some questions of my

own.

11

The case is not about whether or not we agree

12

or disagree with what the Supreme Court ruled a couple

13

weeks ago because that's the Supreme Court's business.

14

Only the Supreme Court can overrule the Supreme Court.

15

So if anybody is in here looking for me to

16

reverse the Supreme Court, that's not going to happen.

17

think I would quickly be reversed, and I don't really

18

enjoy doing that.

19

I

So we're here to hear the evidence necessary

20

for the preliminary injunction motion, and then I'll give

21

you an opportunity to orally make whatever argument you

22

want to make.

23

You can still file written response if you

24

wish.

25

wish.

Mr. Mando, you can file a written response if you
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1

So, I guess, the burden is on the plaintiff.

2

So I'll give you the opportunity to call witnesses.

3

mean, there may be an opportunity to stipulate to facts.

4

The facts seem fairly straightforward.

5

I

I've read a little bit about what's in the

6

pleadings.

7

public statements that the Defendant Davis made within

8

the pleadings.

9

don't know if that would be the testimony that she would

10

The public statements, I think, there's

Of course, that's not under oath so I

give today.

11

But, Mr. Gannam -- is it Gannam?

12

MR. GANNAM:

13

THE COURT:

14
15

Yes, Your Honor.
All right.

Do you wish to say

something, sir?
MR. GANNAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

On a preliminary

16

matter, Kim Davis, the defendant, has not been served;

17

and, therefore, this Court does not currently have

18

jurisdiction over her.

19

I have authorities providing that when a

20

preliminary injunction motion is called for hearing and

21

the defendant hasn't been served yet, the Court is

22

without jurisdiction, and the motion should be denied

23

without prejudice with the opportunity to refile it once

24

the defendant is served.

25

But Kim Davis has not been served; and,
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1

therefore, this Court does not currently have

2

jurisdiction over her.

3

THE COURT:

Well, I have jurisdiction over the

4

complaint.

5

hear evidence today regardless because everybody is here.

6

We'll just hear evidence on -- I'm going to

MR. GANNAM:

Well, Your Honor, may I just ask

7

then that we would move to suspend the hearing and

8

request the Court to certify that ruling that we'll

9

proceed even though she has not been served for an

10

immediate appeal under 28 USC 1292(b)?

11
12

THE COURT:

So you're going to come back

tomorrow?

13

MR. GANNAM:

14

THE COURT:

Your Honor, we are -I mean, I'm here.

I mean, you

15

don't know my -- I'm in -- I usually am in Covington.

16

had a regular docket today, so I just set this for

17

hearing today because I was going to be here.

18
19

MR. GANNAM:

THE COURT:

21

MR. GANNAM:

23
24
25

And I

would just say that the case law that --

20

22

Understood, Your Honor.

I

Trying to save everybody some time.
The case law makes it clear the

burden to accomplish service is on point.
THE COURT:

Well, I recognize that.

she been served?
MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, if I may.

Why hasn't
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1

THE COURT:

Sure.

2

MR. SHARP:

It's been sent out via certified

3

mail, returned delivery, signature confirmation.

4

are -- obviously, we drove here last night, which is

5

obviously a three-hour drive so we haven't been in the

6

office today to see if the confirmation on service has

7

come back.

8
9

We

I would point out that counsel for Ms. Davis
e-mailed me on June -- July the 7th --

10

THE COURT:

So six days ago.

11

MR. SHARP:

-- with their entry of appearance.

12

They formally filed their entry of appearance in this

13

case on July the 8th.

14

driven three hours yesterday to be here that this is the

15

first time we're hearing about it.

16

THE COURT:

It's unfortunate that after having

Well, I'm not surprised.

I mean,

17

if they're -- they're going to raise arguments that

18

they're going to raise.

19

arguments with you.

20

trying to get the -- and the only -- I look out here

21

among the lawyers that I recognize, and Mr. Mando appears

22

before me regularly in Covington, and he knows one of my

23

favorite things is to see what we can all agree about.

I mean, they don't have to raise

They can -- I mean, I'm not -- I'm

24

MR. SHARP:

If I may, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT:

Yes.
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1

MR. SHARP:

If it please the Court, I mean, we

2

would consider asking the Court to convert the motion for

3

preliminary injunction to a motion for TRO.

4

prepared to present evidence on that request today.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

We're

How about that, if they convert it?
Your Honor, it -If I orally grant their motion, and

8

we convert it to a TRO motion, I mean, I can grant that

9

without notice.

10
11
12

MR. GANNAM:

The TR -- they haven't filed a

motion for TRO.
THE COURT:

I know, but if I allow them to do

13

it orally, and we have a temporary restraining order

14

hearing today, it wouldn't be a preliminary injunction.

15

It could only be good for 10 days.

16

MR. GANNAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

But the rule for

17

TRO requires, first of all, that a sworn pleading or an

18

affidavit be provided to the Court establishing the facts

19

in which the TRO would be based.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. GANNAM:

I also --

Well, the -It also requires written statement

22

from the attorneys explaining why service wasn't possible

23

before the hearing.

24

declaration to the Court that in the second case that was

25

filed against Kim Davis the attorneys filed the case on

And we're prepared to provide a
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1

July 10th, and accomplished service by hand delivery at

2

her office on the same day.

3

So the plaintiffs cannot show that it was

4

impractical or impossible or that they were unable to

5

effect service prior to today's hearing that they've

6

known about.

7

And we believe that it was incumbent on the

8

plaintiff to notify the Court that they didn't have

9

service and couldn't proceed today.

10

THE COURT:

Well, the notice that's required --

11

well, Rule 65, which is the rule that governs TROs, if

12

you want to receive injunctive -- temporary injunctive

13

relief, you have to submit an affidavit showing why the

14

other side should not be notified.

15

notified of this hearing.

16

And you've been

Now, the service thing is a quandary to me

17

because I think the lawyer representing the plaintiff in

18

15-46 -- I just was able to review that Friday -- was a

19

lawyer from Lexington, as I recall.

20

MR. SHARP:

Yes, sir.

21

THE COURT:

And I haven't received any notice

22
23

of the service in ECF as of this weekend.
Do you take a position on this, Mr. Mando, this

24

request to continue the hearing?

I don't want to

25

continue the hearing because we're all here.
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1

MR. MANDO:

We prefer not to continue the

2

hearing just for a matter of convenience, and the fiscal

3

court's position is a little bit different than

4

Ms. Davis's.

5
6

THE COURT:

I would -- I would suspect it would

MR. MANDO:

Because we have no authority,

be.

7
8

Your Honor, to tell the clerk what to do when it comes to

9

issuing those marriage licenses.

10

issue one.

11

issuing one under Kentucky law.

12

We can't order her to

We can't tell her -- to forebear her from

THE COURT:

Well, what is the -- what is the

13

process?

14

But I remember I lived in Fayette County at the time, and

15

I went into the clerk's office and paid $25 or whatever

16

it was and walked out with an envelope, sealed envelope,

17

that I -- it's still in my house, probably still sealed.

18
19

It's been awhile since I've gotten married.

Is that the process?

And I realize we're --

you're probably not -- maybe you might --

20

MR. MANDO:

The county attorney might be able

22

THE COURT:

-- know, Mr. Watkins.

23

MR. MANDO:

-- give the specifics of that than

21

24
25

to --

I can, Your Honor.
MR. WATKINS:

Well, afterwards, Your Honor,
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1

they're going to have to come back in and do their proper

2

filing of their marriage.

3

you're correct what you need to do.
Okay.

But, I mean, initially I think

4

THE COURT:

Well, I think what I'm going

5

to do -- get my rule book out.

6

MR. SHARP:

Let's see here.

Your Honor, if we could take a

7

five-minute recess, we'll check with the office to see if

8

service has been returned as of this morning.

9
10

THE COURT:
you've cited?

11
12

15

Are they all Sixth Circuit, I guess?

MR. GANNAM:

I'm sorry, Your Honor, I didn't

hear you.

13
14

And can I see your cases that

THE COURT:

You were citing some authority

earlier.
MR. GANNAM:

Well, your Honor, I can provide --

16

I have -- have it all here if I may approach and provide

17

the Court, please.

18
19
20
21
22

THE COURT:

Well, you can hand it to the court

security officer.
MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, the first case is

Schuh versus Michigan Department of Corrections.
Your Honor, these cases are all over the place

23

in terms of providing the basic proposition.

In this

24

case it's on the second page in the highlighted portion.

25

It simply provides, "When a preliminary injunction is
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1

sought under Rule 65(a), service of the summons and the

2

complaint is required.

3

service of process a Court has no jurisdiction over

4

defendants named in a lawsuit."

It is well settled that without

5

THE COURT:

Well, I agree that service is

6

ultimately required.

7

you can't have notice of the proceeding.

8

receive due process.

9

far as no service, formal service, of course, if she

I mean, if you don't get served,

I mean, you have to.

You can't
I mean, as

10

hasn't been formally served, the Court is not without --

11

is without jurisdiction to order her to do anything until

12

she's properly served.

13

to do anything today.

14

plan on hearing evidence today so that I can ultimately

15

make an informed decision.

16

to hear evidence today.

17

And I don't plan on ordering her
I don't plan on ruling today.

I

That's all I'm here to do is

So I understand that it's well settled that

18

without service of process, a Court has no jurisdiction

19

over defendants named in a lawsuit.

20

I have dismissed lawsuits without -- what is

21

it -- Rule 12 -- 12(b) -- I can't remember off the top of

22

my head, one of the subsections.

23

recognize that.

24

Florida.

25

for another hearing.

But, at any rate, I

I mean, you-all traveled here from

I mean, I don't want to have to bring you back
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1
2

MR. GANNAM:

Well, Your Honor, we're not

concerned about our own travels.

3

THE COURT:

Well, I'm concerned because I think

4

it's important that we try to to the extent that everyone

5

can save resources of whatever entity is representing

6

them, we're all here.

7

not, I don't know how I -- why I can't hear evidence of

8

the case.

9

MR. GANNAM:

10
11

THE COURT:

I mean, whether there's service or

Your Honor, in -And the complaint has been filed.

I have jurisdiction over the civil rights complaint.

12

MR. GANNAM:

That's correct, Your Honor.

The

13

proper procedure if -- if you only have jurisdiction over

14

the plaintiffs would be a TRO procedure if they can show

15

there's a reason why they couldn't get notice.

16

And under Rule 65 notice includes at least

17

service of the summons and complaint and the motion

18

papers.

19

I can provide -- I can point to other cases in

20

here that -- where summons -- where the service had not

21

been accomplished, the appropriate step was to deny the

22

motion for preliminary injunction and have the plaintiffs

23

refile it.

24
25

THE COURT:

Well, I can pull the names.

going to get to the merits.

We're
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1

MR. GANNAM:

2

THE COURT:

3

Your Honor -We will all get to the merits.

mean, your client would love to get to the merits.

4

MR. GANNAM:

5

THE COURT:

Your Honor, we would -Mr. Mando's client would love to

6

get to the merits, as would the plaintiffs.

7

extent we can expedite this, it helps everyone.

8
9

I

MR. GANNAM:

To the

Your Honor, we believe it would be

more appropriate to allow service to be accomplished,

10

allow Ms. Davis a regular standard briefing schedule to

11

be able to respond to this motion for preliminary

12

injunction, and then have a hearing on the merits of the

13

preliminary injunction motion after we've had an

14

opportunity to develop somewhat of a record.

15
16
17

THE COURT:

Well, that's what we're here today

to do is develop a record.
MR. GANNAM:

I mean, develop a record before

18

the hearing so that we're not presenting witnesses for

19

the first time at the hearing, but rather have the

20

opportunity perhaps to take a little discovery or do

21

whatever -- do whatever we can do within the regular

22

21-day briefing period that the rule already provides.

23
24
25

THE COURT:
motion filed.

Well, the motion -- there was a

Mr. Sharp, do you have that?

MR. SHARP:

I do, Your Honor.

July the 2nd.
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1

THE COURT:

July 2nd.

So your response is due

2

on the 23rd.

Well, actually, it's the 26th, three days

3

for mailing.

That's always been a --

4
5

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, it will be due 21 days

after service, and it has not been served yet.

6

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, I'm a -- I'm a little

7

perplexed given that counsel has entered their appearance

8

in the case.

9

THE COURT:

Well, again, we're dealing with a

10

situation where there's not going to be any agreements so

11

everybody is going to have to comply with all the rules

12

and the procedures, which is fine.

13

everybody wants to have everything work, that's -- I

14

presided over that type of case, and I've presided over

15

cases where people are more conciliatory.

16

really -- it doesn't matter to me.

17

If that's how

So it

But if everybody is going to be required to

18

cross every T and dot every I, that's fine.

19

hear the evidence today.

20

be put on today.

21

we're going to put it on today.

22

written response, as will you if you wish to file written

23

response.

24
25

I'm going to

I'm going to allow the proof to

Whatever proof you want to put on,
You'll have time to file

I have some questions myself.

I take it

Ms. Davis is not here because she wasn't served.

Is that
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1

fair?

I'm just guessing based upon the conversation.

2

MR. GANNAM:

She's not currently in the

3

courthouse, Your Honor.

4

here.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

She is available, but she is not

Okay.

She is available?

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay.

All right.

Well, so let me

8

make sure I have the record that needs to be completely

9

clear.

10

There is an oral motion -- you make your oral

11

motion, and then I'll let you make your oral motion, and

12

then we can make sure the minutes reflect exactly what we

13

want here.

14
15

What's your oral motion, Mr. Gannam?

Is it

Gannon or Gannam?

16

MR. GANNAM:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. GANNAM:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. GANNAM:

Gannam, Your Honor.
Gannam.

G-A-N-N-O-M?

A-M.
A-M, okay.

All right.

Thank you.

Well, Your Honor, our initial

21

objection was lack of service and therefore lack of

22

jurisdiction.

23

THE COURT:

So oral motion to dismiss.

24

dismiss but -- was it -- it wasn't to dismiss.

25

oral motion to what?

Not
It was
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1

MR. GANNAM:

No, Your Honor.

We object to

2

proceeding with the hearing on a PI motion when there has

3

not been service.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. GANNAM:

6

The oral motion to what?
Well, in light of the Court's

ruling to move forward despite there not being service.

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

I mean, it will be

8

defendants -- Defendant Davis's objection to the hearing

9

in absence of service.

Is that fair?

10

MR. GANNAM:

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

All right.

What's your other request?

14

MR. GANNAM:

12

That's correct, Your Honor.
All right.

That will be

overruled.

In light of overruling that

15

objection and proceeding forward, we request the Court to

16

suspend the hearing and immediately certify that issue

17

for an immediate appeal under 28 USC 1292(b).

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. GANNAM:

Okay.

That's going to be denied.

And I would -- if I just may point

20

out in the same case I read from earlier, Your Honor, the

21

Court there held that to the extent plaintiff seeks an

22

ex parte preliminary injunction, which is what this

23

proceeding will now be --

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. GANNAM:

It's not ex parte.
-- that that's procedurally
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1

improper.

2

THE COURT:

It's not ex parte.

Ex parte would

3

be if -- obviously, we have lots of folks in the back and

4

lots of folks here.

5

you've been -- you have notice.

6

been served.

7

restraining order under subsection (b)(1), without --

8

without notice.

9

written notice or oral notice to the adverse party only

10

if.

11

service.

12

I mean, it's not ex parte.

I mean,

You haven't formally

I mean, under Rule 65 a temporary

The Court may issue a TRO without

Now, you have notice.

This doesn't talk about

This talks about notice.
MR. GANNAM:

But notice as a legal matter

13

includes at least service, Your Honor.

That's our point

14

is that notice has legal significance.

And in a case

15

where there has been no service there has been no notice.

16

And, therefore, under the TRO ruling reading it

17

with that interpretation, which we think is the correct

18

one, the plaintiff has to show why not providing notice,

19

which is at least service, is -- is permissible or

20

excusable under all of the circumstances.

21

willing to show --

22
23

THE COURT:

And what we're

The other case they served, they

walked over --

24

MR. GANNAM:

25

THE COURT:

-- is that there was no --- and hand delivered, which is
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1

what should have been done here, but it wasn't.

2

Road blocks to getting to the merits.

3

which is certainly -- I want to give everyone a decision,

4

an informed decision, as quickly as possible, but I want

5

to make sure that everybody has a right to argue whatever

6

they want to argue for.

I --

7

So your two requests are overruled, denied.

8

What was your request to convert it, an oral

9

motion to convert the hearing to a TRO hearing?

10

MR. SHARP:

Yes, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

Well, we're going to

12

take a five-minute recess.

13

at finding out if there's been formal service by way of

14

certified mail, and then we'll reconvene at 12:30.

15

Do you mind if I keep these, Mr. Gannam?

16

I'll

read them.

17

MR. GANNAM:

18

THE COURT:

19

I want you to take a gander

You may keep them.
Thank you.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken at 12:20 p.m., and

20

the proceedings continued at 12:30 p.m., on the record in

21

open court, as follows.)

22

THE COURT:

All right.

I will go ahead and

23

give these cases back to you, Mr. Gannam.

24

them was one of my cases.

25

All right.

I see one of

Mr. Sharp, what did you find out?
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1

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, if I may.

We have not

2

been able to confirm that Ms. Davis has, in fact, been

3

served.

4

county's service was perfected Thursday night.

5

is looking into an alternative option.

6

we cannot represent that she's been served.

7

Speaking with Mr. Mando, it seems like the

THE COURT:

But at this point

Well, I'm certainly not going to

8

enter any formal order until she's been served.

9

that would be inappropriate.

10
11

Mr. Canon

But I'm here.

I think

I do want to

hear the evidence today while I'm here.
I don't think it's necessary either to convert

12

the hearing to a TRO hearing.

13

defendants 21 days from the date that you entered your

14

appearance to file a response.

15

appearance last week.

16

from date of service of the motion.

17

the motion on counsel was the date you entered your

18

appearance.

19

ECF you would have known when the complaint was filed.

20

You would have gotten notice of the motion filing as of

21

the date you entered your appearance.

22
23
24
25

I plan on giving the

Because you entered your

I know the local rules say 21 days
I think service of

You would have known about it -- getting on

So a written response to the motion for the
preliminary injunction will be due on July 30th.
MR. GANNAM:
point of appearance?

Your Honor, may I be heard on the
We -- to be clear, we have not
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1

filed a general appearance.

2

and I filed in our individual capacities motions for

3

pro hac vice admission, which was necessary for us to

4

even come to court and argue anything, whether it's

5

jurisdiction or anything else.

6

an appearance for Ms. Davis as such.

7

motion for pro hac vice.
Okay.

We filed -- Mr. Christman

But we have not entered

8

THE COURT:

9

Well, okay, I'll rephrase.

It's simply a

Well, I granted that.

10

MR. SHARP:

If I may, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

Both defendants -- yes.

12

MR. SHARP:

I'm looking at record entry

13

number 8 and number 7.

14

counsel will be permitted to appear and practice in this

15

court as counsel for Defendant Kim Davis in the

16

above-referenced case."

17

language in both.

18
19

Those motions is identical

Those are granted.

THE COURT:
order last week.

The, "Wherefore, undersigned

Right.

I mean, that's --

I granted those by gavel

I did.

20

What did you find out, sir, anything?

21

MR. CANON:

22

We're working on it, Judge.

Yeah,

as far as I know, the county was served on --

23

THE COURT:

Please stand, please.

24

MR. CANON:

Yes, I'm sorry.

25

The county was served on Thursday.

Apparently
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1

service went out on Monday, last Monday.

2

served on Thursday.

3

The county was

So as far as where the service is, stands for

4

as far as Ms. Davis goes personally, I assume it's

5

sitting in her mailbox.

6

THE COURT:

Well, she's apparently not in

7

Rowan County right now.

8

probably doesn't have access to her mailbox.

9

She's in Boyd County.

So she

At any rate, here's what I'm going to do.

10

Whether or not you were here just for -- to argue the

11

case, you will be arguing Mr. Gannan -- Gannam -- I'm

12

having a hard time with that.

13

MR. GANNAM:

14

THE COURT:

Is it Gannam?

Gannam.
Gannam, okay.

A written response

15

by either the county or the Defendant Davis individually

16

will be due on July 30th.

17

lengthen the time by local rule by order, and I'm doing

18

that.

19
20
21
22

I can always shorten or

So the responses will be due on the 30th of July.
Your oral motion to convert the hearing to a

TRO motion will be denied.

I don't think it's necessary.

I'm going to hear the evidence today.
can call your first witness.

23

MR. SHARP:

Thank you, Your Honor.

24

The plaintiffs call Dr. April Miller.

25

THE COURT:

All right.

Come around.

So you
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1
2

(Whereupon, the witness, APRIL MILLER, Ph.D., was
placed under oath by the clerk of the Court.)

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

5

THE COURT:

You may proceed.

6

MR. SHARP:

Thank you, Your Honor.

7

Good afternoon.
Hi.

APRIL MILLER,

8

having been first duly placed under oath, was examined

9

and testified as follows:

10

DIRECT EXAMINATION

11

BY MR. SHARP:

12

Q.

13

Court?

14

A.

April Miller.

15

Q.

And do you have a professional title?

16

A.

I have a Ph.D., so my professional title is doctor.

17

Q.

Would you please spell your last name for the Court?

18

A.

Miller, M-I-L-L-E-R.

19

Q.

Dr. Miller, where do you live?

20

A.

I live in Morehead, Kentucky.

21

Q.

And how long have you lived there?

22

A.

Nine years.

23

Q.

Dr. Miller, I'm now going to ask you some questions

24

about your personal life.

25

committed relationship?

Ma'am, can you please identify yourself for the

First, are you currently in a
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

With whom?

3

A.

Karen Roberts.

4

Q.

How did the two of you meet?

5

A.

We were work colleagues at the University of

6

Southern Mississippi.

7

Q.

8

relationship?

9

A.

A relationship, 11 years.

10

Q.

Dr. Miller, do you and your partner intend to get

11

married?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

When did the two of you decide to do so?

14

A.

We talked about it on the 26th of June after the

15

Supreme Court ruling.

16

Q.

17

do the two of you want to get married?

18

A.

19

married.

20

Q.

21

legally get married?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Are you both over the age of 18?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Neither of you are currently married to someone

And how long have the two of you been in a

Now, this may seem like an obvious question, but why

Because we love each other, and we want to get

Are there any reasons why the two of you cannot
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1

else?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

And the two of you are not related by blood?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Now, I'm going to ask you a few questions about what

6

dealings, if any, you and your partner have had with the

7

Rowan County Clerk's office.

8
9

First, have you or your partner had an occasion to
seek a marriage license --

10

MR. GANNAM:

11

THE COURT:

Objection.
Overruled.

12

BY MR. SHARP:

13

Q.

14

marriage license from the Rowan County Clerk's office?

15

A.

16

license.

17

Q.

Did you do that in person?

18

A.

Yes, we were both there.

19

Q.

Before you sought the marriage license, were you

20

aware that the Rowan County Clerk's office had made

21

public statements about any policies regarding the

22

issuance of marriage licenses?

23

A.

24

media -- media outlets had said -- stated that Kim Davis

25

had said she was not issuing licenses.

Have you or your partner had an occasion to seek a

Yes.

Yes.

We went on June the 30th to seek a marriage

On Monday, the 29th of June, there were
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1

Q.

In these media reports was there any indication of

2

the reasons why that was the case?

3

MR. GANNAM:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE WITNESS:

Objection.
Overruled.
I believe they stated that it was

6

her religious beliefs that kept her from issuing

7

licenses.

8

BY MR. SHARP:

9

Q.

And those beliefs kept her from issuing licenses to

10

whom?

11

A.

To all couples in Rowan County.

12

Q.

Can you please explain the circumstances

13

specifically under which you and your partner went to

14

seek a marriage license that day?

15

A.

16

that we now had the right to marry in all 50 states, my

17

partner and I talked about finally getting married and

18

having that right.

19
20

On the 26th of June when the Supreme Court ruled

And on Monday when I heard that Kim Davis was not
issuing licenses --

21

MR. GANNAM:

22

THE COURT:

23

THE WITNESS:

Objection.
Overruled.
-- my partner and I decided to go

24

down to the courthouse on Tuesday morning ourselves to

25

see if that was true or to see if on Tuesday she was
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1

issuing licenses.

It had not been confirmed Tuesday when

2

we were there that anybody had been denied that morning,

3

so we went in and requested a marriage license on

4

Tuesday, the 30th.

5

BY MR. SHARP:

6

Q.

Were you able to obtain a marriage license that day?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Did anyone from the clerk's -- did you interact with

9

anyone from the clerk's office in seeking to obtain a

10

marriage license?

11

A.

12

desk, requested a marriage license from the person

13

sitting at the counter.

14
15

We walked into the clerk's office.

We walked to the

She got up and went to the back to speak with
Kim Davis in her office.

16

Spoke to Kim Davis.

She turned around and came back, and she said to us,

17

we are not issuing any marriage licenses at this time.

18

Q.

Did they identify any reasons why that was the case?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

How did it make you feel to be denied a marriage

21

license in your county of residence?

22

A.

I was pretty furious.

23

Q.

Have you or your partner sought to obtain a marriage

24

license in any other county?

25

A.

No.

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 21 Filed:
15-5
07/16/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 29 of 112
Page:
- Page
30 ID#: 128
(94 of 313)
29
APRIL MILLER, Ph.D. - CROSS BY MR. CHRISTMAN

1

Q.

Why not?

2

A.

We live in Morehead, Kentucky.

3

Rowan County.

4

time.

5

purchase our car tags, and we register to vote, and this

6

is where we do our business.

7

degrading to have to go somewhere else to get my license

8

because of this.

9

Q.

We live in

This is where we do our business all the

This is the same county clerk's office where we

I think it would be

Dr. Miller, if you were able to obtain a marriage

10

license in Rowan County, would you and your partner then

11

get married?

12

A.

Yes.

13

MR. SHARP:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

Cross?

15

Mr. Christman.

16

MR. CHRISTMAN:

17

Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

18

BY MR. CHRISTMAN:

19

Q.

20

Good afternoon, Ms. Miller.
My name is Jonathan Christman.

I represent

21

Ms. Davis in this case.

22

A.

Hi.

23

Q.

Ms. Miller, you did not try to obtain a marriage

24

license from Rowan County Judge/Executive Walter Blevins;

25

correct?
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1

A.

I did speak with Walter Blevins on July 1st.

2

Q.

Did you try to obtain a marriage license from

3

Mr. Blevins?

4

A.

5

that did ask for a marriage license, but other plaintiffs

6

and myself did request a license, yes, on July 1st.

7

Q.

From Mr. Blevins?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Who else was there with you?

10

A.

Plaintiffs Jody Fernandez and Kevin Holloway.

I was one of the people in the office at the time

11
12

THE COURT:
Judge/Executive?

13
14

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:
him.

19
20

23
24
25

No, we did not get a license from

We requested one from him.
THE COURT:

Oh, you requested one from him, but

he didn't give it to you?

21
22

So you were able to get a license

from him?

17
18

Rowan County Judge/Executive

Walter "Doc" Blevins.

15
16

This is the Rowan County

THE WITNESS:

We did not receive licenses from

him.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

wanted to make sure that was correct.
THE WITNESS:

Thank you.

Thank you.
Thank you.

I
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1

BY MR. CHRISTMAN:

2

Q.

3

from another county; correct?

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

Rowan County is bordered by seven other counties

6

in -- of Kentucky; correct?

7

A.

I'm not sure how many.

8

Q.

And you decided to get married after the

9

Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell; correct?

You did not attempt to obtain a marriage license

10

A.

11

get married in my state.

12

Q.

13

to get married after hearing of Ms. Davis's deep

14

religious convictions?

15

A.

16

marriage license on July -- or June the 30th.

17
18

Yes.

Previous to that I did not have the right to

And then you went to the Rowan County Clerk's office

I went to the Rowan County Clerk's office to get a

Had I heard about her convictions and that she was
not issuing marriage licenses?

Yes.

19

MR. CHRISTMAN:

20

THE COURT:

Thank you.

21

MR. SHARP:

No, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

23

No further questions.
Any redirect?

May this witness be

finally excused?

24

MR. MANDO:

Your Honor --

25

MR. SHARP:

Yes, sir.
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1

MR. MANDO:

Your Honor, excuse me.

2

THE COURT:

Oh, I'm sorry.

3

MR. MANDO:

I did -- I did have one question,

4

Your Honor.

5
6

THE COURT:

That's fine, Mr. Mando.

Go ahead,

sir.

7

CROSS-EXAMINATION

8

BY MR. MANDO:

9

Q.

Good afternoon, ma'am.

10

A.

Hi.

11

Q.

My name is Jeff Mando.

12

I represent Rowan County.

You mentioned you spoke with Judge/Executive

13

Walter Blevins after you were denied a marriage license

14

by the clerk's office.

15

Is that correct, ma'am?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And when you spoke with Judge/Executive Blevins, did

18

he tell you that he could not issue a marriage license to

19

you because he did not have the authority to do so?

20

A.

21

Kim Davis was not absence -- was not absent that he could

22

not issue a license.

23

Q.

24

a statute that only allows him to issue a marriage

25

license in the absence of the clerk, and since she was

He told Jody and Kevin and myself that because

All right.

And did he explain to you that there was
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1

not absent from the county, he could not issue that

2

marriage license?

3

A.

Correct.

4

MR. MANDO:

Thank you, ma'am.

5

THE COURT:

All right.

6

Anything else?

7

MR. SHARP:

8

MR. CHRISTMAN:

9

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Nothing further, Your Honor.
No further questions.

No, all right.

10

You may step down.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

All right.

13

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, the plaintiffs call

14
15
16
17

Thank you.

Thank you.
Next witness, please.

Jody Fernandez.
THE COURT:

All right.

(Whereupon, the witness, JODY FERNANDEZ, was placed
under oath by the clerk of the Court.)

18

THE COURT:

19

THE WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

You may proceed.

21

MR. SHARP:

Thank you, Your Honor.

22

Good afternoon.
Good afternoon.

JODY FERNANDEZ,

23

having been first duly placed under oath, was examined

24

and testified as follows:

25

DIRECT EXAMINATION
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1

BY MR. SHARP:

2

Q.

3

Court?

4

A.

My name is Jody Fernandez.

5

Q.

And could you please spell your last name?

6

A.

F, as in Frank, E-R-N-A-N-D-E-Z.

7

Q.

Ms. Fernandez, where do you live?

8

A.

I live in Morehead, Kentucky.

9

Q.

That's in Rowan County?

10

A.

That is in Rowan County.

11

Q.

And how long have you lived there?

12

A.

I have lived there since 2008.

13

Q.

Ms. Fernandez, I'm now going to ask you some

14

questions about your personal life as well.

15

Ma'am, could you please identify yourself for the

Are you currently in a committed relationship with

16

another person?

17

A.

Yes, I am, with Kevin Holloway.

18

Q.

Is Kevin one of the other plaintiffs in this case?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

We met in 2005 in -- while we lived in Florida.

22

all lived in the same neighborhood.

23

Q.

24

relationship together?

25

A.

Okay.

How did the two of you first meet?

And how long have the two of you been in a

Since 2006.

We
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1

Q.

Ms. Fernandez, do you and Mr. Holloway intend to get

2

married?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Again, I'm afraid I have to ask.

5

A.

Because we love each other.

6

Q.

Are there any reasons why the two of you cannot get

7

married?

8

MR. GANNAM:

9

THE COURT:

10

THE WITNESS:

Why?

Objection.
Overruled.
No.

11

BY MR. SHARP:

12

Q.

You're both over the age of 18?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Neither of you are currently married to someone

15

else?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

The two of you are not related by blood?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Now, I'm going to ask you about any dealings you may

20

have had with the Rowan County Clerk's office.

21

Have you --

22

A.

Go ahead.

23

Q.

I'm sorry.

24

to seek a marriage license from the Rowan County Clerk's

25

office?

Have you or Mr. Holloway had an occasion
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1

MR. GANNAM:

Objection.

2

THE WITNESS:

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

Yes.
Overruled.
Yes.

We went on July 1st to seek

5

a marriage license.

Both of us went to the office.

6

BY MR. SHARP:

7

Q.

8

circumstances of what happened when -- did you go in

9

person?

And can you please describe for the Court the

10

A.

11

asked the -- there was no one sitting at the desk so we

12

asked someone else about getting a marriage license.

13

We both went in person.

We entered the room.

We

And she went back to the office and got Kim Davis,

14

and Kim Davis came out and told us she was not issuing

15

marriage licenses.

16

Q.

Did Ms. Davis explain to you why that was the case?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

What did you and Kevin do after that?

19

A.

After that we walked down the hall, we went to

20

Dr. Blevins -- Judge Blevins's office, and requested a

21

marriage license from him.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

That he was unable to give us a license because

24

Kim Davis was available in the building.

25

Q.

And what did -- what were you informed there?

Is that the meeting that Dr. Miller just talked
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1

about?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Did -- other than this explanation for why the

4

county judge/executive could not issue a marriage

5

license, did Judge Blevins explain, give you any reasons

6

why the county clerk was not issuing marriage licenses?

7

A.

No, he did not.

8

MR. GANNAM:

9

THE COURT:

Objection.
Overruled.

10

BY MR. SHARP:

11

Q.

12

license on two occasions in the same day?

13

A.

14

would have been my father's 81st birthday, and it was an

15

important date for me.

16

Q.

17

license in any other county?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Why not?

20

A.

We live in Rowan County; we work in Rowan County; we

21

pay taxes in Rowan County; we live walking distance to

22

the courthouse in Rowan County.

23

need for us to drive to another county to get married.

24

Q.

25

Rowan County, would you and Kevin get married?

How did it make you feel to be denied a marriage

We were -- I was quite upset.

That date was --

Have you or Kevin sought to obtain a marriage

There seemed to be no

If you were able to obtain a marriage license in
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1

A.

Absolutely.

2

MR. SHARP:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Any cross?

4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

5

Yes, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. CHRISTMAN:

7

Q.

8

Good afternoon, Ms. Fernandez.
My name is Jonathan Christman.

9

A.

Good afternoon.

10

Q.

If you were able to obtain a marriage license in

11

another county in Kentucky, would you and Kevin get

12

married?

13

A.

14

in our county.

15

Q.

16

you would get married; correct?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And how far did you drive to today's hearing?

19

A.

From Morehead it took about an hour.

20

don't know.

We plan to get married, but we wanted to get married

So if you got a marriage license from Boyd County,

21

MR. CHRISTMAN:

22

THE COURT:

23

Mileage I

No further questions.

Mr. Mando.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

24

BY MR. MANDO:

25

Q.

Just briefly about this short meeting with
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1

Judge/Executive Blevins.

2

As I understand it, ma'am, he explained to you that

3

he was restricted by law.

He could not issue the license

4

because Ms. Davis was present in the county?

5

A.

That's correct.

6

MR. MANDO:

All right.

Thank you, ma'am.

7

THE COURT:

You may step down.

8

All right.

Next witness.

9

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, if I may, defense

Thank you.

10

counsel previously indicated the defendant Kim Davis was

11

not in the courthouse and was available.

12

seemed to indicate that she was in Boyd County.

13

THE COURT:

The Court later

No, I just thought because Boyd --

14

that she was in Boyd County because I thought she was

15

here for the hearing.

16

MR. SHARP:

Well --

17

THE COURT:

That was my supposition I suppose.

18

MR. SHARP:

-- based on defense counsel's

19

representation that she wasn't in the courthouse, she was

20

available, we would call Defendant Kim Davis to the

21

stand, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

Is she here?

23

MR. GANNAM:

24

available to testify.

25

today would potentially waive her objection to service

Your Honor, Ms. Davis is not
We believe that her appearance
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1

and this Court's jurisdiction; and, therefore, she will

2

not be here.

3

THE COURT:

All right.

4

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, I mean, we're prepared

5

to serve counsel for Ms. Davis.

6

THE COURT:

Well, they're not going to

7

accept service.

8

which I -- are you willing to accept service on her

9

behalf?

10

I mean, unless he's changed his tune,

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, the rules provide a

11

quid pro quo.

12

provides more time to the defendant to respond.

13

would --

14
15

THE COURT:

We

To respond to -- for the answer,

sure, but not for the motion.

16
17

If waiver of service is requested, it

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, we are not willing to

accept service at this point.

18

THE COURT:

No.

19

MR. SHARP:

I mean, I --

20

THE COURT:

Do you have any other witnesses to

22

MR. SHARP:

We do, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

Why don't you call your other

21

24
25

call?

witnesses then?
MR. SHARP:

Thank you.
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1

We now call Barry Spartman, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

3

All right.

Come around, sir.

BARRY SPARTMAN,

4

having been first duly placed under oath, was examined

5

and testified as follows:

6

DIRECT EXAMINATION

7

BY MR. CANON:

8

Q.

Good afternoon, Mr. Spartman.

9

A.

Good afternoon.

10

Q.

Would you please identify yourself, and state your

11

full name for the Court?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Can you spell your last name, please?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And, Mr. Spartman, how are you employed?

16

A.

I work in Rowan County at Morehead State University.

17

Q.

And do you also live in Rowan County?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

And how long have you lived there?

20

A.

I have lived in Rowan County for over 20 years.

21

Q.

Very good.

22

relationship with anybody?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Can you tell the Court who that is?

25

A.

Yes.

My name is Barry Spartman.

It's S-P-A-R-T-M-A-N.

And are you currently in a committed

That is Aaron Skaggs.
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1

Q.

And is Mr. Skaggs also a plaintiff in this case?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And how did the two of you first meet?

4

A.

We met in college through mutual friends.

5

Q.

And do you know approximately when that was?

6

A.

It was around '98.

7

Q.

And so the two -- how long have the two -- let me

8

ask you this.

9

committed relationship?

How long have the two of you been in a

10

A.

We've been together for 21 years.

11

Q.

And have you-all developed the intention to get

12

married?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And I know this seems like a silly question, but why

15

do you want to get married?

16

A.

17

love each other, and we do want to spend the rest of our

18

lives together.

19

Q.

20

for 21 years?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

When did you first decide to get married?

23

A.

We've talked about it before the Supreme Court

24

decision on and off.

25

Q.

We've been in a very long-term relationship, and we

And I think you said you've been living as a couple

In --

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 21 Filed:
15-5
07/16/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 43 of 112
Page:
- Page
44 ID#: 142
(108
43 of 313)
BARRY SPARTMAN - DIRECT BY MR. CANON

1

A.

After the decision came down, that's when we

2

realized that if it actually come to be, that we would be

3

married.

4

Q.

5

you can't be married that you know of?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Now that the Obergefell decision is in?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

You're not related by blood?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

You're both over the age of 18?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And you're not currently married to someone else,

14

are you?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

And let me ask you a couple of questions about the

17

dealings that you've had with the Rowan County Clerk's

18

office.

19

personally?

20

A.

21

get a marriage license, and beforehand we called the

22

courthouse.

23

Q.

Let me stop you there.

24

A.

It was Tuesday, June 30th.

25

Q.

Okay.

And is there -- is there any reason why the two of

Have you spoken to anybody in that office

Yes.

We were prepared to go to the courthouse to

Go on.

What day was that?
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1

A.

2

we wanted to make sure that we had the correct documents

3

or anything that we may need to get the license rather

4

than go to the courthouse and not have what was

5

necessary.

6

Q.

And what happened?

7

A.

The person on the phone basically said that they

8

were not issuing licenses --

9

We wanted to -- since this was completely new to us,

MR. GANNAM:

Objection.

10

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

12

Who did you call?

13

THE WITNESS:

14

THE COURT:

15

THE WITNESS:

16

Overruled.

The clerk's office.
The Rowan County Clerk's office?
Rowan County Clerk's office,

that's correct.

17
18

-- to anyone.

THE COURT:

And were told what by whoever

answered the phone?

19

THE WITNESS:

They said that they weren't

20

issuing any marriage licenses and don't bother coming

21

down.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

Overruled.

23

BY MR. CANON:

24

Q.

And so did you go down there anyway after that?

25

A.

After that we were pretty disappointed and
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1

frustrated.

2

Q.

3

information that the Rowan County Clerk's office had

4

stopped issuing marriage licenses?

5

A.

We had seen an article, yes.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

think what those -- what the reasons were for the clerk's

8

refusal to issue licenses?

Now, prior to that time had you received any

9

And did you -- did you have any reason to

MR. GANNAM:

Objection.

10

THE COURT:

What was the question?

11

MR. CANON:

The question was, did he have any

12

basis to believe -- for -- to understand what the reasons

13

were for the clerk to refuse to issue licenses.

14

THE COURT:

15

THE WITNESS:

Okay.
Yes.

Overruled.
There -- it was clearly

16

quoted that it was because of her deep religious beliefs.

17

BY MR. CANON:

18

Q.

19

or --

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

-- tell the Court about that.

22

A.

That's correct.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

No.

25

would not issue licenses that, therefore, she wasn't

And you say it was quoted.

You saw news articles,

And any other reasons you can think of?
Basically -- I'm sorry.

There was also she
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1

discriminating.

2

Q.

3

marriage license in Rowan County since then?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Did you attempt to obtain a license from the

6

county judge/executive?

7

A.

8

not physically go there.

9

Q.

Well, what happened when you contacted his office?

10

A.

Basically the same response, that he could not

11

issue --

And I take it you've not been able to obtain a

No, we did not.

12

MR. GANNAM:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

We did contact his office but did

Objection.
Overruled.
He could not issue a marriage

15

license.

16

BY MR. CANON:

17

Q.

And did he tell you why?

18

A.

Because Kim Davis was not absent from her job.

19

Q.

How did that make you feel to not be able to get a

20

marriage license in the county where you work and live

21

and pay taxes?

22

A.

Pretty frustrated, kind of furious.

23

Q.

Do you know if you can obtain a marriage license in

24

any other county?

25

A.

Yes, I'm aware that we can.
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1

Q.

Have you tried to do that?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Why not?

4

A.

Because we pay taxes.

5

and Morehead since the beginning of our relationship.

6

And that's our home, and that's where we want to obtain

7

that license and get married.

8

Q.

9

would go get it, wouldn't you?

10

A.

We've lived in Rowan County

Now, if you could get a license in Rowan County, you

Yes.

11

MR. CANON:

Nothing further.

12

THE COURT:

Cross?

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

14

Yes, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

15

BY MR. CHRISTMAN:

16

Q.

17

Good afternoon, Mr. Spartman.
My name is John Christman.

18

A.

Good afternoon.

19

Q.

Mr. Spartman, there's nothing preventing you from

20

staying in a committed relationship, as you said, with

21

Mr. Skaggs; is that correct?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

And nobody has stopped you from having a commitment

24

ceremony; correct?

25

A.

Yes, that's correct, there's nothing.

That's correct.
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1

Q.

And you haven't gone to any other county to try to

2

obtain a marriage license, that's correct?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

Rowan County?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

And you haven't come to Boyd County to try and

8

obtain a marriage license?

9

A.

No.

None of the neighboring counties around

It would be very inconvenient to drive an hour

10

for something we could get in our own home county.

11

Q.

12

county, would you and Mr. Skaggs attempt to get married?

13

A.

If you could get a marriage license from another

Yes, we would.

14
15

MR. CHRISTMAN:

No further questions.

Thank you.

16

THE COURT:

Mr. Mando.

17

MR. MANDO:

No questions, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

All right.

19

You may step down.

Thank you.

20

Next witness.

21

MR. SHARP:

No further witnesses, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

23

MR. GANNAM:

24

THE COURT:

25

Any witnesses?

No, Your Honor.
All right.

We're going to set a --

we're going to recess the evidentiary portion of this
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1
2

hearing in progress.
As soon as you file a notice of service of

3

Kim Davis, 24 hours after she's served we'll reconvene

4

this hearing in Covington.

5

only conflict would be tomorrow afternoon.

6

the All-Star game so I'm not going to be hearing it at

7

8:00 tomorrow night.

8
9
10

So whenever that is.

The

I'm going to

So we'll give you -- we'll have 24-hour notice,
and then we'll have the hearing in Covington whenever
she's served.

11

MR. SHARP:

Thank you, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

13

MR. GANNAM:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor -Yes, sir.
-- may I request that that be

16

48 instead of 24, just because of the time it takes to

17

travel from our office in Florida to Covington?

18

And I would secondly request that should this

19

process coincide with this Thursday and Friday of this

20

week, I am due in Washington, D.C., for a deposition in

21

another case.

22

two requests as part of this process.

23
24
25

We just ask the Court to accommodate those

THE COURT:

Will the attorneys approach the

bench, please?
(Whereupon, a bench conference was had with the
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1

Court and counsel out of the hearing of the open court,

2

as follows.)

3
4

THE COURT:

All right.

Let the record reflect

we're at the bench.

5

And I'm trying to be as accommodating as I can.

6

The service thing, I recognize that she hasn't been

7

served right now.

8
9

Is Ms. Davis, did you say she's not going to
testify today?

10
11

MR. GANNAM:

THE COURT:

MR. GANNAM:

Do you know

I do know where she is, yes,

Your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. GANNAM:

18

You won't produce her.

where she is?

14
15

Well, we won't produce her today,

Your Honor.

12
13

Is she available today?

she is.

19

Okay.

You --

Well, actually, I don't know where

I know how to get in touch with her.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm just trying to -- and I

20

brought this up because I know Mr. Mando has heard me say

21

this.

22

the tracks.

23

I'm trying to get the evidence in that is necessary one

24

way or the other.

25

I try to just -- I'm trying to get the train on
I'm trying to get the ball down the field.

And we're all here.

I mean, you're asking me to accommodate your
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1

request, and I want to accommodate the lawyers as much as

2

I can because I want to be a judge that's accommodating,

3

not a judge that's obstructionist, not that I know any

4

that are.

5

get her here to testify, it would help everyone.

But ultimately if she's here -- if we could

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

I understand, Your Honor, and -And eventually she's going to be

8

served, and eventually we're going to hear the evidence.

9

I mean, it's a -- well, I mean, she can be hit by a truck

10

tomorrow and die and never appear.

11

a -- it could happen.

12

MR. GANNAM:

13

I mean, that could be

Your Honor, we also do not desire

to be an obstructionist.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. GANNAM:

I'm not saying that you are.
But in this case this is a

16

complaint filed where they've sued her individually.

17

Their seeking punitive damages against her.

18

certainly not --

It's

19

THE COURT:

Are you seeking punitive damages?

20

MR. SHARP:

No, Your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

MR. GANNAM:

23
24
25

I haven't --

-- her responsibility to assist

the plaintiffs in their obligation to serve us.
THE COURT:

No, I know you're not, but we're

trying to accommodate everyone here, and --
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1

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, we believe that her

2

appearing here today will prejudice her rights to object

3

to the Court not having jurisdiction over the prelim, and

4

that's the reason why.

5
6
7

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, eventually she'll --

well -MR. GANNAM:

She will -- she will appear,

8

Your Honor, and she will have to, and we want that day to

9

occur, but we don't want it to occur prematurely.

And we

10

will -- we will produce her at the appropriate time when

11

she's been served, and we have the ability for her to be

12

subject to the Court's jurisdiction.

13

MR. WATKINS:

14

THE COURT:

15
16

microphone.

Judge, I will -You need to speak into the

I'm sorry.

MR. WATKINS:

I will be out of town July 25th

17

through August 2nd, if we can at least have a hearing

18

prior to then.

19
20

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Mando would be --

hopefully you're not going anywhere.

21

MR. MANDO:

No, sir.

22

THE COURT:

Well, I'm going to be in Columbia,

23

Kentucky, on Thursday.

24

Adair County, but I don't think we'll want to do that.

25

We can recess this in

Well -- and the service thing, I mean, I'm
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1

not -- this could have been prevented just with personal

2

service.

I'm just -- it's -- so there's --

3

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor --

4

THE COURT:

-- enough to kind of -- there's

5

gifts for everyone here at the bench.

6

bit --

7

MR. SHARP:

But I'm a little

Your Honor, with all due respect,

8

we had -- we had no reason to suspect that

9

Ms. Davis wouldn't pick up her mail as did the

10

county judge/executive.

11

THE COURT:

Well, if it's -- do you believe --

12

MR. SHARP:

I mean --

13

THE COURT:

-- that she just didn't pick up her

MR. SHARP:

Well, I don't know.

14

mail?

15

When we find

16

out, we'll -- when we get her here, we'll certainly ask

17

her.

Well, I mean, the county was served.

18

THE COURT:

Well, but once she's served she's

19

served.

20

mean, if everybody wants their --

21

I don't think it's -- it seems kind of petty.

MR. SHARP:

I

And we don't want to -- we're not

22

interested in fighting over issues that are not worthy of

23

fighting over, Your Honor.

24
25

THE COURT:
hear argument.

Well, all right.

We're going to

I know we're recessing it, and I do want
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1

to hear kind of a preliminary -- your preliminary

2

thoughts on some issues that I have to raise with

3

counsel.

4
5

But what we'll do, your 48-hour request will be
granted.

I won't set anything earlier than next Monday.

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
And what we'll do, if you would

8

file a notice of service -- and you can object to the

9

service if you think that it's not appropriate under the

10

rules, and then we'll litigate the service.

But once

11

she's formally served, file a notice within -- forthwith.

12

We'll contact -- we'll put on an order not earlier than

13

48 hours from that date.

14

be no earlier than Monday.

15

25th --

It won't be this week.

It will

But you're leaving on the

16

MR. WATKINS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WATKINS:

19

THE COURT:

So probably a day next week in

21

All right.

Very well.

22

MR. WATKINS:

23

MR. GANNAM:

20

24
25

25th.
-- which would be -That's a Saturday.

Covington.
Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the bench conference concluded, and
the proceedings continued on the record in open court,
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1
2

as follows.)
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, we are going to

3

reconvene the hearing in progress in Covington after

4

Ms. Davis is formally served.

5

As I indicated here at the bench, we'll set

6

that matter for a date not earlier than next Monday to

7

accommodate counsels' schedules.

8

Now, let me turn to my questions here.

9

And I will allow a written response.

10
11
12

I've

already indicated that will be due on the 30th of July.
All right.

In Obergefell -- is that the right

pronunciation of that?

13

MR. CANON:

O-ber-ge-fell, Judge.

14

THE COURT:

Ober --

15

MR. CANON:

Ge-fell.

16

THE COURT:

Obergefell?

17

MR. CANON:

Yes.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

19

I've read that case a couple of times, the four

Obergefell, okay.

20

dissents a couple of times.

21

not anybody individually disagrees with the ruling, the

22

ruling is individuals have a fundamental constitutional

23

right to marry under the Fourth -- Fourteenth Amendment.

24
25

It's clear that whether or

In this particular case we have a defendant who
has made public comments that she, because of her
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1

religious convictions, is not going to be issuing any

2

marriage licenses at all, which, I guess, takes equal

3

protection issue off the table potentially, but not the

4

fundamental right issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.

5

What is the government's compelling state

6

interest in her refusal to issue marriage licenses?

7

Either one of -- I mean, from the defendant's

8

standpoint.

I mean, that's your -- we've got a

9

fundamental right.

I mean, all of us have taken

10

Con Law 1 from law school, depending on whether or not it

11

impinges on what type of right it impinges on, that

12

dictates the standard of review under the case law.

13

We've got a fundamental right involved.

14

mean, we're not contesting that.

15

Supreme Court has held.

16

interest?

17
18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

I

That's what the

So what is the compelling state

Your Honor, the fundamental

right --

19

THE COURT:

Please stand, please.

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Thank you.

The compelling state interest

21

is only applicable in the context where strict scrutiny

22

would apply, and there are cases that plaintiffs cited in

23

their motion for preliminary injunction that the

24

fundamental right to marry, the strict scrutiny analysis

25

requiring a compelling government interest is a direct
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1

and substantial burden on the fundamental right to marry.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

the compelling state interest?

4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

5

THE COURT:

6

Again, that's assuming --

No, what's the compelling state

interest?

7
8

What's the substan -- what's

MR. CHRISTMAN:

We would argue that it's not a

compelling government interest that --

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

MR. CHRISTMAN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CHRISTMAN:

What's the standard that --

-- needs to apply.

-- applies then?
The standard that should apply

13

here with respect to plaintiffs' request would be a

14

rational basis first.

15
16

THE COURT:

Why, if it involves a fundamental

right?

17

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Because the fundamental right

18

to marriage cases you get the strict scrutiny if it's a

19

direct and substantial burden on the fundamental right to

20

marry.

21

Not every -THE COURT:

Okay.

They've gone down to get a

22

license in the county they live, and she refuses to give

23

it.

Why isn't that a direct burden on their right?

24

MR. CHRISTMAN:

25

THE COURT:

Because it's not --

Because they can go over to
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1

Carter County or Fayette County and get the license?

2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

5
6
7
8
9

counties.

Correct, Your Honor.

Is that why?
They can go to the neighboring

They can go to the -THE COURT:

Why do they need to go to the

neighboring county?
MR. CHRISTMAN:

Well, I'm explaining and

answering your question as to why it's not a direct and

10

substantial burden.

It calls for a substantial burden

11

analysis themselves on why their fundamental right to

12

marry is being directly and substantially burdened.

13

can go to neighboring counties.

14

other counties --

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CHRISTMAN:

17

THE COURT:

They

They can go to numerous

So does the county --- across the state.

Does the county reimburse them for

18

going to the neighboring county?

19

write them a check for mileage to go to the other county?

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Is Kim Davis going to

Well, they haven't -- they

21

haven't made the attempt.

22

none of them have even attempted to go to another county

23

to try to obtain a license.

24

exclusively try to go to the Rowan County Clerk's office.

25

As the plaintiffs conceded,

All they've done is

A few of them testified that they did even try
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1

to go to Chief Judge/Executive Walter Blevins.

2

And I would submit to the Court that under

3

Kentucky Revised Statute 402.240 it says that in the

4

absence of the county clerk or the vacancy of the office,

5

that the county judge or executive may issue marriage

6

licenses.

7

So that statute already -- under Kentucky law

8

there's already a provision for if the county clerk

9

cannot issue a license that --

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. CHRISTMAN:

12

THE COURT:

13
14
15
16

marriage licenses?

Why can't she issue the license?
Which license?

Why can't Kim Davis issue the
Why?

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Well, it depends on which

plaintiff we're talking about because for -THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, let's say Plaintiff

17

April Miller, why can't she issue the license to

18

April Miller?

19

MR. CHRISTMAN:

For Ms. Miller -- overall

20

Ms. Davis stopped issuing all marriage licenses because

21

she wanted to ensure that people who were coming to seek

22

marriage licenses were treated equally, that they were

23

given the same treatment by --

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay.

she issue the one to Miller?

But why can't -- why can't
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1

MR. CHRISTMAN:

For -- in addition to that why

2

she can't issue the license to Miller is because

3

Ms. Miller wanted to be married to another woman.

4

the count -- the mandated form from Kentucky from the

5

Department of Libraries and Archives, the marriage form

6

itself, Ms. Davis has no choice, no discretion over the

7

license that has to be issued to a couple.

8

prescribed from the governor's office through the

9

Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives, and it's

10

that form.

11

provide the citation.

It's

It's uniform under Kentucky statute.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

And

I can

What's wrong with the form?

So the form requires the county

14

clerk on four occasions, or at a minimum at least two,

15

for every license that the county clerk issues she has to

16

give her approval at least two times on that license with

17

her name and affixing her signature, name, her sign of

18

approval for the marriage license.

19
20

THE COURT:

But is it a sign of approval, or is

it more a ministerial act?

21

MR. CHRISTMAN:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. CHRISTMAN:

It's a sign of approval --

Approval.
-- because it's her name.

So

24

as a -- as a public record when that marriage license is

25

issued, it becomes solemnized by someone that can
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1

solemnize the marriage, and then comes back to be

2

recorded.

3

Rowan County Clerk's office has issued, is the one with

4

the authority to bless, approve, sign the marriage

5

license.

6

It's a public record in Rowan County that the

And that form requires Ms. Davis when two

7

individuals come in, or whoever comes in, asking for a

8

marriage license requires her, even -- and I said there

9

were two or four.

So the deputy clerks in her office

10

there is -- for four of the spaces that require her name

11

or signature to be on, two of those under Kentucky law

12

can be completed by the deputy clerks in a Kentucky

13

county office.

14

THE COURT:

Why -- in the absence of a clerk,

15

like if I go to my home county Campbell -- and we have a

16

new clerk.

17

only time I've been down there is to vote absentee and to

18

get my driver's license.

19

ever had any act -- ever -- I've never had any

20

interaction with the clerk himself.

21

Tom Calme before that.

22

deputies would take my money and my information and then

23

issue my driver's license.

24

the clerk, but it's not -- I mean, it's stamped by the

25

clerk.

Jim Luersen is the new clerk.

I think the

The clerk -- I don't think I've

I think it was

I never saw the clerk.

The

I mean, it may be signed by
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1

MR. CHRISTMAN:

2

THE COURT:

3

talking about here?
MR. CHRISTMAN:

5

THE COURT:

You said two or four.

MR. CHRISTMAN:

THE COURT:

Right.

And, I mean, I could --

How about now?

10

MR. CHRISTMAN:

11

THE COURT:

13

You're

we could show at the appropriate time what --

9

12

There are --

confusing me here.

7
8

There are --

What are you -- what are you

4

6

Yeah.

-- a license --

I think now is the appropriate

time.
MR. CHRISTMAN:

Yes, Your Honor.

We

14

actually -- we actually have a copy of what the license

15

looked like immediately prior to the Obergefell decision

16

on June 26th, and then on June 30th with the governor of

17

Kentucky said, "I'm going to instruct and direct my

18

Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives to issue a

19

new form --"

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

MR. CHRISTMAN:

"-- because Kentucky is now

22

going to recognize and issue marriage licenses to

23

same-sex couples."

24
25

THE COURT:

Right.

So now we're -- I think the

one that's really relevant now is the one that's
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1

post-6/30/2015.

2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Right.

And there's very little

3

that was changed.

4

Your Honor that there is very little that changed before

5

and after.

6

We just wanted to show that to

But there are four spots.

You'll see in the

7

middle of the form with the one that is redacted because

8

it was easier to draw your attention to.

9

THE COURT:

10

Yes.

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Where it says, issued this

11

month, day, year, in the office of, and then it says,

12

name, comma, county.

13

Kim Davis.

14

Rowan County has to have her name right there.

15

prescribed by -- Kentucky marriage law requires her name

16

there.

17

And in those spots on every form is

Every marriage license form that comes out of
That's

Immediately below that is where it says

18

recorder's name, and that is a spot that under Kentucky

19

marriage law allows either the county clerk's name to be

20

there or a deputy clerk.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

So if the statute was

22

amended to allow for a deputy clerk to sign off on all of

23

this, would that change all of your opinion of this case?

24
25

MR. CHRISTMAN:

What -- what it would change if

you take -- if you take Kim Davis's requirement of having
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1

affix her name and approval of that marriage off of the

2

license and put it onto the hands and the authority of

3

somebody else, that's not her name, it's not her

4

approval, she doesn't have to bless that marriage,

5

then --

6
7

THE COURT:

She's just signing it as a representative of the county.

8
9

MR. CHRISTMAN:

THE COURT:
"bless."

I mean -MR. CHRISTMAN:

13

THE COURT:

14

about in church.

15

the county clerk.

17

Under

Well, you keep using the word

12

16

Yeah, she's approving.

the statute is what it says, that --

10
11

Well, she's not blessing anything.

-- under the authority --

-- blessing is something we talk

I mean, she's signing it because she's

MR. CHRISTMAN:

She's authorized.

The statutes

use the word authorized --

18

THE COURT:

Right.

19

MR. CHRISTMAN:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- approved.

Right.
And so, yeah, if you remove --

22

if the State of Kentucky or the Commonwealth of Kentucky

23

removes the statutory requirement that a county clerk

24

must authorize and approve these licenses, then that

25

would eliminate for Ms. Davis -- when Ms. Miller walked
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1

in for a marriage license, that would eliminate the

2

religious conscientious objection that Ms. Davis has to

3

having her name, signature, and approval on that license.

4

There are -- there are other ways -- again,

5

there are less restrictive means, other ways in which

6

Ms. Davis's religious objection can be accommodated.

7

example --

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CHRISTMAN:

For

Well, is that the --- you were actually talking

10

about your driver's license.

There are numbers of things

11

that people can get in a county.

12

a fishing license.

In fact, one of them is

Well --

13

THE COURT:

I do that online.

14

MR. CHRISTMAN:

You can do it online, and

15

that's certainly an option that's out there.

16

other states across the country have done this where they

17

move marriage out of a particular county clerk's office

18

and put it in the hands of the state or the Commonwealth

19

that people sitting in their living room, you know, can

20

go on their iPad and get a marriage license as long as

21

they verify who they are, and they pay the fee.

22

THE COURT:

Other --

No, those are -- these are all

23

prospective things that could impact this case.

I mean,

24

if the state were to go to online marriage licenses and

25

have the -- I guess it would be the -- is there a
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1

commissioner of that particular -- who was it that prints

2

out these forms?

3
4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Department of Libraries and Archives.

5
6

It comes from the Kentucky

THE COURT:

Yeah.

It's a branch --

Is there a commissioner of

Department of Libraries --

7

MR. CHRISTMAN:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CHRISTMAN:

There is --

-- and Archives?
There is a commissioner.

10

There's a commissioner that --

11

THE COURT:

That commissioner would sign off on

12

all of those I suppose.

13

I would assume that that's what would be who would sign

14

that.

15

MR. CHRISTMAN:

16

would come issued and --

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

19

Commonwealth's office.

20

there are --

21

THE COURT:

If you went to an online system,

And the -- yeah, the license

All right.
-- approved out of the
There are several other exempt --

You're going to have to keep your

22

voice up because it's getting hot in here.

23

come over to the podium so we can hear you.

24
25

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Why don't you

That -- Your Honor, that was --

that's one of the options that's available.
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1

And actually I was briefly about to mention

2

that there are several other licenses, different things,

3

that people can get from a county, and one of them is a

4

fishing license.

5

for county clerks that they can choose to submit

6

something in writing to this -- to the Commonwealth that

7

they can exempt themselves from their requirement to

8

actually issue a fishing license.

9
10
11
12
13

And Kentucky actually has an exemption

The cite for that would be Kentucky Revised
Statute 150.195.

So you --

THE COURT:

Why would they ever to that?

Do

they have an objection to issuing a fishing license?
MR. CHRISTMAN:

Well, people might have

14

different kinds of objection to different things.

15

what it shows, and evidence is, is that the legislature

16

and the governor know how to sit down and figure out how

17

to accommodate different exemptions.

18
19

THE COURT:

And

Is that something that can be done

by executive order?

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Actually --

Does anybody know?
Yes.

In this country there are

23

two examples at least already in Louisiana, not too far

24

from here, where Governor Jindal--

25

THE COURT:

Well, it's pretty far from here.
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1
2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

I'm coming from Florida so

Louisiana is not too far from here.

3

Where Bobby Jindal, the governor in that state,

4

actually issued an executive order that was entitled

5

Marriage and Conscience Order giving exemptions to a

6

whole litany of different people that would qualify.

7

Recently, after the Obergefell decision,

8

Governor Brownback in Kansas also issued an executive

9

order related to religious conscience and religious

10

exemption.

Both of the gubernatorial candidates in this

11

state in recent news articles have talked about when --

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

14

THE COURT:

15

We only have one now.

MR. CHRISTMAN:

THE COURT:

19

MR. CHRISTMAN:

I believe it was Bevin is the

-- current attorney general

is -THE COURT:

22

MR. CHRISTMAN:

23

THE COURT:

25

Who's the other one?

Oh, Jack Conway.

21

24

I mean,

republican candidate, and the --

18

20

Kentucky.

Bevin, didn't he win the primary?

16
17

In what state?

Oh, okay, Jack Conway, okay, okay.
-- running for governor.

I was just thinking Republicans

because -MR. CHRISTMAN:

I apologize for devolving into
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1

Kentucky politics for the moment.

2

an --

3
4

THE COURT:

I'm certainly not

I'm familiar with Kentucky

politics.

5

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- expert on them.

But both --

6

both of them have made public statements that related to

7

religious conscience about the legislature taking this

8

up, thinking about it to both work with what the

9

Supreme Court has said in Obergefell, but also then work

10

with a person like Kim Davis who has to affix her name

11

and approval on every license.

12

what's at issue here.

13

plaintiffs conceded and admitted in their testimony, they

14

can get a license other places.

15

And that's -- that's

We're not talking about -- as

They can obtain it.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky is not here saying

16

we're not going to issue you a license.

17

Kentucky says.

18

That's not what

In fact, what Kentucky says through

19

Governor Beshear, through Attorney General Conway, is

20

that we are recognizing same-sex marriages, both those

21

here in Kentucky, as well as all of the other states, if

22

you move to Kentucky, we will recognize your same-sex

23

marriage.

24
25

So Kentucky is not saying you can't get a
marriage license.

And that's what's different going back
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1

to some of those --

2

THE COURT:

The county -- well, what's

3

happening here is the county clerk is saying she's not

4

going to issue it.

5

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Because of -- because -- she's

6

not issuing any licenses right now because she wants to

7

comply with her obligations and duties to treat people

8

equally.

9

THE COURT:

Well, by doing that she's denying

10

the rights to anyone to get a marriage license in her

11

county.

12

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Well, it goes back to the

13

direct and substantial burden, and is that fundamental

14

right to marry being directly and substantially burdened?

15

They can go to these other counties.

16

can get licenses there.

17

go to the chief -- the county judge, the county

18

executive, who under Kentucky law, under current Kentucky

19

law, he may issue the license.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. CHRISTMAN:

22

They can go to Rowan County and

Even if she's sitting downstairs?
What the statute says is in the

absence of --

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. CHRISTMAN:

25

They'll get -- they

Or upstairs, wherever it is.
Any absence of the county

clerk, the county -- the county judge or executive may --
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

3

How is that defined absence?
-- issue the license.

The

statute --

4

THE COURT:

Is that an absence, physically

5

absent, or just because she has a conscientious objection

6

to issuing a license?

7

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Your Honor, I think it's both.

8

The statute does not define absence so it's left for

9

interpretation.

It says, "in the absence of county clerk

10

or vacancy in the office."

11

needs to be treated separately.

12

So vacancy in the office

In other words, there's an instance where we

13

can have a gap in time where there's nobody in the

14

position of county clerk.

15

absence --

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. CHRISTMAN:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. CHRISTMAN:

That's vacancy.

So in the

Someone resigns.
Someone resigns.

Right.
Various things could happen

20

that somebody -- there's nobody in the office, you have

21

to call special election.

22

Absence can happen in several different ways.

23

Somebody could be absent for a medical reason.

24

could be absent because of a religious conscious

25

objection.

Somebody

They could be absent because they're on
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1

vacation.

2

be absent from being able to be the county clerk who

3

issues the license.

4

There are several ways in which somebody could

And what Kentucky marriage law then provides

5

is if the county clerk is absent, you can go to the

6

chief judge and that chief judge may then issue a license

7

to you through a memorandum.

8
9
10
11

And what the plaintiffs have testified to
is that they went to the chief judge, the county
judge/executive, and he said no.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me ask this.

Let me ask

12

this question.

You represent Ms. Davis in her individual

13

and official capacity to the extent that she's ultimately

14

going to be served, both official and individual

15

capacity; correct?

16

MR. GANNAM:

17

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay.

If you bring -- you brought

18

this action under 1983 and have requested attorneys'

19

fees; correct?

20

MR. SHARP:

Yes, Your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

22

MR. CHRISTMAN:

All right.

Your Honor, so there is no

23

evidence that -- other than the admission now that the

24

plaintiffs actually tried the option in Rowan County.

25

there was another option that the law provided to them,

So
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1

that Mr. Blevins chose not to issue the license.

2

Mr. Blevins isn't before this Court so I'm not going to

3

presume upon his reasons for not issuing the license.

4

But there is that option, along with all these other

5

counties.

6

And by the governor's own statements that this

7

issue about individuals within Kentucky their inability

8

to obtain a marriage license, again, it's not -- this is

9

not the pre-Obergefell world.

If a same-sex couple

10

walked into one of the 120 Kentucky counties on

11

June 25th, 2015, not a single one of them could have

12

gotten a marriage license from Kentucky on that day.

13

Because why?

At that point the Kentucky

14

Constitution said what marriage was between one man and

15

one woman.

Kentucky statute said that.

16

THE COURT:

Well, that's --

17

MR. CHRISTMAN:

18

THE COURT:

Kentucky Supreme Court, so --

That's all well and good, but

19

that's pre-Supreme Court decision.

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Right.

And so it's to show

21

that -- and that county clerk in that instance

22

couldn't -- wasn't even permitted under the law, didn't

23

have any ability to issue the license.

24

Now the governor has come out, Kentucky has

25

come out and said we're recognizing and we're issuing
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1

marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and here's the

2

form you must use, mandatory, prescribed.

3

requires Kim Davis to put her name and her approval on

4

it.

And that form

5

The governor said this is not a widespread

6

issue, that this is limited in terms of the counties

7

where the county clerks, one of whom is Ms. Davis, is

8

unwilling to issue the marriage license.

9

different world from before.

This is a much

And that's why it goes back

10

to the fundamental right to marry is not being

11

substantially burden because --

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

14

class.

15

policies.

16

Well --- in those cases it was to a

It was to classes of people on statewide
And in -THE COURT:

Well, they filed a motion for

17

class cert -- well, you filed it as a purported class

18

action.

19

potentially --

I mean, the class is very small right now

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

21

THE COURT:

22

-- because of 119 other counties

are not objecting.

23

Is that fair?

24

MR. SHARP:

25

Right.

Your Honor, the proposed class is

defined in the complaint as present and future
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1

individuals who would seek to obtain a marriage license

2

in Rowan County.

3

statewide.

The proposed classes would not be

4

THE COURT:

It would just be one county?

5

MR. SHARP:

One county.

6

THE COURT:

Right.

7

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Kentucky law does not require

8

these couples to get a marriage license in Rowan County.

9

Kentucky law --

10

THE COURT:

I understand that.

11

MR. CHRISTMAN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- let's them go wherever.

I understand that, I do.
Loving versus Virginia, all

14

these fundamental right-to-marry cases all dealt with

15

statewide policies that prohibited groups of people by

16

class identification from being married.

17

Virginia was a Virginia law, a ban on interracial

18

marriages.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Loving versus

Right, right.
Zablocki was a Wisconsin law

21

that prevented parents who had support obligations still

22

owed to children that they had support -- child support

23

obligations to, if that wasn't paid in full, they

24

couldn't get a license.

25

It was a statewide policy.

In the Turner v. Safley case, which they cited
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1

in their papers, it was a Missouri statewide regulation.

2

In the case that was up at the Supreme Court in

3

Obergefell rising from Kentucky, it was a statewide

4

answer.

5

Here we're not talking about statewide.

What's

6

statewide as the general policy and the general rule is

7

what Governor Beshear said, what Attorney General Conway

8

said, is that marriage for any two people, subject to

9

some other requirements, that it's open for all, that

10

here's the form.

You can walk -- you can go get married,

11

and we'll recognize your marriage.

12

privileges, all the benefits that come from marriage.

13

Kentucky can do it.

14

can go to the neighboring counties.

15

other things.

16

THE COURT:

17

should they have to?

18

We'll give all the

These people can -- these plaintiffs
They can go to these

Well, why should they have to?

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Why

Four -- there are four sets of

19

couples who are plaintiffs in this case.

20

back to as my initial answer the reason for four is

21

because Ms. Davis does not want to issue -- does not want

22

to make any steps that would be seen as not treating

23

couples equally so --

24

THE COURT:

Right.

25

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Again, I'll go

Now, how many --

-- she does --
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1
2

THE COURT:

MR. CHRISTMAN:

She was elected in November of

2014 and --

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CHRISTMAN:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. CHRISTMAN:

9

THE COURT:

So she has --- took office --

Is it a four-year term?
It's a four-year term.

So for the next four years no

10

marriage licenses at all in Rowan County?

11

that what's going to happen?

12
13

When was she

elected?

3
4

Hold on, hold on.

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Is that -- is

I believe -- I believe that

there's an easier solution, and there are -- and it --

14

THE COURT:

Well, what's the --

15

MR. CHRISTMAN:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- can be easily resolved.

-- easier solution?
Well, we talked about some

18

other less restrictive alternatives and means that can

19

happen, is the -- remember, in Rowan County they can get

20

a license.

They can get one from Judge Blevins as well.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. CHRISTMAN:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Well, that's something I want to -Apparently they're saying --

That's something I want to explore

at some point with Mr. Mando.
MR. CHRISTMAN:

We'll cabin that.
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1

So another option is that, as I mentioned

2

earlier, there are other legislative and executive

3

options that are available that as that --

4

THE COURT:

Well, they may not --

5

MR. CHRISTMAN:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- other states --

-- be available now.
They're not available today,

8

but states are already working to take steps, and both of

9

the candidates have indicated that this is something that

10

they want to --

11
12

THE COURT:

Well, that's probably not going to

happen --

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

14

THE COURT:

15

-- to take up and address.

-- until the spring anyway.

That

wouldn't happen until the spring.

16

MR. CHRISTMAN:

17

THE COURT:

Yeah.

I can't imagine them calling a

18

legislative session for this one issue.

19

a little --

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. CHRISTMAN:

That would seem

And the current --

-- bit expensive.
Admittedly, the current

23

governor has said that he will not call a current -- a

24

special session right now for it.

25

But there are other -- there are other ways for
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1

licenses to begin to get issued because the governor can

2

work with the KDLA --

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

5

Okay.
-- to revise the form in the

interim and, again, going back to the four couples.

6

So that's why everybody -- that's why no one is

7

getting a marriage license with Kim Davis's authorization

8

and signature right now.

9

Now, for the two couples who came -- there is

10

one couple that was two women and another couple that was

11

two men.

12

held religious belief and a religious conscience

13

objection that prevents her name and her affixing her

14

name and signature to those licenses.

15

we'll present evidence that she does not have a

16

religious -- a sincerely held religious belief,

17

conscientious objection, to issuing a license to a couple

18

that's one man and one woman because --

For those two couples Ms. Davis has a sincerely

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

21
22
23
24
25

She does not --

Do you know what religion she is?
She's a professing Christian,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

She's a Christian, okay.

All

right, all right.
MR. CHRISTMAN:

And when she took office as the

elected county clerk, she -- at the time -- the day she
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1

took office it was January 1st, 2015.

2

the 1st.

3

year.

4

was in Kentucky was one man, one woman.

5

constitutional amendment, the legislative act, the

6

Sixth Circuit case at that point had overruled

7

Judge Heyburn's decision from the Western District, had

8

reversed that.

9

Or maybe it wasn't

It was the first Monday of January in the new

When she took office at that moment, what marriage
The

So there was no question at that point what the

10

law of marriage in Kentucky was.

11

with what Ms. Davis's sincerely held religious beliefs

12

were at that moment.

13

And that law comported

After she took office, and only after, is when

14

the Supreme Court even granted certiorari in the

15

Obergefell case.

16

That happened on January 16th of 2015.

And we'll present evidence from Ms. Davis that

17

from the moment the Obergefell decision, the cert

18

petition was granted, knowing that Kentucky's law there

19

was going to be a decision on it, that Ms. Davis began to

20

take steps that she could to alert legislators in

21

Kentucky, representatives, that depending on how this

22

goes, this is going to be a real issue for me because of

23

my religious, conscientious objection and what I believe

24

marriage to be.

25

She swore an oath to the Constitution, the
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1

United States Constitution, the Kentucky Constitution, so

2

help me God, that the entire oath was an oath that was --

3

it's built into the oath is inherent inalienable

4

protections for her conscience, for her religious

5

liberties, for her freedom.

6

THE COURT:

7

mentioned the oath.

8

the Constitution?

9
10

Well, she -- didn't she -- you
Did the oath require her to uphold

MR. CHRISTMAN:
Constitution.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CHRISTMAN:

13

THE COURT:

14

Well, now, the -What she took an oath --

-- definition of fundamental right

to marry has changed in the last two weeks.

15

MR. CHRISTMAN:

16

THE COURT:

17

And she is upholding the

changed.

The Supreme --

Well, the Supreme Court hasn't

It's been --

18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

19

THE COURT:

The Supreme --

-- the Supreme Court has upheld the

20

Fourteenth Amendment due process, fundamental right to

21

marry same-sex couples.

22

in March of this year.

23

an oath to uphold the Constitution.

24

now been expanded, if you will, to include same-sex

25

marriage.

That's different now than it was
So the Constitution -- she took
The Constitution has
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1
2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

the Constitution only expands by way of amendment and --

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

5

Your Honor, I would submit that

Well, okay.

Listen, we're --

-- she took an oath.

I don't

want --

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. CHRISTMAN:

8

COURT REPORTER:

9

THE COURT:

10

-- not going to --- to -- you said -I can only take one at a time.

Yes, thank you.

From the standpoint -- you're talking to

11

somebody who generally speaking is -- I look at the

12

Constitution and somebody can say it changes, it's a

13

living, breathing document.

14

people say it's what it says is what it should be.

15

we probably got lots of people in this room that agree

16

with one or the other.

17

Some
And

Now, I took an oath to uphold the law 13 plus

18

years ago.

19

the last say.

20

Some people say that.

The Supreme Court in matters like this has

Now, from a -- in a civilized society we set it

21

up that way.

22

appellate courts, and then we have the Supreme Court.

23

We've got district courts, we have

And if you get to the Supreme Court and they

24

make a final ruling -- and I apologize for using the word

25

amendment because I know how the constitutional amendment
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1

process works.

2

familiar with that.

3

I did go to law school.

I'm pretty

I'm sure you're aware of it as well.

But the Supreme Court made its ruling.

That's

4

what from a constitutional Fourteenth Amendment

5

perspective there's a fundamental right to marry to

6

both same and opposite-sex couples.

7

Supreme Court says the Constitution includes now, whether

8

it be -- it's not an amendment to the Constitution, but

9

it's held to be a fundamental right.

10

That's what the

I'm here to uphold the Constitution, among

11

other things.

Individuals who take oaths who are there

12

to uphold the Constitution have to do that as well.

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

14

THE COURT:

15

your point.

16

Constitution.

17

when she took office.

18

Yes.

So, I mean, I'm trying to follow

I mean, she took this oath to uphold the
The Constitution may not be what it was

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Yes, Your Honor, that's correct

19

in terms of how the Supreme Court is interpreting the

20

Constitution.

21

THE COURT:

Correct, correct.

22

MR. CHRISTMAN:

But what was also in effect on

23

January 1st, as well June 26th and today, was the

24

First Amendment of the United States.

25

THE COURT:

All right.

So we have a
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1

conflict --

2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

3

THE COURT:

4

Fourteenth Amendment.

5
6

-- First Amendment versus
We're getting somewhere.

MR. CHRISTMAN:

And what the Supreme Court said

in Obergefell --

7
8

So there are --

THE COURT:

Page 27.

I've read it multiple

times.

9

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- the one unanimous -- the one

10

unanimous ruling from that court was that religious

11

liberties, religious freedoms are still protected in this

12

country.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CHRISTMAN:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CHRISTMAN:

17

Right, pastors -And that when --

-- and churches, all agree.
Well, I mean, there's -- how

far does religious freedom and religious liberty go?

18

Religious conscience objections have been and

19

are accepted constitutionally for public employees, for

20

public officials that -- when you take office, you don't

21

waive and suddenly shed your constitutional rights,

22

freedoms, and liberties at the door of the government

23

courthouse --

24

THE COURT:

Sometimes you have to.

25

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- when you walk in.

There --
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1
2

THE COURT:

I mean, if I'm telling -- if I'm

picking a jury, I got to be careful what I say sometimes.

3

When I'm in this courtroom, I've got to be

4

careful what I say sometimes.

5

religion from this bench.

6

that would be inappropriate.

7

I mean, I can't profess

I would never try to because

I recognize that there's a conflict here.

The

8

Supreme Court recognizes a conflict.

9

Justice Thomas's dissent, I mean, he may very well be a

10

prophet.

11
12

If you read

I mean, he -MR. CHRISTMAN:

Your Honor, he predicted this

very --

13

THE COURT:

-- says, "It appears all but

14

inevitable that the two will come into conflict."

15

is being these two Fourteenth and First Amendment.

16

"Government and religious institutions, particularly as

17

individuals and churches are confronted with demands to

18

participate and endorse civil marriages between same-sex

19

couples."

20

That

So this is just the first, according to

21

Justice Thomas, of many situations where there may be a

22

conflict going forward.

23

MR. CHRISTMAN:

24

THE COURT:

25

that.

That's correct, Your Honor.

So, I mean, I'm -- I'm aware of

I am trying to get -- I would love for this to be
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1

a situation where if Kim Davis has a conflict, a deeply

2

held religious belief, that she can't sign off on these

3

marriage licenses, they go down the hall to the

4

judge/executive, and he signs it.

5

worry about an attorney fee petition where Rowan County

6

might be on the hook to sign -- to pay their attorneys'

7

fees.

8

recognize that.

Then we don't have to

I mean, there's a lot in play here potentially.

9

So, I mean, I'm going to go back to the very

10

first question that I asked that you then, as a good

11

advocate will, you kind of answered in a way that didn't

12

really answer the question.

13
14

But is there a compelling state interest in her
denying these marriage licenses?

15
16

I

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Yes, there is, and that

compelling --

17

THE COURT:

What is that?

18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- state interest is protecting

19

the individual religious freedoms of every person in the

20

Commonwealth of Kentucky.

21

Kim Davis.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. CHRISTMAN:

One of those people is

Okay.

So that's your answer?

That is a -- that is the

24

compelling interest of the highest degree because it goes

25

to the very first freedoms that are articulated in the
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1

United States Constitution, as well as the Kentucky

2

Constitution, which says, "The civil rights, privileges,

3

or capacities of no person shall not be taken away, or in

4

anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief

5

or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma, or teaching.

6

No human authorities shall, in any case whatever, control

7

or interfere with the rights of conscience."

8

That Kentucky has a compelling government

9

interest of upholding the rights of conscience, the

10

rights of religious freedom, rights of religious liberty,

11

free speech implications here because she's actually

12

putting her name and signature again on a form.

13

It is a -- if Kentucky is forcing her to do it,

14

Kentucky is compelling her, forcing her to speak as to a

15

view, a message, an idea, that -- a belief that she does

16

not agree with.

17

In addition to the constitutional protections,

18

in Kentucky enacted in 2013 over Governor Beshear's veto

19

overwhelmingly -- I think the votes were approximately

20

75 plus percent or 80 percent over the veto -- enacting a

21

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prevents the

22

government, prevents Kentucky, from burdening a person's

23

religious freedom.

24

THE COURT:

Now, a --

25

MR. CHRISTMAN:

They --
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1
2

THE COURT:

-- person's religious freedom in

what regard?

3

MR. CHRISTMAN:

The statute goes on.

"To act

4

or refuse to act motivated by a sincerely held religious

5

belief."

6

So when you get to the same-sex couple that

7

wants Ms. Davis personally to affix her name and approval

8

on it, and Kentucky is saying you must do it because this

9

is the form, and that's the only acceptable form, and

10

nothing else can be a marriage license in the

11

Commonwealth of Kentucky, what the government of Kentucky

12

is doing is saying to Kim Davis you have to act in a way

13

that violates your sincerely held religious belief.

14

And she says, no, the Kentucky Religious

15

Freedom Restoration Act protects me from refusing to act

16

in a certain way, motivated by a sincerely held religious

17

belief, which we will present and demonstrate at the

18

appropriate time, unless -- now, there is an unless.

19

When Ms. Davis says, I have a sincerely held

20

religious belief, I have a conscious objection, that

21

doesn't end this case.

22

Kentucky then can prove by a compelling, clear and

23

convincing evidence that it has a compelling government

24

interest and has used the least restrictive means.

25

Because the government of

So when Ms. Davis steps up and says, I submit
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1

that I have a sincerely held religious belief that

2

prevents me from putting my name and signature and

3

approval on this license, the government of Kentucky can

4

come in and make an argument that as a state, if they

5

want to argue, and I don't think they do, because the

6

candidates have said they want to recognize religious

7

conscience, but they would have to make some argument

8

that the Kentucky has a compelling government interest to

9

force Ms. Davis to violate her individual religious

10

liberties, protections.

11

least restrictive means.

12

compelling government interest, they have to do it in the

13

least restrictive means.

14

But they have to do it in the
Not only do they have to show a

In the Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby case from a

15

year ago, they interpreted the federal RFRA, which is

16

very similar and analogous to what Kentucky enacted.

17

the Kentucky statute even puts government on a higher

18

burden.

19

proof is for Kentucky to show.

But

It's clear and convincing is what the burden of

20

And in the Hobby Lobby case, it talked very

21

much about how -- how invasive and difficult it is to

22

satisfy the least restrictive means, that Kentucky is

23

going to have to show that there was no other way for

24

these four couples to get a license unless Kim Davis

25

personally signs, approves, and do it, that there's no
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1

other least restrictive means because --

2
3

THE COURT:

Well, I don't know why.

still -- you pointed --

4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

5

THE COURT:

6

certificate.

7

you know?

8
9

-- they've already --

-- to this form, marriage

How many clerk's deputies does she have, do

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Your Honor, she has -- she has

six deputy clerks currently employed.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. CHRISTMAN:

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

The numbers --

How many share --

-- sometimes fluctuate.

How many share her deep religious

13

conscientious objection?

14

MR. CHRISTMAN:

15

answer to that question.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. CHRISTMAN:

18

THE COURT:

19

I'm

Your Honor, I don't know the

Because you only represent her?
That's correct, Your Honor.

Okay.

Do you know the answer to

that, Mr. Mando?

20

MR. MANDO:

I'm sorry?

21

THE COURT:

Do you know how many of her six

22

deputies share her religious convictions?

23

MR. MANDO:

No, I do not, Your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

Do not?

25

MR. MANDO:

No.
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1

MR. CHRISTMAN:

2

THE COURT:

3

Okay.

Your Honor --

That might be an answer you might

want to get when she testifies --

4

MR. CHRISTMAN:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CHRISTMAN:

What I -- what I --

-- the next hearing.
-- would also submit is if

7

those deputy clerks also themselves have a sincerely held

8

religious belief, that Kim Davis in that case as the

9

employer of those individuals has a compelling government

10

interest herself to protect the individual consciences

11

and rights of those employees because of Kentucky Civil

12

Rights laws and other -- and constitutional protections

13

that she has.

She swore an oath to the Constitution --

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. CHRISTMAN:

-- to protect her religious

16

liberties but also others.

17

steps up and says, well, I have a religious conscientious

18

objection as well, as the employer in that instance

19

Ms. Davis would have to figure out a way, or try to

20

figure out a way, to accommodate that interest.

21
22

And so if an employee of hers

But here again, I go back to the other -- the
other ways in which Kentucky can --

23

THE COURT:

Well, we've talked --

24

MR. CHRISTMAN:

25

THE COURT:

-- issue a license without --

-- about that ad nauseam.
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1
2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

So those individuals are not

currently before this Court.

3

THE COURT:

No, they're not, they're not.

But

4

I'm -- part of my job is to try to figure out a way to

5

resolve all of this without lots of paper being burned,

6

with briefs, and lots of potential attorneys' fees being

7

litigated.

8

argue of ways to try to resolve this.

9

And I'm thinking of that as I listen to you

MR. CHRISTMAN:

And I go back to what we talked

10

about earlier about this is not -- this is not -- again,

11

it's not a statewide policy or mandate --

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. CHRISTMAN:

14

No, we're limited to one --- that's at issue.

We're

talking about --

15

THE COURT:

-- county, in --

16

MR. CHRISTMAN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

We're talking about --

-- Rowan County, yes, sir.
-- one county.

So, again, if

19

there is a scenario in place where there is a county

20

clerk that has a religious objection and demonstrates

21

that, and that government hasn't shown a compelling

22

government interest or a least restrictive means to

23

overturn it, and it turns out in the facts and the record

24

to be demonstrated later on that other deputy clerks also

25

have a sincerely held belief --
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

3

THE COURT:

4

So are you thinking --- over this --

-- that the other six are going to

have the same belief she has?

5

MR. CHRISTMAN:

I -- again, I don't know.

6

They're not before this Court.

7

THE COURT:

8

The plaintiffs --

It sounds to me like you think they

all will have it.

9

MR. CHRISTMAN:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. CHRISTMAN:

12

THE COURT:

I don't think that, Your Honor.

You don't think that?
I don't.

Okay.

So you think there may be a

13

deputy clerk in Rowan County that would be willing to

14

issue a license to a same-sex marriage?

15
16

MR. CHRISTMAN:

More importantly than a deputy

clerk is the chief judge, the county executive who --

17

THE COURT:

Well, that's something --

18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CHRISTMAN:

21

THE COURT:

-- publicly on record --

Okay.

Well, let's --

-- as saying he would.

I think I've heard enough from you

22

here.

I mean, I don't -- not that I'm mad at you.

23

just want to give the others an opportunity --

24

MR. CHRISTMAN:

25

THE COURT:

I'm not --

-- to speak.

I
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1
2

MR. CHRISTMAN:

across the face, Your Honor.

3
4

THE COURT:
sir.

It's not a slap across the face,

I just want to give these other --

5

MR. CHRISTMAN:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. CHRISTMAN:

8

-- going to take that as a slap

I appreciate --

-- folks an opportunity to talk.
-- it.

Thank you very much,

Your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

10

All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Mando, clear up this statute thing.

I

11

wasn't prepared to discuss this particular statute that

12

you referenced, or Mr. Christman mentioned about the

13

judge/executive having the ability to issue licenses in

14

the absence of the clerk herself.

15

MR. MANDO:

Right.

I believe the statute,

16

Your Honor -- and I don't have it with me -- but I think

17

it's 402.240.

18
19

THE COURT:

Russ, could you turn down the air,

please?

20

Thank you.

21

MR. MANDO:

And that statute, Your Honor,

22

provides that the judge/executive may issue a marriage

23

license in the -- when there's a vacancy in office or the

24

absence of the county clerk.

25

In this particular case the evidence that I've
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1

heard from the bench -- from the witness stand so far is

2

that Ms. Davis was, in fact, present when the plaintiffs

3

called and/or visited the office to secure the license.

4

And the testimony from the witness stand was is

5

that judge/executive understood what the limitations on

6

his authority were, that he could not issue that if, in

7

fact, Ms. Davis was not absent.

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. MANDO:

And she wasn't.

10

THE COURT:

Is absence -- I don't think absence

11
12
13

is defined though.
MR. MANDO:

I don't believe it is, but it's --

absence to me is she's not there.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. MANDO:

She's gone.

16

THE COURT:

Well, if -- so if these two

17

same-sex couples hypothetically were to go to Morehead on

18

a day that she was at lunch, or not at the courthouse for

19

whatever reason, doctor appointment, medical appointment

20

with a child, something, vacation, and Walter Blevins was

21

there, he could -- he would issue a license to them in

22

her absence?

23

MR. MANDO:

It depends on -- in that

24

particular situation, I mean -- again, I think absence

25

means she's not there.

I think the interprets of the
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1

General Assembly would be if she is out of the country,

2

if she is incapacitated in some way.

3

THE COURT:

Right.

4

MR. MANDO:

It doesn't mean, I don't think,

5

from trying to get commonsense from what the General

6

Assembly is trying to say, I don't think it means she's

7

simply out for lunch.

8

at 1 o'clock and secure their licenses.

9

THE COURT:

10

little bit flippant.

11

MR. MANDO:

12

that he met.

13

license.

14

In that case they should come back

I understand that.

I was being a

But the statute says that he --

He doesn't have to issue that particular

THE COURT:

Are you aware of any conscientious,

15

religious deeply held belief that the judge/executive has

16

on this issue?

Has he made any public comments at all?

17

MR. MANDO:

No.

18

THE COURT:

No?

19

MR. MANDO:

No.

The county's position on this,

20

Your Honor, is that they have no authority except for

21

this limited exception in the statute for the

22

judge/executive.

23

issue marriage licenses to people who apply or to

24

restrict the clerk to forebear from issuing licenses when

25

they are sought.

The county itself has no authority to
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1
2

Instead, the county clerk is a separate
constitutional office under the Kentucky Constitution.

3

The fiscal court of Carter -- of Rowan County

4

and Judge/Executive Blevins have no authority to weigh in

5

here and tell her what not to do or what to do with

6

regard to her religious objections to issuing these

7

licenses.

8
9

THE COURT:

Okay.

Who -- hypothetically, if

the plaintiffs prevail in this case, who would be

10

responsible for the attorneys' fees under the statute?

11

Would it be the county?

12

MR. MANDO:

Would it be --

There's two potentials there,

13

Your Honor.

14

testimony today and thought about this, hearing the

15

evidence, it sounds to me like there's potential that the

16

county clerk in terms of issuing this license could be

17

considered a state actor.

18

evidence I heard today, the license forms come from the

19

KDLA, Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives, an

20

executive branch of Kentucky state government.

21
22
23

Because the more I've listened to the

Because, according to the

The governor issued a directive to the county
clerks to issue -- for the clerks to issue the licenses.
Those types of forms, directives are not coming

24

from the fiscal court.

And, therefore, if that ends up

25

being the proof, that's not a policy, custom, or practice
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1

of the county, which would expose the county to that

2

attorney fee exposure.

3

I do, however, acknowledge the counter-argument

4

that she is a separately elected county clerk, and there

5

is certainly a potential exposure that the county, the

6

county clerk's office, her budget could be at risk if

7

attorney fees are awarded.

8

THE COURT:

All right.

9

MR. MANDO:

Thank you.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

11

Thank you.

I'm not going to let

you off without some questions here, Mr. Sharp.

12

Could the defendants comply with Obergefell by

13

having someone else in the clerk's office issue the

14

license?

15
16
17

MR. SHARP:

That's not the world we live in,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, is it?

I mean, I finally got

18

Mr. Christman to answer a question after a little bit of

19

discussion.

20

are trying to accommodate the religious conflict that

21

exists here between the First Amendment and the

22

Fourteenth Amendment.

23

with situations where you've got one constitutional claim

24

pitted up against another constitutional claim.

25

have that to a certain extent here.

But, I mean, is that -- I know other states

And there's -- history is littered

And we

I mean, they've
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1
2
3
4

raised it.
Now, whether or not she has a legitimate
religious conviction or not, I mean, they say she does.
So -- and on page 27 of the decision that I

5

quoted from earlier, this is the majority.

I mean, this

6

is Kennedy writing.

7

religious organizations and persons are given proper

8

protection as they seek to teach the principles that are

9

so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths

"The First Amendment ensures that

10

and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family

11

structure that they have long revered."

12

It goes on to state, "It must be emphasized

13

that the religion -- that religions and those who adhere

14

to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with

15

utmost, sincere conviction that, by devine precepts,

16

same-sex marriage should not be condoned."

17

So, I mean, that -- I've read the decision

18

multiple times, and there are going to be situations

19

where it's difficult to reconcile a -- in this case, a

20

particular defendant's First Amendment right as set forth

21

in -- well, reconcile the fundamental right that the

22

Supreme Court in Obergefell found with that

23

First Amendment right.

24
25

I mean, it -- there is -- even the
Supreme Court seemed to recognize that there could be
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1

conflicts.

2

MR. SHARP:

3

as that, Your Honor.

4

says that, you know, they may continue to advocate, not

5

that they may continue to impose their religious beliefs

6

on others when they are, in fact, employed and an actor

7

of the government.

8
9

I don't think it's as complicated
The -- Justice Kennedy's opinion

This case is really quite simple.

And the

political proposals that have been offered by opposing

10

counsel about solutions to this, you know, that's for the

11

General Assembly.

12

government.

13

That's for the political branches of

Today we're dealing with a very simple

14

situation, and that is whether or not it is unlawful for

15

a government official for personal religious reasons to

16

impose a substantial burden on individuals' right to

17

marry by withholding an essential government service.

18

And that's really what this is about.

19

I mean, aside from the legally articulated

20

interest of protecting, you know, all the clerks' right

21

to the free exercise of religion, I mean, Ms. Davis

22

herself has said she opposes on religious grounds

23

same-sex marriage.

24

her name to a same-sex marriage license.

25

She has said she would never affix

Opposite-sex couples got swept up in
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1

Ms. Davis's policy because she said she didn't want to

2

discriminate against same-sex couples.

3

the class of individuals whose rights she decided to

4

violate.

5

So she broadened

She does not get to impose her religious views

6

on others.

7

fundamental right to marry.

8

official, crosses the line when for personal religious

9

reasons she withholds a government benefit that they are

10
11

It's as simple as that.

They have a

And she, as a government

otherwise entitled to receive.
Particularly, where, as here, the government

12

entitlement is a legally required prerequisite for those

13

individuals to exercise their own constitutionally

14

protected fundamental right to marry.

15

THE COURT:

So if -- going back to the original

16

question I asked you though, if someone else in the

17

clerk's office would sign off on that marriage license,

18

would that be enough?

19

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, I will tell you that I

20

think that would depend largely on the facts because

21

there is a -- there would very much be an equal

22

protection concern insofar as separate but equal.

23

You know, the notion that Kim Davis could with

24

a wink and a nod go on break, and this other clerk deal

25

with the same-sex couples is offensive insofar as --
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1
2

THE COURT:

Okay.

If it's offensive, there's

MR. SHARP:

I mean, to the extent the same-sex

a --

3
4

couples have to accommodate Kim Davis's schedule, be it

5

vacation or break or lunch so they can avail themselves

6

of their fundamental --

7

THE COURT:

I understand.

8

MR. SHARP:

-- right to marry, that's not what

9

the First Amendment free exercise provides.

10
11

THE COURT:

Well, I know that some states are

allowing that to occur.

12

MR. SHARP:

If --

13

THE COURT:

Some counties, I guess, are

14

allowing that to occur; not in Kentucky but in other

15

places.

16

MR. SHARP:

If the General Assembly crafted

17

such a thing, I mean, it would be impossible for me to

18

offer any conjecture about what that would look like at

19

this point.

20

THE COURT:

Well, it seems like the license

21

itself -- and I'm not trying to -- I mean, obviously, the

22

choice of the sacrament of marriage and getting married

23

is much more important than making sure you have your

24

fishing license to go fish at Cave Run there in Zilpo

25

in Rowan County.

Make sure -- I mean, there are two
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1

different -- there's two licenses.

One you pay whatever,

2

$25 or whatever the fee is, and you go fish.

3

one is something that lasts a lifetime, much more

4

significant.

The other

5

But at the end of the day the piece of paper,

6

the license itself, is just a piece paper that's signed

7

by whoever the clerk happens to be.

8

why these ideas of making it just online, if you're

9

really just dealing with a piece of paper, it seems like

10

So it's -- that's

that would be the best way to do it.

11

Now, again, that's a legislative choice, an

12

executive choice.

13

those are all things that could impact potentially this

14

case going forward.

15

We're here in the judicial branch, so

But I'm -- the idea of trying to accommodate

16

the defendant's First Amendment right, which even the

17

Supreme Court says, she does have a First Amendment

18

right.

19

exercise that in her capacity as the Rowan County Clerk,

20

I mean, the Supreme Court talks about individuals and

21

churches.

22

not so sure that -- like, for instance, pastors who want

23

to not -- who don't want to officiate over same-sex

24

marriage, I don't think that this case requires a pastor

25

in a church to officiate over same sex.

Now, whether or not she -- it allows her to

It talks about -- let's see.

Well, I'm just

They still can
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1

say, no, I don't want to do it.

2

And I have someone I knew from college who just

3

officiated over a same-sex marriage in Covington, one of

4

the district judges, a family court judge.

5

her right to do that if she wanted to.

6

if you could compel her to do that.

7

No one has asked me one way or the other.

8
9

And that was

Now, I don't know

But she's a judge.

But I'm just thinking that her First Amendment
right I'm going to need to -- hopefully you can address

10

this in your written filing.

11

answered my question about what the substantial

12

government interest is when you were talking earlier

13

about her individual First Amendment right.

14

the government has a compelling interest in allowing that

15

to occur.

16

not the state's right, but --

17

I mean, you finally

I mean, and

I mean, that seems to be her individual right,

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, that -- and I think

18

that's exactly correct.

I mean, we're not talking

19

about we're -- that analysis, whether it be strict

20

scrutiny, compelling interest, intermediate scrutiny,

21

important interest, or rational basis, legitimate

22

interest --

23

THE COURT:

It's not rational basis.

24

be something higher than that.

25

MR. SHARP:

It's state -- exactly.

It has to

It's state
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1

interest.

2

What is the state interest at stake?
What we have here is Ms. Davis's personal

3

interest.

4

her obligations to issue same-sex marriage licenses on

5

the same terms as opposite-sex couples.

6

Her personal religious beliefs conflict with

I mean, it's evident in her own public

7

statements.

8

prohibition on issuing marriage licenses occurred after

9

Obergefell.

10

It's not coincidence that this blanket

So -- and to the extent that opposing counsel

11

suggest, well, the plaintiffs can simply drive to another

12

county or they can walk down the hall.

13

have walked down the hall, and the county judge/executive

14

has said, I'm in charge of enforcing or applying this

15

statute, she's not absent, can't, won't issue you a

16

marriage license.

17

I mean, A, they

Ms. Davis through her religious beliefs does

18

not get to impose those on the plaintiff.

She does not

19

get to dictate the manner in which they have to exercise

20

their own fundamental right.

21

When she voluntarily seeked public office,

22

elected or employment or otherwise, she is no longer

23

acting as citizen vis-a-vis government sovereign.

24

acting as government herself, vis-a-vis the residence of

25

Rowan County.

She's
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1

And when she has to comply with the legal

2

requirements of her office, that is her employment.

3

And the cases cited about, you know, burden on

4

the right to marry, you know, and whether it's a

5

substantial and direct, I mean, it doesn't get more

6

substantial and direct than when the county clerk

7

responsible for issuing marriage licenses refuses to

8

issue them, particularly where the plaintiffs have to

9

obtain those in order to avail themselves of the right to

10

marry in the first place.

11

The suggestion that they should simply go to

12

another county is totally inadequate and misses the

13

point.

14

It then confers on county clerks the apparent

15

authority, you know, at what point does the Court decide

16

whether or not there's enough counties available to issue

17

marriage licenses?

18

I mean, the media has reported, you know,

19

somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 county clerks who

20

have indicated that perhaps they have objections.

21

But, you know, in any event, Ms. Davis's legal

22

obligations to perform the functions of her office,

23

though conflicting with her personal religious beliefs,

24

is not -- her personal religious beliefs or opposition to

25

it is not in and of itself a state interest.
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

One of the things I want

2

someone to produce, and I don't know if it's going to be

3

Ms. Davis or the county itself or both, what are her

4

obligations as the county clerk?

5

job duties, if you will?

6
7
8
9

What are her, I guess,

Is there a --

MR. SHARP:

Vis-a-vis marriage licenses or more

THE COURT:

No, just -- well, I mean, vis-a-vis

broadly?

marriage licenses.

I mean, just something that if you

10

have something -- if it's like a job description, or I

11

don't know if it would be a regulation or administrative

12

regulation, I don't know what it would be.

13

and that can be produced the next time we meet.

14

don't have to produce it today.

15
16
17

Perhaps -You

I -- is there anything else you want to say?

I

don't want to keep everybody too long.
MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, I believe -- again, the

18

focus here is on whether or not Ms. Davis can withhold

19

government benefits based on her religious beliefs.

20

fact that she has included in this blanket policy

21

opposite sex couples is of no consequence.

22

interest that's served by her policy is personal,

23

personal religious beliefs.

24

in so far as it imposes an unlawful burden on plaintiffs'

25

right to get married.

The

It's the

And it simply is untenable
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1

Thank you.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

Okay.

Well, here is

3

what we're going to do.

4

of this hearing will be continued in progress.

5

said, as soon as we find that -- or learn that she has

6

been properly served, file a notice of that with the

7

Court.

8

Covington not earlier than Monday of next week.

9

have Court on the 21st.

10

This -- the evidentiary portion
Like I

We'll set a follow-up evidentiary hearing in

employment case.

I do

I know of a final pretrial in an

I'm not sure what time that is.

11

Do you recall what time that is set, morning?

12

LAW CLERK:

10:00.

13

THE COURT:

10:00, okay.

14

than Monday.

15
16

I'll have my clerk contact counsel.

Are you going to enter a formal entry of
appearance?

17
18

It will be no earlier

MR. MANDO:

I will make sure that's done

tomorrow as soon as I return to the office.

19

THE COURT:

Okay, great.

And then we'll

20

contact counsel just by phone just to get a time that

21

will work.

22

can.

I want to try to expedite this as much as I

23

All right.

Can I see counsel -- oh, yes, sir.

24

MR. MANDO:

Just one more thing, Your Honor.

25

The county is interested in reducing expense,
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1

being efficient as we possibly can.

We know there's

2

another lawsuit that was filed.

3

Attorney Joe Buckles who's out of Lexington.

I think it was filed by

4

THE COURT:

Right.

5

MR. MANDO:

I haven't had a chance to get it

6

downloaded yet.

7
8

THE COURT:

I have a copy in my office if you

want a copy of it.

9
10

I think it was maybe filed Friday.

MR. MANDO:

I'm not sure if it's -- if they've

asked for injunctive relief.

11

THE COURT:

They have not.

12

MR. MANDO:

All right.

I'm just saying that if

13

there -- we would be interested in some consolidation,

14

again, to minimize expense to the county, to save

15

resources.

16
17
18
19
20

THE COURT:

Okay.

Any objection to that?

It's

MR. SHARP:

I'm sorry, Your Honor, consolidate

15-46.

the later filed case?
THE COURT:

Well, it's assigned to me.

21

Judge Wilhoit refused in that case as well so -- in fact,

22

it's related.

23

MR. SHARP:

24

MR. GANNAM:

25

No objection.
Your Honor, I think we would have

to -- there's complexities with the punitive class action
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1

on one hand and an individual action on the other.

2

they be class reps?

3

proper motion for consolidation.

4

THE COURT:

Would

I just think we would need to see a

Well, I'm thinking that this case

5

is going to be resolved well before we get to any motion

6

for class certification.

7
8

MR. SHARP:

The proposed

class is 23(b)(2), prospective injunctive relief.

9
10

Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT:

It would likely include them

MR. SHARP:

They are only seeking damages

anyway.

11
12

actions in that subsequent case.

I mean, yes, they would

13

presumably be class members unless and until they get

14

married.

15

action for their damages claims aside from the class

16

action.

But they would have an independent cause of

17

THE COURT:

Well --

18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Your Honor, those plaintiffs

19

haven't asked for injunctive relief so if they're going

20

to be joined in the action in any way, Your Honor, we

21

would ask that they, you know, have to file their own

22

motion in order to be --

23

THE COURT:

Well, since they are both assigned

24

to me, they are related.

I'm not necessarily going to

25

join them at this point.

It makes sense to at least
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1
2
3

consider that at some point.
I would like to see the attorneys in my office
after this hearing.

4

MR. SHARP:

If I may, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

6

MR. SHARP:

One final thing.

I think the Court

7

had ordered that the response be due July the 30th

8

presuming -- July 30.

9

reply time of --

We would just ask for an expedited

10

THE COURT:

Seven days?

11

MR. SHARP:

Seven days is fine.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

13

MR. SHARP:

Thank you.

14

THE COURT:

Very well.

15

MR. SHARP:

Thank you.

16

We will be in recess.

(Whereupon, the proceedings adjourned at 12:20 p.m.)
C E R T I F I C A T E

17
18

Seven days.

I, Peggy W. Weber, certify that the foregoing is a

19

correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the

20

above-entitled matter.

21
22
23
24
25

July 16, 2015
DATE

s/Peggy W. Weber
PEGGY W. WEBER, RPR
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1

(Proceedings commenced at 9:59 a.m.)

2
3

THE COURT:

Good morning.

call the matter for preliminary injunction hearing.

4

DEPUTY CLERK:

5

et al., versus Kim Davis, et al.

6
7

THE COURT:

Why don't we have entries of appearance,

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, Bill Sharp on behalf of

plaintiffs.

10

MR. CANON:

11

MR. GANNAM:

12
13
14
15
16

Judge, Dan Canon here for the plaintiffs.
Roger Gannam for the defendant, Kim

Davis.
MR. CHRISTMAN:

Good morning, Your Honor.

John

Christman also for Kim Davis.
MR. DONAHUE:

A.C. Donahue on behalf of the

defendant, Kim Davis, Your Honor.

17

MR. MANDO:

18

County, Your Honor.

19

Ashland Civil 15-44, April Miller,

please.

8
9

Madam Clerk, if you would

MR. WATKINS:

Jeff Mando for the defendant, Rowan

Cecil Watkins for the defendant, Rowan

20

County, Your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

You're Miss Davis?
Yes.

We continued the hearing today because

24

you had not been formally served last week.

Your attorneys

25

made some motions regarding that, which the Court previously
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1

denied.

2

served.

3

But we're here now.

You're here.

You've been

The purpose of today's hearing is to hear any proof that

4

you have or that Rowan County has on behalf of either yourself

5

or the county.

6

I had asked, I think it was you, Mr. Mando, last week

7

about the oath of the duties of the county clerk, if there was

8

something formal that I could see.

9

generally about that.

I know we had talked

I can't remember if it was you or

10

Mr. Gannam's client.

11

something that showed the formal duties of the clerk.

12
13

Someone was going to bring today

I can't remember who I left that with at the end of the
hearing.

14

MR. MANDO:

Your Honor, I took that -- I apologize,

15

but I took that upon Miss Davis and her lawyer, since she is

16

the county clerk, to provide the list of duties.

17

some statutes that I think we would all agree apply to the

18

county clerk for issuing of marriage licenses.

19

THE COURT:

You had sent me that or shown me that

20

last week.

21

judge, in her absence, to act.

22

I do have

That was just the one that allowed the county

MR. MANDO:

402.240 that talks about the permissive

23

nature of the judge executive to issue a marriage license in

24

the absence of the county clerk or in the vacancy of the

25

office.

We talked about that and I showed you a copy.

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 26 Filed:
15-607/23/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 5 of 83 Page:
- Page6ID#: 221
(183 of 313)
5
1
2
3

THE COURT:

You did.

This is a separate statute

you're referring to?
MR. MANDO:

There are two other statutes that I think

4

also I would talk about, which would be KRS 402.080, which

5

talks about the issuance of the marriage license shall be

6

issued by the county clerk.

7

that must be used by the county clerk as prescribed by the

8

State Department of Library and Archives.

9

THE COURT:

And 402.100 talks about the form

I recall that.

And someone submitted --

10

I think it was you, Mr. Gannam -- the actual form itself, and

11

it had some blocked-out sections.

12

first party, second party that's, I guess, being used now

13

since the Supreme Court's decision.

14

MR. GANNAM:

There's a new one that had

That's correct, Your Honor.

We're

15

prepared to, through Miss Davis, put on testimony today of all

16

her duties as well as formally admit the forms into evidence.

17

THE COURT:

That's fine.

I just couldn't remember

18

who I left that task with.

19

We'll allow you to call your first witness.

20

MR. GANNAM:

I guess it's you, Mr. Gannam.

Your Honor, before we begin, I wanted to

21

say that the defendant is prepared to argue at this point that

22

the motion could be denied based on the plaintiffs' failure to

23

carry their burden of proving the elements necessary for a

24

preliminary injunction.

25

that point now, before we proceed to put on our evidence,

If the Court would hear argument on
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1

we're prepared to do that.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. GANNAM:

4

That motion will be denied.
Thank you, Your Honor.

We will call our

first witness, who will be County Judge Executive Blevins.

5

THE COURT:

6

WALTER BLEVINS, JR., DEFENSE WITNESS, SWORN

7

THE COURT:

8

All right.

Come around, sir.

You may proceed.

Good morning, sir.

9

THE WITNESS:

10

Good morning.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

11

BY MR. GANNAM:

12

Q.

13

attorneys representing Kim Davis in this lawsuit.

14

please state your full name for the record?

15

A.

Walter Blevins, Jr.

16

Q.

And what is your title?

17

A.

Rowan County Judge Executive.

18

Q.

And what is your business address, Judge Blevins?

19

A.

600 West Main Street, Morehead, Kentucky, 40351.

20

Q.

Is your position as county judge executive an elected

21

position?

22

A.

Yes, sir.

23

Q.

When were you elected?

24

A.

November of last year.

25

think it was maybe the 8th.

Good morning.

My name is Roger Gannam.

I'm one of the
Will you

I don't know the exact date.

I
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1

Q.

And how long is your term?

2

A.

Four-year term.

3

Q.

Judge Blevins, can you just generally describe the

4

duties, responsibilities of your office?

5

A.

6

chairman of the board, more or less, in the fiscal court

7

meetings.

8

try to bring, hopefully, jobs and opportunity to the

9

community, help in any kind of disasters that occur, and just

Well, I'm kind of like the mayor of the county.

I'm the

My job really is to advocate to the county and to

10

try to do the duties of the judge.

11

Q.

12

any other boards or committees that you preside over?

13

A.

14

on the Gateway Services Community Board.

15

appoint many of the boards and attend many of the board

16

meetings.

The airport board, I serve on it, or attend the

17

meetings.

The district health board, the county health board.

18

I'm on several boards.

19

Q.

20

official in Rowan County?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

I'm going to read to you from Kentucky Revised Statute

23

402.240 and then ask you some questions about it.

24

of the statute is County Judge Executive to Issue License in

25

Absence of Clerk.

You mentioned presiding over the fiscal court.

Yeah, there's several.

Are there

I'm on the Gateway Ad Board.

I'm

I'm on the -- I

Would it be fair to say that you are the highest elected

The title

It reads, In the absence of the county
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1

clerk, or during a vacancy in the office, the county judge

2

executive may issue the license and, in so doing, he shall

3

perform the duties and incur all the responsibilities of the

4

clerk.

5

thereof to the clerk and the memorandum shall be recorded as

6

if the license was issued by the clerk.

7

this statute, Judge Blevins?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And according to the statute, is it your understanding

The county judge executive shall return a memorandum

Are you familiar with

10

that you have authority to issue a marriage license in the

11

absence of the county clerk?

12

A.

13

by any other judge executive, though.

14

Q.

15

term, "in the absence of the county clerk"?

16

A.

17

mother at times, when she was gone on vacation, she would

18

allow the deputy clerks to perform that duty.

19

think the judge executive office, as far as I know, has ever

20

done that.

21

Q.

22

what would have to occur for the county clerk to be absent,

23

based on your understanding of that statute?

24

A.

25

question.

According to the statute.

I don't know if it's been used

What is your understanding of the word "absence" in the

Since she has deputy clerks, and I know that at least her

So I don't

So but when it says in the absence of the county clerk,

Say that again.

Let me make sure I understand the
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1

Q.

Where the statute says, "in the absence of the county

2

clerk, the county judge executive may issue a marriage

3

license," what is your understanding of what the word

4

"absence" means?

5

A.

6

being out of office or if the clerk passed away or something

7

like that, it would absent then.

8

Q.

9

would submit would occur if the clerk were to die, as you

I would say absent would be due to health reasons, due to

The statute also talks about a vacancy in office, which I

10

said, or were to leave office completely.

11

you talked about an absence for health reasons.

12

other circumstances that you would understand to mean "absent"

13

as it's used in that statute?

14

A.

15

would assume she would be absent.

16

executive, as far as I know, has never performed that duty.

17

I'm in and out of the office quite often.

18

regular, eight-hour day because of meetings and going to

19

Frankfort and continuing education, of course, I have to take.

20

Apart from that,
Are there any

If she was in the hospital or if she was on vacation, I
But again, the judge

I'm not there on a

So in that respect, when she's not there, her clerks are

21

there to -- the office is still open.

Her clerks are there

22

performing those duties.

23

Q.

24

are you aware of any time that the clerk, Kim Davis, has not

25

been there but that there were not deputy clerks there to

During the regular business hours of the clerk's office,
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1

perform her duties?

2

A.

I can't, I can't remember a time that's occurred.

3

Q.

Is your understanding of the meaning of that statute, KRS

4

402.240, based on any court decision that you've read or

5

received?

6

A.

Again, I can't remember any of those.

7

Q.

Have you received an opinion of the attorney general of

8

the Commonwealth of Kentucky regarding interpretation of that

9

statute?

10

A.

Yes.

I think I had a conversation, a telephone

11

conversation with the county attorney and some people out of

12

the attorney general's office.

13

Q.

When did that conversation occur?

14

A.

That was shortly after this case became prominent in the

15

newspaper that marriage licenses were not going to be given

16

out in Rowan County.

17

wanted to find out as much as I could about this issue.

18

Q.

Who did you speak with in the attorney general's office?

19

A.

I can't remember their -- county attorney might remember

20

who he had on the phone when I talked to him.

21

to my KACO attorney, and he basically said that there was no

22

way that -- county judges are not there to perform that duty.

23

And in an absence, if it was that kind of an absence, that I

24

would appoint someone to perform those duties.

25

Q.

And we're basically on new ground.

I

Also, I talked

Have are you received any kind of formal, written opinion
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1

from the attorney general's office?

2

A.

No, I have not.

3

Q.

Are you aware that the Rowan County Clerk, Kim Davis, is

4

not issuing any marriage licenses?

5

A.

Yes, I am.

6

Q.

Are you aware that she has directed her deputy clerks

7

also not to issue marriage licenses?

8

A.

Yes, I am.

9

Q.

Since Kim Davis discontinuing -- discontinued issuing

10

marriage licenses out of her office, have you been requested

11

to issue any marriage licenses?

12

A.

13

being denied and asked if I could do it.

14

not absent.

15

Q.

Any besides that one couple?

16

A.

That's the only couple I remember that came actually to

17

the office.

18

individual who I think she's one of the plaintiff -- or I

19

guess, yeah, one of the plaintiffs in the case.

20

them.

21

Q.

22

KRS 402.240 the only reason why you did not issue the license

23

upon that request?

24

A.

25

sure I would have the proper paperwork to even do it.

I have people -- one couple came by the office after
I said, well, she's

I cannot do that.

I think she -- they were accompanied by another

She was with

Is your interpretation of the word "absent" as used in

Well, I've never issued a license like that.

I'm not
So I --

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 26 Filed:
15-607/23/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 12 of 83Page:
- Page
13ID#: 228
(190 of 313)
12
1

that would be one of the main reasons is not having any

2

knowledge of how to do -- how to fill it out and the proper

3

procedure I'd have to go through.

4

Q.

5

according to the statute, you would have the legal authority

6

to issue a marriage license?

7

A.

8

duties over.

9

an extended period of time or if for some reason she wasn't

Do you agree that there are circumstances where,

Again, I would probably appoint someone to take those
So it would basically be if she was absent for

10

able to perform her duties, then I would appoint someone.

11

Q.

12

KRS 63.220, Vacancies in County Offices.

13

in the office of sheriff, coroner, surveyor, county clerk,

14

county attorney, jailer, or constable shall be filled by the

15

county judge executive or by the mayor in a consolidated local

16

government.

17

I'm going to read to you another statute.

It's

It says, A vacancy

Are you familiar with that statute?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Would that be the statute that you would rely upon to

20

fill a vacancy in the clerk's office?

21

A.

22

use for any -- any of those individuals or elected office

23

holders, it would be up to me to appoint someone to fill

24

their -- fulfill their duties until another election.

25

Q.

Yes.

That's how -- that's the same statute that I would

Are you aware of any statute that gives you the authority
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1

to appoint a replacement clerk if she is merely absent but not

2

vacant from office?

3

A.

4

are basically under her purview.

5

take over the duties.

6

Q.

7

authority to appoint someone to fill a vacancy in the clerk's

8

office.

9

absent, as that's defined in the statute, would you agree that

I think those -- I'm really not.

I think those clerks

When she's not there, they

So going back to -- we've covered that you have the

But in a circumstance where the clerk is merely

10

you have authority in that situation to issue the license

11

yourself?

12

A.

13

the software to print it.

14

She said we don't have the software to print them out.

15

would have to go to the clerk's office, I assume get one of

16

the deputies.

17

I'm not sure on that myself because I don't have those -I asked my secretary about this.
I

I don't understand why I -- the deputies normally take

18

over her job description when she's absent, like an illness or

19

vacation, so I assume continue with them.

20

Q.

21

form of marriage license to be used by the clerk's office is

22

created by the Kentucky Department of Library and Archives?

23

A.

Yes, I found that out about a week or two ago.

24

Q.

Are you aware of any statute that dictates who provides

25

the form of memorandum that's mentioned in the statute giving

Are you aware that there's a statute dictating that the

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 26 Filed:
15-607/23/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 14 of 83Page:
- Page
15ID#: 230
(192 of 313)
14
1

the county judge executive authority to issue a marriage

2

license in the absence or vacancy of the clerk?

3

A.

No, I'm not, sir.

4

Q.

Assuming there is a situation where you do have the

5

authority to issue a marriage license, would you have a

6

religious objection to issuing that license to a same-sex

7

couple?

8

MR. MANDO:

Objection.

9

THE COURT:

Overruled.

10

THE WITNESS:

I would follow the law.

If the law

11

says I have to give them to everyone, I would do that.

12

morally, it's a tough decision for me, because I'm taught in

13

my Bible that marriage is between a man and a woman.

14

still follow the law.

15

BY MR. GANNAM:

16

Q.

17

license to a same-sex couple?

18

A.

I would issue those license.
MR. GANNAM:

20

THE COURT:

No further questions, Your Honor.
I guess processing-wise, do you all want

21

to ask any questions, Mr. Mando?

22

plaintiffs.

23

25

I would

And so is your answer that yes, you would issue that

19

24

But

Then I'll turn to the

MR. MANDO:

I just have a couple questions, Your

THE COURT:

All right.

Honor.
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1

CROSS-EXAMINATION

2

BY MR. MANDO:

3

Q.

4

the conversation with the county attorney and some state

5

officials, you said it was the attorney general's.

6

have been the Department of Local Government that you had the

7

conversation with?

8

A.

9

because I've had a lot of phone calls and discussions with

10

First, Judge Blevins, to clarify something, when you had

Could that

I'd have to ask my counsel over there to make sure,

people.

11

Do you remember, Cecil?

12

Q.

You just have to answer based on your own recollection.

13

A.

It could have been the Department of Local Government.

14

It could have been the attorney general's office.

15

positive on that, no.

16

Q.

17

came to see you about securing a marriage license late June,

18

early July, at that time, was Kim Davis absent from the county

19

or absent from her office?

20

A.

No, she was not.

21

Q.

Did you feel you had the authority, in that situation, to

22

issue the license?

23

A.

No, I did not.

24

Q.

Had you ever issued a marriage license in the past?

25

A.

No, I have not.

I'm not

When the plaintiffs -- when the plaintiffs in this case
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1

Q.

And as you read the statute, are you required to issue

2

the marriage license?

3

A.

4

she has, it would not be -- they take over when she's not

5

there so it would still be in her office's duties.

6

Q.

7

separately elected constitutional office under the -- in

8

Kentucky?

9

A.

Only in her absence, and I felt with the deputy clerks

Is it your understanding that the county clerk is a

That's correct.

10

MR. MANDO:

No further questions at this time, Your

12

THE COURT:

Cross.

13

MR. SHARP:

Thank you, Your Honor.

11

Honor.

14

CROSS-EXAMINATION

15

BY MR. SHARP:

16

Q.

17

how did you first learn of the policy that you've testified

18

about in the clerk's office?

19

A.

20

Davis.

21

Q.

Did you learn about it from Miss Davis herself?

22

A.

No, I don't believe I did.

23

Q.

Did she send you a memorandum telling you what the policy

24

was?

25

A.

Judge Executive Blevins, good morning.

Let me ask you,

It was after the denial of a marriage license by Miss

I don't remember receiving anything.
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1

Q.

Did she consult with you prior to adopting the policy for

2

your input?

3

A.

4

on, before the decision was made, that if it was to allow

5

same-sex marriage that she could not do that in her moral

6

judgment.

7

Q.

And when did you have this conversation with her?

8

A.

It's been -- it was probably shortly after we got sworn

9

in, I think she brought the issue to me and talked about it.

10

And she did tell me also that I think she -- I don't know if

11

it was that early in the process, but I know she later told me

12

she had contacted all the state representatives and all the

13

state senators in regards to this issue, that she was hoping

14

something would be done because morally, she just could not do

15

it.

16

Q.

17

decision, are you talking about the Obergefell decision?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Let's talk a little bit about the clerk's office.

20

many deputy clerks are employed in the Rowan County Clerk's

21

Office?

22

A.

23

or seven, at least.

24

Q.

And how is that office funded?

25

A.

It's funded through their fees.

Kim and I have conversations, and she did tell me early

She just could not do it.

When you said you spoke with her about this after the

How

I don't have the exact number, but there's probably six

They collect fees for
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1

marriage license, for hunting, fishing license, for any kind

2

of registration of vehicles, all those types of different

3

things that they perform, those type of duties.

4

a fee for that, and that's basically how they're funded.

5

Q.

6

have in the county clerk's budget?

7

A.

8

really, power we have is she submits a budget.

9

myself and four magistrates, we pass the budget.

10

Q.

And they get

And what role, if any, does the Rowan County Fiscal Court

We approve their budget, and that's about all.

The only,

And along with

So the funding mechanism is from county funds, then?

11

MR. MANDO:

Objection.

12

THE COURT:

Grounds?

13

MR. MANDO:

He just said the funds we are generated

14

through fees that were issued.

15

THE COURT:

So asked and answered?

16

MR. MANDO:

Yes.

17

THE COURT:

Sustained.

18

BY MR. SHARP:

19

Q.

20

judgment levied against the county clerk's office?

21
22

Am I correct the county would be responsible for any

MR. MANDO:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

Calls for a conclusion of

law.

23
24

BY MR. SHARP:

25

Q.

Now, you're familiar also with the directive that the
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1

Governor of Kentucky sent to all the county clerks on June 26,

2

correct?

3

A.

Yes, I am.

4

Q.

And you're aware that the policy that's been adopted by

5

Rowan County Clerk's Office is in direct conflict with the

6

governor's directive?

7

A.

Yes, it is.

8

Q.

Do you have any authority to sanction or otherwise

9

censure the elected county clerk?

10

A.

Not that I know of.

11

Q.

Prior to the Obergefell decision, were there any problems

12

with the Rowan County Clerk's Office issuing marriage

13

licenses?

14

A.

No, not that I know of.

15

Q.

When you had this conversation with Miss Davis following

16

the Obergefell decision, did she explain why she intended to

17

adopt this policy?

18

MR. CHRISTMAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE WITNESS:

21

MR. SHARP:

Objection.

Misstates testimony.

Overruled.
Can you repeat the question?
Sure.

22

BY MR. SHARP:

23

Q.

24

the Obergefell decision, did she explain why she was adopting

25

this policy?

When you had this conversation with Miss Davis following

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 26 Filed:
15-607/23/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 20 of 83Page:
- Page
21ID#: 236
(198 of 313)
20

BLEVINS - Cross
1

A.

2

religious, and she was not going to issue any license to

3

anyone because she didn't want to, basically, not issue them

4

to one group that are man and woman versus same-sex marriages,

5

and she just wasn't going to issue any licenses because she

6

didn't want to discriminate in that respect.

7

Yes.

We talked for quite a while, and Kim's very

She was concerned that the -- a 5-to-4 decision is a very

8

close decision by the Supreme Court, and she was concerned --

9

she had some question, I think she told me it was 30 days

10

after their decision, they could actually make a change in

11

that decision if they -- if other information was brought

12

forward.

13

some of the Supreme Court members probably should have excused

14

themselves from the ruling.

15

And she was concerned that -- I think she even said

THE COURT:

Did she explain why she thinks that

16

Supreme Court justices should have recused themselves from the

17

ruling?

18

THE WITNESS:

I don't think she got into detail on

19

that, but she did have some concerns that some of them maybe

20

should have recused themselves.

I don't know if we actually

21

talked about the details on it.

She can probably answer that

22

better than me.

23

THE COURT:

24

BY MR. SHARP:

25

Q.

All right, go ahead.

So am I correct her religious objection went to issuing
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1

marriage licenses to same-sex couples?

2

A.

Yes, I would say that's correct.

3

Q.

And her decision to stop issuing them altogether, even to

4

opposite-sex couples, was so as to not discriminate?

5

A.

I would say that's correct.

6

Q.

The conversation that you had, was that generally

7

consistent with the statements she made to the media following

8

that conversation?

9

A.

I would say they are.

10

Q.

As far as you are aware, is this policy still in place in

11

Rowan County?

12

A.

Yes, it is.

13

Q.

Have you issued any marriage licenses in her stead since

14

it was adopted?

15

A.

No, I have not.

16

Q.

Let me ask you some specific questions about absence.

17

Since June the 26th, are you aware of whether or not

18

Mrs. Davis has been to work?

19

A.

20

a day, I wasn't aware of it.

21

to meetings.

22

I wouldn't be absolutely sure.

23

last court date.

24

went to attend the court hearing, let the judge know I was

25

concerned about this issue as well.

As far as I know, she's there every day.

If she's missed

Of course, I'm gone pretty often

I'm just not there in the courthouse at times.
I know she was absent on the

Of course, I was out of the office as well,

I didn't want to be --
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1

the county to be sued and not show up for court.

And today,

2

she's absent from the court and so am I.

3

Q.

4

office -- does the county clerk's office close?

5

A.

6

I'm not sure -- I would assume it would continue to be open

7

when she's not there.

8

Q.

9

office in Rowan County continue to do business and perform its

Now, when she's not physically in the office, does the

No.

It remains open.

At least it has in past years.

Other than the marriage licenses, does the county clerk's

10

other duties?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Has Miss Davis been on extended leave since June the

13

26th?

14

A.

Not that I know of.

15

Q.

Has she otherwise been unable to perform her job duties

16

since June the 26th?

17

A.

No.

She's been available and able.

18

MR. SHARP:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Any redirect?

20

MR. GANNAM:

21

THE COURT:

May this witness be finally excused?

22

MR. MANDO:

Yes, sir.

23

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, we would ask --

24

MR. GANNAM:

25

Honor.

No, Your Honor.

As far as we're concerned, yes, Your
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1
2

MR. SHARP:

Your Honor, we would ask him to be

subject to recall, pending Miss Davis's testimony.

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

8

Can you stick around?
Yes, sir.
Thank you.

Next witness, please.

Your Honor, the defense calls Kim Davis.
All right.

Come around, ma'am.

KIMBERLY DAVIS, DEFENDANT, SWORN

9

THE COURT:

10

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

Good morning, ma'am.
Good morning.

12

You may proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

13

BY MR. GANNAM:

14

Q.

Good morning, Miss Davis.

15

A.

Good morning.

16

Q.

Please state your full name for the record.

17

A.

Kimberly Davis.

18

THE COURT:

19

THE WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

Try to keep your voice up, please.
Yes, sir.
Thank you.

21

BY MR. GANNAM:

22

Q.

What is your title, Miss Davis?

23

A.

I'm the Rowan County Clerk.

24

Q.

And your business address?

25

A.

600 West Main Street, Room 102, Morehead, Kentucky,
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1

40351.

2

Q.

3

Clerk?

4

A.

5

in January.

6

Q.

January of this year?

7

A.

January 5th, yes, sir.

8

Q.

Were you an employee of the clerk's office prior to being

9

elected as the clerk?

When were you elected to the position of Rowan County

Final election was November 4th of 2014, and took office

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

How long did you work in the clerk's office?

12

A.

Almost 27 years.

13

Q.

Can you describe generally what are the functions of the

14

county clerk?

15

A.

16

departments; Department of Revenue, Transportation Cabinet,

17

Fish and Wildlife.

18

mortgages, all land records.

19

maintaining voter registration records, overseeing elections.

20

The clerk is a pass-through collection agency for many

We -- I bring archives, we record deeds,
We're responsible for

There's just a plethora of stuff we do.

Motor vehicle

21

registration, delinquent taxes.

22

bills, franchise tax bills for collection and then we -- those

23

fees that we collect, we send out every month by the -- you

24

know, the reports are due the 10th of the month.

25

We generate property tax

But at the end of that month prior, you know, we have to
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1

allocate all those monies out and write checks to every taxing

2

district to Frankfort for all the fees we've collected for

3

them.

4

quarterly reports, end of year reports.

5

Q.

6

collects as compensation or as its own fees?

7

A.

8

starting on January 1, we start out with zero dollars.

9

every penny that comes into the clerk's office is money that

There's daily reports, weekly reports, monthly reports,

And does the clerk's office retain a portion of what it

Yeah.

The clerk's office is a fee office.

Every year,
So

10

we have generated and collected from our services.

11

Q.

12

Commonwealth of Kentucky, for example?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Does the clerk's office receive any other checks other

15

than from fees that it collects itself?

16

A.

17

from the Department of Revenue, which is a fee of our office

18

and just goes into our office, but we don't get any money from

19

anyone else.

20

So does the clerk's office receive checks from the

No.

We get -- we do get a check for preparing tax bills

The Secretary of State, State Board of Elections also

21

gives us so much money for each registered voter.

I think

22

this year, I got $162.

23

Q.

For all registered voters in Rowan County?

24

A.

Um-hmm.

25

Q.

Does the clerk's office also issue marriage licenses?
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1

A.

We do.

2

Q.

What is the fee collected by the clerk's office for a

3

marriage license?

4

A.

It's $35.50.

5

Q.

And out of that fee, how does that break down?

6

A.

The clerk retains $21.17, and the state gets $14.33.

7

Q.

So does the clerk's office receive fees for marriage

8

licenses other than the license that it issues itself?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Does the clerk's office receive any funding on the

11

subject of marriage other than from the licenses that it

12

issues itself?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

How many employees do you have in the clerk's office?

15

A.

I have six full-time employees.

16

hired on a 1099 to do grant work for me.

17

Q.

18

deputy clerks?

19

A.

They are.

20

Q.

What is the total revenue in your 2015 budget?

21

A.

We had budgeted $4.2 million.

22

Q.

And year-to-date, is your office carrying a surplus or a

23

deficit?

24

A.

25

above on our receipts and everything.

I have one girl that's

And what do -- your full-time employees, are those called

We're actually 700 -- as of the end of June, we were $733
So our office is really
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1

very -- doing very well.

2

Q.

Did you mean 733,000?

3

A.

733,000, yes, sir.

4

Q.

So that's a surplus currently?

5

A.

It is.

6

Q.

If you get to the end of the year and you have a surplus,

7

what happens to those funds?

8

A.

9

court as excess fees.

Those fees are turned over to the county -- the fiscal

10

Q.

Do you know how much revenue your office collected from

11

the issuance of marriage licenses last year?

12

A.

13

licenses in 2014.

14

Q.

15

number, is my math correct that that would be 0.1 percent of

16

the total budget for the clerk's office?

17

A.

Yeah.

18

Q.

Is that a yes?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

How many licenses did the clerk's office issue in the

21

first half of this year?

22

A.

Ninety-nine.

23

Q.

So compared to 212 for all of last year, would you say

24

that it's comparable?

25

A.

The total that we took in was $4,500.

We sold 212

So if, in 2015, if you were to hit that same, that same

Yeah.

Yes.
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1

Q.

Do all six of the deputy clerks perform the task of

2

issuing marriage licenses?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

If you just limited that task to one of your deputy

5

clerks, approximately how many hours a week would that deputy

6

spend issuing marriage licenses?

7

A.

Maybe one hour.

8

Q.

One hour a week for one employee?

9

A.

Um-hmm.

10

Q.

And that would handle all marriage licenses issued by the

11

Rowan County Clerk's Office?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Now, I trust that the volume of marriage licenses that

14

your office issues isn't exactly the same every month, right?

15

A.

No, it's not.

16

Q.

What is the busiest month this year, to date?

17

A.

May and June were very close.

18

Q.

And in those months, those were the busiest so far this

19

year?

20

A.

Um-hmm.

21

Q.

And in, let's just say June, for example, in the month of

22

June, with that increased volume, would one employee in your

23

office still be able to handle all of that volume?

24

A.

25

a marriage license, to get the information, populate it in the

Yes.

It only takes about five to seven minutes to issue
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1

computer system, print it out, have them proof it, sign it,

2

collect their money, and they're gone.

3

Q.

4

higher, approximately how many licenses were issued in each of

5

those months?

6

A.

Probably 18, 20 at the most.

7

Q.

Miss Davis, I want to ask you now about your religious

8

practices.

9

A.

I'm Apostolic.

10

Q.

And is Apostolic, is that a subset of the Christian

11

religion?

12

A.

It is.

13

Q.

As part of your Christian faith, do you attend a church?

14

A.

I do.

15

Q.

How often?

16

A.

Every time the doors are open.

17

Q.

At least weekly, then?

18

A.

We have Bible study on Tuesday, church on Wednesday,

19

church on Sunday.

20

Q.

21

Rowan County Clerk?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Has that been your continued practice since taking

24

office?

25

A.

And in these months of May and June, where the volume is

First of all, what religion do you practice?

And was that your practice before taking office as the

Yes.
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Q.

Do you participate in any Christian ministries outside of

2

your church itself?

3

A.

I do.

4

Q.

Give me an example.

5

A.

Every Monday night, since October of 2013, I go to the

6

jail, visit the ladies there, do Bible study with them.

7

Q.

8

women in the jail --

Are you aware of some of the offenses committed by the

9

MR. SHARP:

Objection, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

Sustained.

11

MR. GANNAM:

Relevance.

Your Honor, the plaintiffs have alleged

12

in this case that Miss Davis has treated them with malice, and

13

I believe that her activities according to her religious

14

beliefs are relevant to the question of whether she is not

15

issuing licenses based out of malice.

16

THE COURT:

She goes to the jail, ministers to women

17

at the jail.

I think that's sufficient.

What they're in for,

18

I'm sure they're in for Class D felonies or on pretrial

19

detention for more serious offenses.

20

offenses are really relevant.

21

MR. GANNAM:

22

THE COURT:

I don't think the actual

I'll move on, Your Honor.
Thank you.

23

BY MR. GANNAM:

24

Q.

Miss Davis, do you get paid for visiting the jail?

25

A.

No.
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Q.

2

there?

3

A.

I love them.

4

Q.

Does the fact that they've done bad things, perhaps even

5

felonies, affect how you feel towards them?

6

A.

No, not at all.

7

Q.

Miss Davis, do your Christian beliefs include a belief

8

about the definition of marriage?

9

A.

Yes, they do.

10

Q.

And according to your Christian beliefs, what is the

11

definition of marriage?

12

A.

Marriage is a union between one man and one woman.

13

Q.

And what do you base that definition on?

14

A.

The Bible.

15

Q.

And what do you believe the Bible to be?

16

A.

God's holy word.

17

Q.

So according to your Christian belief, can the union of

18

two men be a marriage?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Can the union of two women be a marriage?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

How about three men?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

How about a person and an animal?

25

How do you feel towards these women who you minister to

They're the best part of my Monday.

MR. SHARP:

Objection, Your Honor.
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THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

No.
Sustained.

We don't have that here.

3

BY MR. GANNAM:

4

Q.

5

any arrangement of people other than one man and one woman

6

which can be called a marriage?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Miss Davis, according to your Christian beliefs, do you

9

believe it is a sin for a man and a woman who are not married

According to your religious beliefs, Miss Davis, is there

10

to have sex?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Do you believe it is a sin for two men to have sex?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Do you believe it is a sin for two women to have sex?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Do you believe all sex outside of man and woman marriage

17

is a sin?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

During the almost 30 years total that you've spent in the

20

clerk's office, either as a deputy clerk or as the elected

21

clerk, have you ever asked a marriage license applicant what

22

kind of sins they've committed prior to applying?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Have you ever asked marriage license applicants what

25

kinds of sins they plan to commit after getting married?
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A.

No.

2

Q.

Is it your religious belief that you are required to ask

3

applicants for marriage licenses what kinds of sins they

4

committed?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Is it your religious belief that you're required to ask

7

applicants for marriage what kind of sins they might commit

8

after marriage?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Is it your religious belief that sin disqualifies a

11

person from being married?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

When did your office stop issuing marriage licenses this

14

year?

15

A.

16

June, so June 27th would have been when we stopped.

17

Q.

18

United States Supreme Court decision in Obergefell was handed

19

down?

20

A.

I am.

21

Q.

Your office was open on June 27?

22

A.

We were.

23

Q.

Did you issue any licenses then?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

And was that pursuant to a decision you had made as of

We issued one on the 26th.

So we were open the 27th of

And are you aware that June 26 is the date that the
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1

June 27 not to issue licenses?

2

A.

3

had a legislative meeting in January, and they formed a

4

committee in regard to this Supreme Court decision that was --

5

in light that it was going to be heard in April.

6

When I first took office, when he went to -- the clerks

After that meeting, I came back and I directed a letter

7

to every senator and every legislator that I could get an

8

email address to and asked them, pleaded with them to, while

9

there was still time, to get a bill on the floor to help

10
11

protect clerks who had a moral issue in this regard.
I emailed every person.

I'm not sure.

It was

12

January 23rd was the date that I emailed them, and I emailed

13

every person and our legislators at LRC that I could get an

14

email address to.

15

this decision that came down.

16

forethought and that I had prayed and fasted over weekly.

17

So it wasn't just a spur-of-the-moment decision.

18
19
20

This is not something I decided because of

MR. GANNAM:

22

MR. GANNAM:

25

Your Honor, may I approach the witness

to provide an exhibit?
THE COURT:

24

It was

thought out and, you know, I sought God on it.

21

23

It was something that was a

Sure.

What are you showing her?

This is a copy of the letter she's just

testified to.
THE COURT:
Mr. Sharp?

That's fine.

Do you have a copy,
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MR. SHARP:

2

MR. GANNAM:

3

THE COURT:

4

Yes, sir.
Your Honor, would you like a copy?
Yes, thank you.

Mark this as Defendant's

Exhibit 1?

5

MR. GANNAM:

I marked the version I gave to the

6

witness.

7

BY MR. GANNAM:

8

Q.

9

as Defendant's Exhibit 1.

Miss Davis, I've just handed you a document I've marked
It has a salutation, Dear Senator

10

Robertson.

Is this a copy of the letter you just testified to

11

that you sent to multiple legislators in January?

12

A.

It is.

13

Q.

The first sentence says, I am contacting you in hope of

14

support of possible legislation that would give county clerks

15

the option to exempt themselves from issuing marriage license.

16

Are those your words, Miss Davis?

17

A.

It is.

18

Q.

And in the last sentence of that paragraph, I wanted to

19

have the option, as a person who has deep moral conviction, to

20

choose not to discriminate any party by allowing a clerk to

21

apply for an exemption for the issuance of marriage licenses.

22

Are those also your words?

23

A.

They are.

24

Q.

This was sent to legislators in January of 2015?

25

A.

Yeah, January 23rd.
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Q.

And has your position regarding the issuance of marriage

2

licenses changed between January 23rd of this year and today?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Miss Davis, I'd like to talk about the marriage license

5

form itself.

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

8

Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
You may.

Are you moving to admit

Exhibit 1?

9

MR. GANNAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

Thank you.

10

THE COURT:

Any objection?

11

MR. SHARP:

No objection.

12

THE COURT:

Let it be received without objection.

13

BY MR. GANNAM:

14

Q.

15

Defendant's Exhibit 2.

16

A.

I do.

17

Q.

Can you describe what it is?

18

A.

It is the old version of the marriage license that was

19

prescribed by the KDLA for us to use for the issuance of

20

marriage applications.

21

Q.

22

to the Supreme Court decision?

23

A.

Yes, sir.

24

Q.

So this would be the form of marriage license used by

25

your office up until June 26 of this year?

Miss Davis, I've handed you an exhibit, which will be
Do you recognize this document?

When you say old version, do you mean the version prior
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A.

Yes.

2

Q.

I wanted to point out for you the very first sentence

3

after the heading that says Marriage License, Valid Only in

4

the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

5

religious society qualified to perform marriages per

6

KRS 402.050, you are hereby authorized to join together in the

7

state of matrimony, according to the laws of the Commonwealth

8

of Kentucky.

9

A.

I do.

10

Q.

And when this license says "you are authorized," who do

11

you understand to be authorizing the people on this license to

12

be getting married?

13

A.

That would be me, the clerk.

14

Q.

And is it your understanding that that is dictated by the

15

law of the Commonwealth of Kentucky?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And did you prepare this form yourself?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Who prepared or created this form?

20

A.

The Kentucky Department of Library and Archives.

21

Q.

I want to call your attention down to the middle of the

22

form.

23

this form that would contain the personal information of

24

whoever these applicants are.

25

contain those black boxes, correct?

It says, To any person or

Do you see that language?

And just for the record, there are areas blacked out of

The original forms would not
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A.

Correct.

2

Q.

So in the middle of the form, it says, We hereby certify

3

the above information is true to the best of our knowledge.

4

And it has spaces for, on this form, the bride and groom to

5

sign.

6

2015, and the office of Kim Davis, Rowan County, County Clerk.

7

Do you see that language?

8

A.

I do.

9

Q.

Who puts that information on the form, your name and your

Directly under that, it says, Issued this June 16,

10

title as Rowan County Clerk?

11

A.

It populates from our software.

12

Q.

Do you have any control over that?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

So when your software in your office is used to create a

15

marriage license, does it automatically put your name and

16

title into every marriage license?

17

A.

It does.

18

Q.

According to your understanding, who does this license

19

say is issuing the marriage license?

20

A.

It was issued by my office.

21

Q.

And underneath, in the next line, it says By, and there's

22

a name here, Brian Mason, Deputy Clerk.

23

clerk in your office?

24

A.

It is.

25

Q.

Do deputy clerks have the authority to sign marriage

Is that a deputy
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licenses?

2

A.

They have authority to sign it, yes.

3

Q.

Whose authority are they exercising when they sign it?

4

A.

Mine.

5

Q.

Are you aware of any marriage license currently available

6

in the Commonwealth of Kentucky in Rowan County that would not

7

require you to authorize it?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

And do you have the discretion to create a different kind

10

of license that would not require your authorization for it to

11

be issued?

12

A.

No.

13
14

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, I move to admit Defendant's

Exhibit 2 into evidence.

15

THE COURT:

Any objection?

16

MR. SHARP:

No objection.

17

THE COURT:

Let it be received without objection.

18

MR. GANNAM:

19

THE COURT:

May I approach again, Your Honor?
You may.

20

BY MR. GANNAM:

21

Q.

22

as Defendant's Exhibit 3.

23

document?

24

A.

I am.

25

Q.

What is this document?

Miss Davis, I've shown you a document that's been marked
Are you familiar with this
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A.

It is the marriage license that KDLA has prescribed that

2

we use after the Supreme Court decision on June 26th.

3

Q.

4

beginning, To any person or religious society qualified to

5

perform marriages per KRS 402.050, you are hereby authorized

6

to join together in the state of matrimony, according to the

7

laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky -- I'll stop right there.

8

Is this language the same as was on the prior form marriage

9

license?

And I want to draw your attention to the language at the

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And under this new version of the marriage license who,

12

do you understand, is authorizing the people named in the

13

license to be getting married?

14

A.

That would be me, the clerk.

15

Q.

In moving down to the middle section of the form, after

16

where the party information would be filled in, it says, We

17

hereby certify the above information is true to the best of

18

our knowledge, and then there are lines for signatures of

19

first party and second party, correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Now, on the prior form, that said bride and groom,

22

correct?

23

A.

That is correct.

24

Q.

Now, below that it says issued this -- there's a blank

25

for the date, and the office of.

There's a space for a name
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and then a county.

When this form is used in your office,

2

what would go in that space for name and county?

3

A.

That would be my name, Rowan County.

4

Q.

And is it your understanding that this signifies that the

5

office would be -- the license would be issued under your

6

authority?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Moving down to the part that reads Marriage Certificate,

9

the third line down, it says -- I'm sorry, let me just read

10

that whole section under Marriage Certificate.

It says, I do

11

certify that blank and blank were united in marriage on the --

12

there's a space for a date and location -- under the authority

13

of the above license and in the presence of, please print

14

witnesses' names.

15

A.

I do.

16

Q.

What is your understanding to be the authority of the

17

above license that it's referring to?

18

A.

That would be me.

19

Q.

And since the change in the form following the Obergefell

20

decision, are you aware of any option in Rowan County to issue

21

a marriage license form that's not issued under your

22

authority?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Are you aware of any option for a marriage license form

25

that would not show your name on it?

Do you see that language?

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 26 Filed:
15-607/23/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 42 of 83Page:
- Page
43ID#: 258
(220 of 313)
42

DAVIS - Direct
1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Apart from the sort of aesthetic differences in this form

3

and the prior form marked as Exhibit 2 and the change in

4

designation of parties from bride and groom to first party and

5

second party, is there any substantive difference between the

6

old form and the new form?

7

A.

No.

8
9

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, I move to admit Defendant's

Exhibit 3 into evidence.

10

THE COURT:

Any objection?

11

MR. SHARP:

No objection, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

Let it be received without objection.

13

BY MR. GANNAM:

14

Q.

15

what marriage is, and we've covered the licensing scheme where

16

the licenses are issued in Rowan County under your authority.

17

I want to ask you specifically, why does authorizing the

Miss Davis, we've covered your religious belief about

18

marriage of same-sex couples violate your religious beliefs?

19

A.

20

agree with it, and I can't.

21

Q.

22

authorizing a marriage license for a same-sex couple based on

23

any sin that you believe this couple may have committed?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Is it based on any sin you believe they might commit?

Because if I say that I authorize that, I'm saying I

And to be clear, is your religious objection to
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A.

No.

2

Q.

Is your religious objection to authorizing a marriage

3

license for a same-sex couple based on any religious objection

4

other than what you believe the definition of marriage is?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Miss Davis, understanding that your religious objection

7

prevents you from issuing licenses to same-sex couples, why

8

did you decide not to issue licenses to any couples?

9

A.

I didn't want to discriminate against anybody.

10

Q.

Is that consistent with the position you took in January,

11

when you sent the letter to legislators asking them to provide

12

you an opt-out from issuing any licenses at all?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And has that position ever changed since that letter in

15

January?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Miss Davis, when the Supreme Court decided the Obergefell

18

case in June, after that, did you receive any guidance from

19

the Governor of Kentucky on issuing marriage licenses?

20

A.

21

later got a hard copy that said we may not agree with it,

22

but -- morally, you know, you may not agree with it, but we

23

had to issue them regardless.

24

MR. GANNAM:

25

THE COURT:

He issued a directive that came over the email, and I

May I approach again, Your Honor?
You may.

This will be Exhibit 4?
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MR. GANNAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

2

BY MR. GANNAM:

3

Q.

4

Defendant's Exhibit 4.

5

letterhead of the Office of the Governor dated June 26, 2015.

6

This also appears in the complaint in this case as Plaintiff's

7

Exhibit Number 3.

8

to?

9

A.

It is.

10

Q.

And what did you understand this letter to be directing

11

you to do as a clerk of court or as the county clerk?

12

A.

13

Supreme Court dictates what you must believe.

14

officials, they do prescribe how we must act.

15

Miss Davis, I've just handed you what has been marked as
This appears to be a letter on the

Is this the letter you were just referring

Well, it simply states, says, Neither your oath nor the
But as elected

And we were instructed that Kentucky would recognize as

16

valid all same-sex marriages performed in other states, and we

17

were to start issuing license.

18

Q.

19

communicating to all the county clerk that they should issue

20

the marriage licenses regardless of what they believe?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Have you sent any communications back to the governor

23

after this letter was sent to you?

24

A.

25

Was there any doubt in your mind that the governor was

I have.
THE COURT:

You have or you have not?
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1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. GANNAM:

4

I have.
You have, all right.

Thank you.

Before I get to that, I would move to

admit Defendant's Exhibit 4 into evidence.

5

THE COURT:

Any objection?

6

MR. SHARP:

No objection, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

Let it be received.

8

MR. GANNAM:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

May I approach, Your Honor?
You may.

MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, I apologize, I don't have a

final copy of this one.

12

THE COURT:

That's fine.

13

BY MR. GANNAM:

14

Q.

15

Defendant's Exhibit 5.

16

A.

I do.

17

Q.

What is this document?

18

A.

It's a letter that not just myself but many clerks had

19

sent to the governor just trying to compel him to call a

20

special session or to do something in order to help the clerks

21

who had objections to issuing the same-sex marriage license on

22

grounds of conscience, that he would do something to try to

23

help us.

24

Q.

25

last sentence says, Many clerks firmly believe that forcing

Miss Davis, I just handed you a document marked as
Do you recognize this document?

I want to read from the letter.

The first paragraph, the
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1

county clerk offices to issue same-sex marriage licenses, when

2

it is against their deeply held religious beliefs and

3

traditions, is a direct violation of the U.S. Constitution's

4

First Amendment.

5

Are those the words you sent to the governor?

6

A.

It is.

7

Q.

And do you believe that to be the case?

8

A.

I do.

9

Q.

The next paragraph says, This dramatic and sudden change

10

has caused some clerks to go as far as to halt issuing

11

marriage licenses to anyone rather than compromise their

12

deeply held religious convictions.

13

Would that include you, Miss Davis?

14

A.

Yes, it does.

15

Q.

Next sentence says, This position has ignited litigation,

16

and it is foreseeable that it may invite more lawsuits.

17

How many times have you been sued so far, Miss Davis?

18

A.

Twice.

19

Q.

Finally, next paragraph says, It appears the only timely

20

and reasonable solution to this conflict is a legislative one.

21

So for that reason, I respectfully request that you

22

immediately call an extraordinary session of General Assembly

23

to address the issues that have been caused in this transition

24

from traditional marriage being redefined to include same-sex

25

couples.
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Are those your words to the governor, Miss Davis?

2

A.

They are.

3

Q.

Have you received any direct response from the governor?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Are you aware of press reports of conversations between

6

your counterpart in Casey County, Clerk Casey Davis, and the

7

governor?

8

A.

I am.

9

Q.

And are you aware of what's been reported as the

10

governor's answer to Mr. Davis's similar objection, that he

11

should simply issue the licenses or resign?

12

A.

I am.

13

Q.

Miss Davis, is resigning an option for you?

14

A.

No, sir.

15

Q.

Why not?

16

A.

Because if I resign, that leaves my deputies to deal with

17

this.

18

have an issue with it, but the people that work for me have

19

issue with this also.

20

It helps nobody.

21

everybody can be happy, and it can be done so that nobody has

22

to be compromised in any way.

23

Q.

24

Rowan County?

25

A.

It leaves another clerk to deal with it.

They may not

And if I resign, that solves nothing.

And there is a solution out there that

Would you say that you've done a good job as the clerk of

I think so, yes, sir.
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Q.

Is that based in part on the, for example, the three

2

quarters of a million dollar surplus you've generated since

3

you've been the clerk?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And all those funds, if there's a surplus at the end of

6

the year, go back to the county?

7

MR. SHARP:

Objection, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

Overruled.

9

Relevance.

BY MR. GANNAM:

10

Q.

11

if there's a surplus at the end of the year, correct?

12

A.

13
14

My question was, those funds would go back to the county

That's correct.
MR. GANNAM:

Your Honor, I would move to admit

Defendant's Exhibit 5 into evidence.

15

THE COURT:

Any objection to 5?

16

MR. SHARP:

No objection, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

Let it be received without objection.

18

BY MR. GANNAM:

19

Q.

20

same objection.

21

you know would have a similar religious objection to signing

22

off on a marriage license to a same-sex couple?

23

A.

I know for certainty four.

24

Q.

And out of the other two, do you know their positions?

25

A.

One --

You mentioned some of your deputy clerks may share the
Out of your six deputy clerks, how many do
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MR. SHARP:

Objection, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

Overruled.

If you have a reason to know

3

why.

I mean, first of all, have you spoken with the other six

4

clerks about the issuance of marriage licenses post-Supreme

5

Court decision?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

10

Yes.

You have spoken with them?
Yes.

The four that you've identified as having

objections, did they tell you they had objections?

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE WITNESS:

Yes.
What about the other two?
One said they would be willing to issue

14

the license, wouldn't have any problem with it, one is kind of

15

ambiguous, just kind of straddling the fence.

16

THE COURT:

So there would be one that would be

17

willing to issue the licenses?

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

20

Yes, sir.
And would that individual be able to

issue the licenses without any repercussions from you?

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT:

My name would be on that license.
Okay.

I understand that.

But as far as

23

that individual would be able to issue the licenses without

24

any repercussions from you?

25

THE WITNESS:

That deputy would not have my authority
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1

to issue a license if I did not grant that authority.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

If the authority was required

3

to be granted, would that deputy be able to issue the license

4

without any repercussions from you?

5
6

THE WITNESS:

Repercussions as far as maybe firing

that deputy?

7

THE COURT:

8

THE WITNESS:

9
10

Correct.
I don't know how to answer that,

because that causes me to speculate that if there was a form
that was generated that didn't have my name on it --

11

THE COURT:

Is it the marriage license -- I know your

12

attorney asked to read this section.

13

religious society qualified to perform marriages pursuant to

14

KRS Section 402.050.

15

qualified to perform marriages?

16

THE WITNESS:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE WITNESS:

21
22

To any person or

Are you such a person authorized or

No.

I'm the authority --

You don't perform marriages, correct?
No.
All right.
I'm the authorizing agent of that

license.
THE COURT:

But you're not a person qualified to

23

perform the marriages, correct?

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

No.
All right.

You may proceed.

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 26 Filed:
15-607/23/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 51 of 83Page:
- Page
52ID#: 267
(229 of 313)
51

DAVIS - Direct
1

BY MR. GANNAM:

2

Q.

3

employee who is willing to issue the licenses, have you taken

4

any adverse employment action against that employee?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Do you have any intention of doing that?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Do you consider that employee to be a good employee?

9

A.

Very loyal, very dedicated, very good employee.

10

Q.

And I believe you testified earlier that -- could a

11

single employee handle all of the volume of Rowan County

12

marriage licenses, if called upon to do so?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

I believe you testified that might take an hour a week?

Miss Davis, knowing what you do, that there is an

15

MR. SHARP:

Objection.

16

THE COURT:

Sustained.

Asked and answered.

17

BY MR. GANNAM:

18

Q.

19

office, have you ever objected on religious grounds to doing

20

any of the clerk's office functions apart from this marriage

21

license issue?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

In your almost 30 years in the clerk's office, have you

24

ever witnessed another deputy clerk or the elected clerk make

25

a religious objection to performing some function of the

In the almost 30 years that you've been at the clerk's
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clerk's office?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Are you aware of types of licenses that some clerk's

4

offices issue and some clerk's offices don't?

5

A.

I am.

6

Q.

Can you give an example?

7

A.

Not all county clerks sell hunting and fishing licenses.

8

You can opt out of selling those, just by giving a written

9

explanation to the Department of Fish and Wildlife.

10

Q.

And was that a directive or a law that was created by the

11

Department of Fish and Wildlife?

12

MR. SHARP:

Objection.

Relevance, Your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

I'm going to overrule the objection.

14

THE WITNESS:

I'm not sure how that law is.

It's in

15

our duties that it says that a clerk can opt out from selling

16

hunting and fishing licenses.

17

BY MR. GANNAM:

18

Q.

19

or filed in your office that doesn't depend on your authority?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Let me give you an example what I'm talking about.

22

someone brings a document to you to be recorded, you're not

23

required to authorize or approve of whatever that document

24

says; is that correct?

25

A.

Is there anything else that's issued out of your office

That's correct.

If
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Q.

Your duty would be limited to just recording it in the

2

public records?

3

A.

4

particular type of document, we would record it.

5

Q.

6

immediately surround it?

7

A.

About seven.

8

Q.

Would those be Lewis, Fleming, Bath, Menifee, Morgan,

9

Elliott and Carter Counties?

As long as it meets the statutory requirements for that

Approximately how many counties surround Rowan County,

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

To your knowledge, are all marriage licenses being issued

12

in those seven counties?

13

MR. SHARP:

Objection.

Speculation.

14

THE COURT:

Overruled.

If she knows.

15

THE WITNESS:

They are.

16

BY MR. GANNAM:

17

Q.

18

drive, approximately, from Rowan County to one of those seven

19

surrounding counties?

20

A.

Maybe 30 minutes at the most.

21

Q.

That would be for any of those seven?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Are there other --

And what would be the longest distance one would have to

24

THE COURT:

25

THE WITNESS:

Probably longer to Vanceburg.
Might be if you go over --
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1

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

2

BY MR. GANNAM:

3

Q.

4

Rowan County?

5

A.

Oh, yes.

6

Q.

And to your knowledge, are any of the counties within a

7

60-minute drive of Rowan County not issuing marriage licenses?

8

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

9

Q.

When we were in court in Ashland last week, do you know

Are there even more counties within a 60-minute drive of

10

what county we were in?

11

A.

We were in Boyd.

12

Q.

And to your knowledge, is Boyd County issuing all

13

marriage licenses?

14

A.

They are.

15

Q.

And today, we're sitting in what county?

16

A.

Kenton, I believe.

17

Q.

And to your knowledge, is Kenton County issuing marriage

18

licenses?

19

A.

Yes, they are.

20

Q.

Miss Davis, when you took office in January of 2015, did

21

you swear out an oath?

22

A.

I did.

23

Q.

And did that oath include an oath to uphold the United

24

States Constitution and laws?

25

A.

It did.
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1

Q.

And did it include an oath to uphold the Kentucky

2

Constitution and laws?

3

A.

Yes, it did.

4

Q.

Have you kept that oath since taking office?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

How do you explain the not issuing marriage licenses and

7

upholding, for example, the United States Constitution and

8

laws?

9

A.

I think the First Amendment right gives me a right to

10

religious freedom.

11

Q.

12

uphold the U.S. Constitution?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

And how about under the Kentucky Constitution and laws.

15

How are you upholding those when you're not issuing marriage

16

licenses?

17

A.

18

rewritten.

19

and it still states and has defined, as we voted on in 2004,

20

to define marriage as a union between one man and one woman.

21

Q.

22

conscience protections in the Kentucky Constitution?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And so have you ever made a decision not to follow the

25

Kentucky Constitution?

So have you ever made a decision that you're not going to

Well, so far, our Kentucky Constitution hasn't been
I think it takes an act of legislation to do that,

Are you aware of any things that would be called

Our Bill of Rights.
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A.

No.

2

Q.

And in connection with your current policy on marriage

3

licenses, have you ever made a decision that you were not

4

going to follow the Kentucky Constitution and laws?

5

A.

No.

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

Any questions, Mr. Mando?

8

MR. MANDO:

I do have a few questions, Your Honor.

9

No further questions, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

10

BY MR. MANDO:

11

Q.

12

earlier this morning.

13

Rowan County.

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

It's my understanding you occupy the office of county

16

clerk in Rowan County, correct?

17

A.

I do.

18

Q.

As you understand it, that's a constitutional office,

19

created and recognized by the Kentucky Constitution?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And with regard to marriage licenses, you are directed by

22

state statute as a county clerk to issue marriage licenses,

23

correct?

24

A.

I am.

25

Q.

In fact, issuance of marriage licenses requires you to

Good morning, Miss Davis.

I introduced myself to you

My name is Jeff Mando.

I represent

I just have a few questions.
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1

remit the fee for the marriage licenses, part of it back to

2

the state, correct?

3

A.

It is.

4

Q.

And then you have to report to the state so that the

5

state Department of Vital Statistics can gather and publish

6

information about marriages state-wide, correct?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Also, with regard to marriage licenses, the forms that

9

you are required to utilize come from the state Department of

10

Libraries and Archives; is that correct?

11

A.

That's correct.

12

Q.

That is a state agency that reports to the governor?

13

A.

I would assume they do.

14

Q.

And that state agency, the Department of Libraries and

15

Archives, to your knowledge, directs all clerks to issue

16

marriage licenses on this prescribed form?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

Q.

All right.

19

uniform form, correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And it's directed by the Department of Library and

22

Archives that all county clerks use this state form?

23

A.

That's correct.

24

Q.

The employees in your office, you hire the employees in

25

your office, correct?

It's uniform?

I'm sorry, that was two questions.

It's a
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1

A.

I do.

2

Q.

And you retain the authority to discharge and discipline

3

the employees in your office, correct?

4

A.

I do.

5

Q.

And you retain the authority to set the salaries for the

6

employees in your office, correct?

7

A.

I do.

8

Q.

That's not a fiscal court function?

9

A.

The fiscal court has authority over my maximum allowable

10

salaries and benefits that I pay my deputies as a total, but

11

they do not have control over what each individual one makes.

12

Q.

13

decide how to apportion it among your staff?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

You mentioned that as county clerk, you viewed your job

16

as one where you're -- I think I wrote this down -- a

17

pass-through collection -- you viewed it as a pass-through

18

clerk's agency is the words I heard you say.

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And you're a pass-through for the state, correct?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Because you remit funds to the Department of

23

Transportation, state Department of Revenue, state Department

24

of Fish and Wildlife, state motor vehicle registration,

25

correct?

So they have approval over the total budget, and you
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A.

Yes.

2

Q.

All right.

3

it was the state Department of Libraries and Archives that

4

sent you the revised form and other county clerks across the

5

state to use, correct?

6

A.

It is.

7

Q.

All right.

8

that was introduced by your lawyer, referred to you by your

9

lawyer.

And after the Obergefell decision came down,

And it was the governor who issued a letter

It was the governor who issued a letter directing you

10

to comply with that decision and issue these licenses?

11

A.

It is.

12

MR. MANDO:

Thank you, ma'am.

13

THE COURT:

Cross-examination.

14

No further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

15

BY MR. CANON:

16

Q.

Good morning, Miss Davis.

17

A.

Good morning.

18

Q.

My name is Dan Canon.

19

The good news is that both Mr. Mando and Mr. Gannam have asked

20

you most of the questions I was planning to ask you anyway.

21

promise not to be too long with you.

22

I represent the plaintiffs here.

I

You testified you were elected on November the 4th, 2014;

23

is that right?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And you took office on January 1?
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A.

5th.

2

Q.

The 5th of 2015.

3

that office?

4

A.

5

June, the first part of July of 2013.

6

Q.

7

took at the time that you took office.

8

were elected to that office on November the 4th, were you

9

aware of a district court opinion by Judge Heyburn that struck

When did you first register to run for

I filed an intent in -- it was either the last part of

Okay.

And Mr. Gannam asked you about the oath that you
At the time that you

10

down the constitutionality of the portion of the Kentucky

11

Constitution that you testified about before?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

decision not to follow the Constitution of Kentucky, and you

15

said no.

16
17

Did you make a conscious decision not to follow the
Constitution of the United States?

18
19

And Mr. Gannam asked you whether or not you made a

MR. GANNAM:

Objection, Your Honor.

Asked and

answered.

20

MR. CANON:

I don't think it's been asked.

21

THE COURT:

Overruled.

22

THE WITNESS:

Say again, please.

23

BY MR. CANON:

24

Q.

25

Constitution of the United States?

Did you make a conscious decision not to follow the
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A.

No.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Constitution of the United States on June 26, when you stopped

4

issuing marriage licenses?

5

A.

We issued a license on June 26.

6

Q.

June 27, then.

7

A.

I still feel I'm following the Constitution, knowing my

8

First Amendment rights are constitutional.

9

Q.

Okay.

And so did you believe that you were following the

It was June 27.

Sorry.

So let's back up.

You've got the ability to make

10

the rules for the Rowan County Clerk's Office, right?

11

A.

For my office.

12

Q.

You set policies, practices, all that good stuff for

13

Rowan County, right?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

So even if you've got a deputy clerk that's willing to

16

issue licenses, issue marriage licenses, you can tell them no,

17

right?

18

A.

19

not going to ask them to do something I wouldn't do myself.

20

Q.

21

issue those licenses even if they're willing to do it; is that

22

right?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

it?

As long as my name is issued -- is on that license, I'm

You believe you've got the discretion to tell them not to

And that's, in fact, what you've done here, isn't
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1

A.

(No response.)

2

Q.

Yes?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

policy?

6

talk with them, or did you distribute a memo, or how did that

7

happen?

8

A.

After the doors closed, we had a meeting.

9

Q.

Tell me about that meeting.

10

A.

Just simply stated that my religious beliefs can't

11

condone issuing and being a party to the issuance of a

12

same-sex marriage license.

13

going to be issuing license, period, so we didn't discriminate

14

against any party.

15

Q.

16

religious beliefs, for refusing to issue those licenses?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

And do you believe that county clerks have the discretion

19

to refuse to issue marriage licenses in general if they

20

believe that doing so runs contrary to their religious

21

beliefs?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Mr. Gannam asked you about, if you'll look at Defense

24

Exhibit 2, you'll recall that Mr. Gannam asked you about a

25

litmus test that you may or may not go through.

And in what way did you first institute that

Did you sit down with your deputy clerks and have a

Okay.

And I told them that we weren't

And was there any reason, other than your personal

Said you
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1

didn't go through whether you asked applicants for marriage

2

licenses whether they had engaged in any kind of sinful

3

behavior.

4

A.

I do.

5

Q.

You do ask applicants whether or not they've been

6

divorced, don't you?

7

A.

I do.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

somebody getting remarried once they've been divorced?

Do you remember that line of questioning?

And do you have any religious objection to

10

A.

That's between them and God.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

religious objection to issuing a license to somebody who's

13

been divorced?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

And if a clerk has that religious objection, can they

16

then refuse to issue a license on that basis?

17

A.

I don't know.

18

Q.

Well, I'm asking about your conception of the discretion

19

that you have as a county clerk to deny the issuance of

20

marriage licenses.

21

A.

22

marriage is defined.

23

Q.

24

upon your religious beliefs, right?

25

A.

But you don't have -- you don't personally have a

Any clerk.

I can't speak for them.

Do you understand?

My denial of a marriage license is the basis of what

I understand.

And the definition of marriage is based

The word of God, yes.
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1

Q.

2

divorced should not be able to get remarried, can that clerk

3

then refuse to issue a license on that basis?

4

A.

I can't speak for them.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

interracial marriage.

7

to an interracial couple?

8

A.

I can't speak for them.

9

Q.

So would you acknowledge --

10

A.

If you would like me to answer that, I can answer it.

11

Q.

Would you acknowledge -- do you have a religious

12

objection to an interracial marriage?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Are you aware if any clerks do?

15

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

16

Q.

But if a clerk did have that religious objection, they'd

17

be able to not issue a marriage license?

18

A.

I don't know.

19

Q.

I just want to understand what your concept of your

20

discretion as a county clerk is.

21
22
23
24
25

So if a clerk has a religious belief that someone who is

What if a clerk has a religious objection to an
Can they then refuse to issue a license

I can't speak for them.

MR. GANNAM:

How far does that go?

Objection, Your Honor.

Calls for a

legal conclusion.
THE COURT:
does it go.

That's really not a question, how far

Why don't you ask a more specific question.

MR. CANON:

Sure.
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1

BY MR. CANON:

2

Q.

3

I've got a personal belief that interracial marriage is

4

unBiblical and I don't want to authorize it, can I refuse to

5

authorize it?

6

A.

I don't know.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

license, they can't have their marriage recognized by the

9

state, correct?

If I've got a personal belief -- if I'm a county clerk,

That would be up to you.

You understand if somebody doesn't have a marriage

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And you --

12

THE COURT:

Why don't you ask one question at a time.

13

MR. CANON:

I'm sorry?

14

THE COURT:

You were starting to ask a compound

16

MR. CANON:

I didn't intend to.

17

THE COURT:

You understand if someone doesn't have a

15

question.

18

marriage license, they can't have their marriage recognized by

19

the state, correct?

20

Did you say yes?

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT:

23

BY MR. CANON:

24

Q.

25

June 27?

I did.
I'm sorry.

Go ahead.

Have you been in the clerk's office every work day since
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1

A.

Last Monday, I was out for court.

2

Q.

When we were in court in Ashland?

3

A.

I was there.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

Not there --

6

Q.

You were in the courthouse?

7

A.

No, I wasn't at the courthouse.

8

Wednesday, I had a clerk's meeting in Lexington, and then I'm

9

not there today.
Okay.

I was in Ashland.

And

10

Q.

But generally speaking, you've been available; is

11

that right?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And you heard Mr. Blevins testify that you haven't been

14

unavailable at any point in time, as far as he's concerned, to

15

issue those licenses.

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Have you been personally present when any couples came to

18

apply for a license?

19

A.

I have.

20

Q.

And what did you tell them?

21

A.

I didn't speak to any of the parties involved, I think,

22

except maybe Miss Miller, the couple that you sat back behind

23

the bench.

24

Q.

That's okay.

25

A.

There was one in this case.

Do you disagree with anything he said?

I'm always there at my office.

I don't know who they were.
Any couples.

Do you recall --
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1

Q.

And you recall personally turning them away?

2

A.

I do.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

I just told them that at the present time, we weren't

5

issuing marriage licenses.

6

name to a marriage license that was issued to a same-sex

7

couple, and I didn't want to discriminate.

8
9

And what did you tell them?

Didn't feel that I could put my

And I asked -- I told them that if what they were trying
to accomplish was to receive a marriage license, that they

10

could go to any of the surrounding counties and that they

11

could get a marriage license.

12

and get married in Rowan County if they wanted to, but that we

13

weren't issuing them, and I apologized for their

14

inconvenience.

15

Q.

Now, how long is your term?

16

A.

Four years.

17

Q.

And assuming that you're not reelected for a second term,

18

do you intend not to issue marriage licenses during that

19

entire four-year duration?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And you had testified before that you think that that's

22

not a violation of the United States Constitution.

23

understand that you swore an oath to uphold the United States

24

Constitution, right?

25

A.

I did.

They could actually come back

You
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1

Q.

2

States means?

3

A.

Well, I'm not a lawyer.

4

Q.

Right.

5

A.

But I do know that the First Amendment right gives me the

6

right to my religious freedom.

7

Q.

8

conception, trumps the right -- you understand that the

9

couples in this case have a right to get a marriage license,

10

How do you determine what the Constitution of the United

Very good.

correct?

11
12

And your religious freedom, in your

MR. GANNAM:

Objection, Your Honor.

Calls for a

legal conclusion.

13

THE COURT:

Overruled.

14

BY MR. CANON:

15

Q.

Is that your understanding of the law?

16

A.

My understanding is that the U.S. Supreme Court redefined

17

marriage.

18

Q.

And you don't want to abide by that definition, correct?

19

A.

It's not the definition that I believe in.

20

Q.

But you understand when the Supreme Court says that,

21

that's an issue of constitutional interpretation.

22

law of the land.

23

A.

I suppose.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

isn't quite the same thing as a hunting or a fishing license,

That's the

You do understand that?

And you also understand that a marriage license
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1

don't you?

2

A.

They're still a license.

3

Q.

Well, is there any --

4

A.

It's still giving authority to do something.

5

Q.

Is there any difference in the rank of importance to you

6

between hunting and fishing and marriage?

7

A.

They're a license.

8

Q.

So they're all the same?

9

married, all the same thing?

Hunting, fishing, getting

10

A.

I think marriage is a sacred union.

11

Q.

I agree.

12

going to the judge executive's office, which we've already

13

talked about, are there any alternatives available for anybody

14

in Rowan County that wants to actually have their marriage

15

licensed in Rowan County right now?

16

A.

Not unless the legislation can enact something.

17

Q.

So that's a no?

18

A.

Not unless the legislation can enact something.

19

Q.

And they haven't enacted anything, right?

20

A.

Uh-uh.

21

Q.

And if Judge Bunning orders you to start issuing marriage

22

licenses as a result of the proceedings we've had here today,

23

are you going to do it?

24

A.

I can't tell you.

25

Q.

You can't tell me?

Aside from traveling to another county and
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1

A.

Because you're asking me to speculate on something that

2

hasn't happened.

3

Q.

4

order you to do that, right?

5

A.

He could.

6

Q.

Have you thought about what that possibility might look

7

like for you?

8

A.

I have.

9

Q.

Okay.

You understand that it's a possibility that he could

And have you made a decision as to what you're

10

going to do if you are ordered to start issuing licenses?

11

A.

I'll deal with that when the time comes.

12

Q.

And you testified a little bit about the seven counties

13

that surround Rowan County.

14

somebody has their marriage license, they've got to also

15

travel back and have that marriage license filed?

16

A.

They can mail it.

17

Q.

Okay, very good.

18

this a little bit before.

19

opposite-sex couples based on your religious beliefs, right?

20

A.

No.

Now, you understand that once

Now, you're not -- you testified about
You're not denying licenses to

I just didn't want to discriminate.

21

MR. CANON:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

Any redirect?

23

Because I have a few

questions myself.

24

MR. DONAHUE:

25

THE COURT:

Your Honor, may I be excused?
Yes.

We were told you would have to be
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1

in Louisville this afternoon.

2

MR. DONAHUE:

3

You may be excused, sir.

Thank you.

(Mr. Donahue exited the courtroom.)

4

THE COURT:

5

Mr. Gannam.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. GANNAM:

7

Q.

8

said that you pledged to uphold the United States

9

Constitution; is that correct?

I want to clarify, the oath of office that you took, you

10

A.

I did.

11

Q.

Did you pledge to abide by the United States Supreme

12

Court's decisions?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

So that wasn't a specific part of your oath?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Mr. Canon referenced a federal district court decision

17

invalidating Kentucky's marriage laws at the end of last year.

18

Are you familiar with that?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Were you also aware that a federal appellate court, the

21

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed that decision?

22

A.

I am.

23

Q.

At the time you took office in January of 2015 and swore

24

your oath, was same-sex marriage permitted in the Commonwealth

25

of Kentucky?
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A.

No.

2

MR. GANNAM:

3

THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Mando?

4

MR. MANDO:

No, sir.

5

No further question, Your Honor.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. CANON:

7

Q.

8

means?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Who has the final say on what the United States

11

Constitution means?

Ma'am, do you get to interpret what the Constitution

12
13

MR. GANNAM:

Objection, Your Honor.

Calls for a

legal conclusion.

14

THE COURT:

I can answer that.

It's not me.

15

BY MR. CANON:

16

Q.

17

the final say as to what the United States Constitution says?

18

A.

(No response.)

19

Q.

Do you know?

20

A.

I don't know.

21

Q.

And the Sixth Circuit opinion that Mr. Gannam referenced,

22

do you know what day that came down?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

If I told you November the 6th, would you have any reason

25

to dispute that?

I'll ask it a different way.

Who do you understand has
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1

A.

I assume you wouldn't lie to me.

2

Q.

I would not, ma'am.

3

THE COURT:

I can take judicial notice of that.

4

MR. CANON:

Very good.

5

BY MR. CANON:

6

Q.

7

opinion striking down the portion of the Kentucky Constitution

8

that prohibits same-sex marriage, you knew about that the

9

entire time you were on the campaign trail, didn't you?

10

A.

And the prior opinion that you and I discussed, the

It was there.

11

MR. CANON:

Nothing further.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

Can I have Exhibit 3?

Now, I

13

asked you earlier, ma'am, about the marriage license.

14

looking at the one that was prepared by the state Department

15

of Library and Archives.

16

Exhibit 3 there.

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

Now I'm

You should have Defendant's

I do.
I asked you earlier about this KRS

19

section referenced in the top, 402.050.

And this includes, in

20

the definitional section -- it's not on the form, but it

21

includes ministers of the gospel and priests, justices and

22

judges of the court, county judge executives, justices of the

23

peace, and fiscal court commissioners authorized by the

24

governor or county judge and any religious society with no

25

minister.
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1

Those are the -- where it says to any person qualified to

2

perform marriages, that list I just gave you, that's the list.

3

THE WITNESS:

4

THE COURT:

Right.
County clerks aren't on that list.

So if

5

Jane Doe and Richard Roe came in and said will you marry us,

6

like formally, you take this person, you take this person, et

7

cetera, you don't do that?

8

THE WITNESS:

9

THE COURT:

No.
Okay.

So where it says you are

10

authorized to join together in the state of matrimony

11

according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, you're

12

not authorized to join together in the state of matrimony

13

because you're not included in that definition?

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

But I'm authorizing the license of -I understand that, but he read this.

16

"You are hereby authorized to join together."

17

authorized to join them together?

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE WITNESS:

21

THE COURT:

You're not

No.
As an official of the marriage?
That's correct.
Now, when two individuals come in to seek

22

to get the license, the top part, above where it says "we

23

hereby certify," is that already filled out?

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

No.
So the deputy or the clerk would help
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1

them fill that out?

2
3
4

THE WITNESS:

Yeah.

We ask the information, type it

in.
THE COURT:

So they come in across the counter and

5

they ask -- it's actually typed into some sort of template

6

form, then printed out?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE COURT:

9

Um-hmm.
At the bottom of Exhibit 2, where it says

issued June 16, 2015, the office of Kim Davis, Rowan County,

10

Morehead, and then Brian makes -- you referenced him.

11

initials, these are Brian Mason's initials?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

These

They are.
So the individual filling this out, that

14

typewritten portion would be based on whoever's typing the

15

information into the computer; is that fair?

16
17

THE WITNESS:

Yeah.

His name, he types his name in,

but my name is already populated in there.

18

THE COURT:

19

THE WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

Yours is just part of the form?
Yes.
Now, at the bottom of the marriage

21

certificate itself, this is handwritten, said recorded this

22

July 2, 2015, and the office in Kim Davis, Rowan County Clerk,

23

says Roberta H. -- is it --

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

Earley.
Earley, deputy clerk.

Is that actually

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 26 Filed:
15-607/23/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 76 of 83Page:
- Page
77ID#: 292
(254 of 313)
76
1

handwritten in by the deputy clerk?

2

THE WITNESS:

3

THE COURT:

It is.
In this case, why would Brian Mason be

4

different than Roberta Earley?

5

THE WITNESS:

Because you're catching the license at

6

two different times.

7

the center section where it says Marriage Certificate is

8

filled out by the person performing the ceremony.

9

it's performed and completed, then the license is turned back

10

into the clerk's office, and then that's the recording of the

11

bottom part down here.

12

document into our permanent records and indexing system.

13
14

THE COURT:

Then once

That is the actual recording of the

And who fills that out, the bottom

THE WITNESS:

The very bottom would be my clerk, my

deputy.

17

THE COURT:

18
19

Then

portion?

15
16

Brian Mason issued the license.

The clerk would fill that out, all right.

Let me check my notes here.
have.

That's all the questions I

Any further questions of the witness?

20

MR. SHARP:

21

MR. GANNAM:

22

No, Your Honor.
Your Honor, just briefly on the form.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION

23

BY MR. GANNAM:

24

Q.

25

marriage license, the new marriage license, where it reads to

Miss Davis, going back to Defendant's Exhibit 3, the
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1

any person or religious society qualified to perform

2

marriages, it says who it's to.

3

who it's from?

4

A.

It's from me.

5

Q.

When it says "you are hereby authorized," who is the

6

"you" referring to?

7

A.

8

ceremony.

9

Q.

And who is telling them that they are authorized?

10

A.

Me, the clerk.

11

Q.

So who is it that is authorizing them to do it?

12

A.

It would be me, the clerk.

What is your understanding of

"You" is talking about the people performing the

13

MR. GANNAM:

14

THE COURT:

15

statute doesn't include you?

16

doesn't include the deputy clerk.

17

No further questions, Your Honor.
And you believe that, even though the

THE WITNESS:

Right.

The statute I read to you

But if you read after the

18

semicolon, it says you.

The people you talked about in the

19

KRS that you read, it says you are authorized to join together

20

in the state of matrimony according to the laws of Kentucky.

21

I'm the one that's authorizing that marriage license.

22

one giving the authority because they can't get a marriage

23

license online, or they can't, you know -- it's actually the

24

clerk that's authorizing -- I'm saying that these people meet

25

the qualifications, and that they're not related, that

I'm the
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1

they're -- that they meet the age requirements and everything.

2

That's the authority that I'm given through the statutes to

3

issue the marriage license and that's what --

4

THE COURT:

The statute you referenced earlier before

5

we got started, Mr. Mando, those are the statutes she's

6

referring to?

7

MR. MANDO:

The statute I was referring to, Your

8

Honor, was 402.080, talks about issuing -- the license shall

9

be issued by the clerk.

10

THE COURT:

The license itself.

11

MR. MANDO:

The license is issued by the clerk.

12

ceremony is performed by one of those in the statute.

13
14

The

THE COURT:

The individuals authorized to perform the

ceremonies are the 402.050?

15

MR. MANDO:

Correct.

16

THE WITNESS:

17

MR. CHRISTMAN:

Um-hmm.
Your Honor, if I can interject as

18

well, Section 402.100 is actually the section that walks the

19

clerk through what the clerk needs to do in order to issue a

20

license, and it's the form that says each -- I'm reading

21

directly out of the statute.

22

Each county clerk shall use the form prescribed by the

23

Department For Libraries and Archives when issuing a marriage

24

license.

25

information required in this section and may also provide for

This form shall provide for the entering of all the
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1

the entering of additional information prescribed by the

2

Department For Libraries and Archives.

3

The form shall consist of, and then it identifies what

4

has to be on the license.

5

for the entering of an authorization statement of the county

6

clerk issuing the license.

7

THE COURT:

A marriage license which provides

So you are authorizing the -- you are, in

8

essence, telling the state that the information provided on

9

this is accurate?

10

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

Um-hmm.
Is that what you're doing?
The information that's given, they

13

presented their information, and we applied it to the

14

prescribed document.

15

requirements, then we're authorizing someone who is eligible,

16

like what you had stated earlier, to perform a ceremony, to

17

take this license that we've issued and actually marry

18

someone.

19

THE COURT:

And if they meet those statutory

So once the couple, if you will, leaves

20

the courthouse with this, takes it, gets married, brings it

21

back or mails it back --

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

Or mails it back, yes.
So you're, in essence, signing off on the

24

accuracy of the information provided?

25

this is?

Is that kind of what
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1

THE WITNESS:

Well, we are verifying the information,

2

yes, as true and correct.

3

issuance of it, we're saying that they're authorized to take

4

this and go to someone who is legally able to perform a

5

marriage, and they can present this form to them and that they

6

can have their ceremony performed and then bring it back in to

7

us for recording.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CHRISTMAN:

And by our signature and the

All right.
Your Honor, if I could continue with

10

the statute.

11

portion of the statute, it then says that the name it refers

12

to -- all the information that needs to be listed again, and

13

it refers to authority, and says the name of the county clerk

14

under whose authority the license was issued.

15

name is required on every license in those two places.

16

Further down, with the marriage certificate

THE COURT:

17

being on the license?

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

All right.

That's why her

You just object to your name

My name and my county, yeah.
Well, your county, you're elected by the

20

county.

But if it said Rowan County and listed a deputy

21

clerk -- let's say the deputy clerk that would be permitted

22

to, or has agreed that he or she would not be religiously

23

opposed to issuing the license, if it just was the deputy

24

clerk's name with Rowan County and not your name, would you

25

object to that?
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1
2
3

THE WITNESS:

It is still my authority as county

clerk that issues it through my deputy.
THE COURT:

All right.

4

You may step down.

5

Any further proof?

6

MR. GANNAM:

7

THE COURT:

8

Very well.

Thank you.

No, Your Honor.
All right.

Mr. Mando, any proof from the

county's perspective?

9

MR. MANDO:

No, sir.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

11

MR. SHARP:

No rebuttal evidence, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

We have a response which is due on the

13

Any rebuttal?

30th, and then the reply is due seven days after that.

14

MR. SHARP:

That's correct.

15

THE COURT:

Well, I think the earliest I would have a

16

decision -- I start a trial in Ashland on the 11th -- probably

17

the week of the 11th at some point.

18

Thursday, the 7th, so I'll get a decision out as quickly as I

19

can on the motion.

The response is due on

20

We'll be in recess.

21

(Proceedings concluded at 11:43 a.m.)

22
23
24
25

- - -
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I, LISA REED WIESMAN RDR-CRR, certify that the
foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of
proceedings in the above-entitled case.
_\s\ Lisa Reed Wiesman
LISA REED WIESMAN, RDR-CRR
Official Court Reporter

July 23, 2015
Date of Certification
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
ASHLAND DIVISION
APRIL MILLER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KIM DAVIS, ET AL.,
Defendants.

KIM DAVIS,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN L. BESHEAR, in his official
capacity as Governor of Kentucky, and
WAYNE ONKST, in his official capacity as
State Librarian and Commissioner,
Kentucky Department for Libraries and
Archives,
Third-Party Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION
0:15-CV-00044-DLB
DISTRICT JUDGE
DAVID L. BUNNING

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

VERIFIED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT KIM DAVIS
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, KIM DAVIS (“Davis”), for her third-party
complaint pursuant to Rule 14, Fed. R. Civ. P., sues Third-Party Defendant STEVEN L.
BESHEAR, in his official capacity as Governor of Kentucky (“Governor Beshear”), and ThirdParty Defendant WAYNE ONKST, in his official capacity as State Librarian and Commissioner,
Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives (“Commissioner Onkst”), and alleges:
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INTRODUCTION
1.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, acting through Governor Beshear, has deprived

Davis of her religious conscience rights guaranteed by the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions and laws, by insisting that Davis issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples
contrary to her conscience, based on her sincerely held religious beliefs. Because of Governor
Beshear’s open declaration that Davis has no such rights, Governor Beshear has exposed Davis
to the Plaintiffs’ underlying lawsuit, in which the Plaintiffs claim a constitutional right to a
Kentucky marriage license issued specifically by Davis. Governor Beshear is not only liable to
Davis for Plaintiffs’ claims, but is also obligated to effect Kentucky marriage licensing policies
that uphold Davis’s rights of religious conscience.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2.

This action arises under Article VI and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sections 1, 3, 5, and 8 of the Constitution of
Kentucky, and the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 446.350 (the
Kentucky “RFRA”).
3.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Davis’s federal law claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Davis’s
state law claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
4.

This Court has jurisdiction to render declaratory and injunctive relief under 28

U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
PARTIES
5.

Davis is the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky. She was elected to the

office of County Clerk in November 2014, and officially took office January 1, 2015, for a four-

2
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year term. Prior to taking office, Davis was a deputy clerk for her predecessor in office for nearly
thirty years.
6.

Governor Beshear is the Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. As the

highest executive officer of the Commonwealth, Governor Beshear has responsibility for
effecting Kentucky marriage law, and has final policymaking authority over the enforcement of
Kentucky marriage laws.
7.

Commissioner Onkst is the State Librarian and Commissioner of the Kentucky

Department for Libraries and Archives. The Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives
(“KDLA”) is an executive branch department of Kentucky government “headed by a
commissioner whose title shall be state librarian who shall be appointed by and serve at the
pleasure of the Governor.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 171.130. Commissioner Onkst has responsibility for
the design and provision of the official Kentucky marriage license form to be used by all county
clerks in the issuance of marriage licenses, and has final policymaking authority over the design
of the official Kentucky marriage license form to be used by all county clerks in the issuance of
marriage licenses.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
Administration of Kentucky Marriage Policy before Obergefell
8.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky has a body of democratically-enacted law

memorializing the millennia-old, natural definition of marriage as the union of one man and one
woman. In 1998, the Kentucky legislature codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.005 the natural
definition of marriage, previously entrenched in Kentucky common law, that “‘marriage’ refers
only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one (1) man and one (1) woman united in law for
life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon

3
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those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex.” In 2004, the Kentucky legislature
proposed a constitutional amendment, which was subsequently enacted on the approval of
seventy-four percent (74%) of the voters, memorializing that “[o]nly a marriage between one
man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky” KY. CONST. §
233A.
9.

The Commonwealth also has a body of legislation governing the issuance of

marriage licenses in Kentucky. Under these Kentucky marriage laws, individuals may obtain a
Kentucky marriage license in any of Kentucky’s 120 counties, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.080, some of
which have multiple branch offices. Thus, in total, there are approximately 137 marriage
licensing locations in Kentucky.
10.

Pursuant to Kentucky’s marriage licensing scheme, “[e]ach county clerk shall use

the form proscribed by the Department for Libraries and Archives when issuing a marriage
license” which “shall be uniform throughout this state, and every license blank shall contain the
identical words and figures provided in the form.” Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 402.100, 402.110. County
clerks have no local discretion under Kentucky law to alter the composition or requirements of
the KDLA-prescribed form.
11.

The KDLA form must include both a “marriage license” and a “marriage

certificate.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.100. The marriage license section must include an
“authorization statement of the county clerk issuing the license” and “[t]he date and place the
license is issued, and the signature of the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.” Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 402.100(1). The marriage certificate section must include “the name of the county
clerk under whose authority the license was issued, and the county in which the license was
issued” and “[a] signed statement by the county clerk or a deputy county clerk of the county in

4
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which the marriage license was issued that the marriage license was recorded.” Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 402.100(2), (3). The KDLA-prescribed form specifically uses the word “marriage” at six
different places on the form (and one reference to “join[ing] together in the state of matrimony”).
(A true and correct copy of a completed, KDLA-prescribed form of marriage license used in
Rowan County prior to June 30, 2015, with personal information redacted, is attached hereto as
Exhibit A. 1)
12.

Thus, every marriage license must be issued and signed in the county clerk’s

name and by the county clerk’s authority. In other words, no marriage license can be issued by a
county clerk without her authorization and without her imprimatur.
13.

As an alternative to a marriage license issued by a county clerk, Kentucky

marriage law provides for the issuance of a marriage license by a county judge/executive, the
highest elected officer in a county, upon the absence of the clerk or vacancy in the clerk’s office.
See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.240. This alternative procedure does not require the use of the KDLA
marriage license form; rather, it authorizes the county judge/executive to issue a marriage license
by “a memorandum thereof,” which is recorded by the clerk in the same manner as a KDLA
form. See id.
14.

In February 2014, the Western District of Kentucky issued a decision holding

Kentucky’s definition of marriage unconstitutional. 2 In March 2014, Kentucky Attorney General
Jack Conway, whose office had represented Kentucky in the case, tearfully proclaimed that after

1

The document attached as Exhibit A was admitted into evidence at the hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 2 (“Old version of
marriage license from KDLA”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).)
2
See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (decided February 12,
2014).
5
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prayer and consultation with his wife he could not continue defending Kentucky’s marriage laws
as an “inescapable” matter of conscience. 3 Conway said,
There are those who believe it’s my mandatory duty, regardless of my personal opinion,
to continue to defend this case through the appellate process, and I have heard from many
of them. However, I came to the inescapable conclusion that, if I did so, I would be
defending discrimination. . . .
That I will not do. . . .
....
. . . . I can only say that I am doing what I think is right. In the final analysis, I had
to make a decision that I could be proud of – for me now, and my daughters’ judgment
in the future. 4
15.

Within minutes of Conway’s announcement, Governor Beshear announced the

Commonwealth would hire private attorneys to pursue the appeal of the Western District’s
ruling, and to represent Kentucky in a companion Western District case. 5 Governor Beshear
directed no adverse statements or actions towards Conway as a result of Conway’s refusal to
perform official duties due to his conscience, though Conway’s refusal caused additional cost to
the Commonwealth upwards of $200,000.00 for outside counsel. 6

3

Beshear to hire $125-an-hour lawyer for gay marriage appeal after Conway bows out,
Wave3 News, available at http://www.wave3.com/story/24886884/beshear-to-hire-125-an-hourlawyer-for-gay-marriage-appeal-after-conway-bows-out (last accessed July 30, 2015) (quoting
Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Dan Canon, that Conway’s conscientious objection to performing his duty to
defend Kentucky’s marriage laws gave him “hope.”).
4
Read and watch Jack Conway’s statement on same-sex marriage, WKYT.com, dated
Mar. 4, 2014, available at http://www.wkyt.com/home/headlines/Read--watch-AttorneyGeneral-Conways-same-sex-statement-248381361.html (last accessed July 30, 2015) (emphasis
added).
5
See supra, n. 3. The Western District ruled against Kentucky in the second case, see Love
v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014). The Sixth Circuit reversed both district court
decisions in DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), which was ultimately reversed by
the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
6
Ky. Pays $195K+ to defend gay-marriage ban, The Courier-Journal, dated May 20, 2015,
available at http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2015/05/20/cost-gay-marriagedefense/27404461/ (last accessed July 30, 2015) (stating that Kentucky paid $195,400 to a
6
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Davis’s Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs About Marriage
16.

Davis is a professing Christian who is heavily involved in her local church,

attending weekly Bible study and worship services there, and who leads a weekly Bible study for
women at a local jail.
17.

As a Christian, Davis possesses a sincerely held religious belief and conviction,

based upon the Bible which she believes to be the Word of God, that “marriage” is exclusively a
union between one man and one woman. According to her beliefs, there is no arrangement of
people other than one man and one woman that is, or can be called, “marriage.”
18.

As county clerk, as a matter of Kentucky law, Davis authorizes, and signifies her

authorization and approval by affixing her name to, each and every marriage license issued from
her office. But Davis can neither authorize nor approve the “marriage” of a same-sex couple
according to her conscience, because even calling the relationship of a same-sex couple
“marriage” would violate her deeply and sincerely held religious beliefs. Nor can Davis allow
her name to appear as the source of authority and approval for any marriage license issued to a
same-sex couple because providing such approval would violate her sincere religious beliefs and
convictions.
19.

Before taking office as County Clerk in January 2015, Davis swore an oath to

support the constitutions and laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky “so
help me God.” Davis understood (and understands) this oath to mean that, in upholding the
federal and state constitutions and laws, she would not act in contradiction to the moral law of
God, natural law, or her sincerely held religious beliefs and convictions. Davis also understood
(and understands) the constitution and laws she swore to uphold to incorporate the constitutional
private firm through March 31, 2015 to defend Kentucky’s marriage law after Conway refused to
do so).
7
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and other legal protections of all individuals’ rights to live and work according to their
consciences, as informed by their sincerely held religious beliefs and convictions, including
without limitation such rights she holds in her own individual capacity.
20.

Davis’s sincerely held religious belief regarding the definition of “marriage” was

perfectly aligned with the prevailing marriage policy in Kentucky at the time she took office, as
provided in the Kentucky Constitution, Kentucky statutes, and controlling court decisions, and as
effected by the Commonwealth through Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst.
21.

On January 16, 2015, just two weeks after Davis took office, the United States

Supreme Court announced it would review the then-controlling Sixth Circuit decision upholding
Kentucky’s natural definition of marriage.
22.

On January 23, Davis wrote Kentucky legislators exhorting them to “get a bill on

the floor to help protect clerks” who had a religious objection to issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. (A true and correct copy of the form of letter sent to legislators is attached
hereto as Exhibit B. 7)
23.

Davis does not have a religious objection to issuing, signing, or otherwise

approving a marriage license for any man and woman who otherwise satisfy all of the legal
requirements for marriage under Kentucky law, regardless of the identities, orientations, or
practices of the applicants, including sexual identities, orientations, and practices. Furthermore,
Davis’s religious beliefs do not compel her to inquire of such applicants as to any aspects of their
identities, orientations, or practices beyond the information required to complete the prescribed
marriage license form.

7

The document attached as Exhibit B was admitted into evidence at the hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 1 (“Letter to
Senator Robertson from Kim Davis”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).)
8
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Administration of Kentucky Marriage Policy after Obergefell
24.

On June 26, 2015, a five-to-four majority of the United States Supreme Court

held that democratically-approved laws from Kentucky and three other states, defining marriage
as the union of one man and one woman, were “invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex
couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). According to the majority, the United States
Constitution “does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms
as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” Id. at 2607.
25.

The same day, Governor Beshear sent a letter to all “Kentucky County Clerks,”

including Davis, informing them that “[e]ffective today, Kentucky will recognize as valid all
same sex marriages performed in other states and in Kentucky.” The letter stated that “Kentucky
. . . must license and recognize the marriages of same-sex couples,” and further instructed that
“[n]ow that same-sex couples are entitled to the issuance of a marriage license, the Department
of Libraries and Archives will be sending a gender-neutral form to you today, along with
instructions for its use.” (A true and correct copy of Governor Beshear’s letter to county clerks is
attached hereto as Exhibit C. 8)
26.

On Governor Beshear’s instructions, the KDLA provided county clerks with a

new marriage license form, reflecting changes from the prior approved form to accommodate
same-sex couples. 9 Critically, however, the new form retained all references to “marriage,” and
all references to the name, signature, and authorization requirements of the county clerk. (A true

8

The document attached as Exhibit C was admitted into evidence at the hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 4 (“6/26/15 Letter
from Governor”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).).
9
The post-Obergefell marriage form eliminated references to “bride” and “groom” and
replaced them with “first party” and “second party.
9
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and correct copy of the new KDLA marriage license form is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 10)
Thus, Davis cannot issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple on the new form without
violating her conscience, as informed by her sincerely held religious beliefs.
27.

Following Governor Beshear’s decree, county clerks across the Commonwealth

began issuing same-sex marriage licenses. Governor Beshear reiterated, “government officials in
Kentucky . . . must recognize same-sex marriages as valid and allow them to take place,” 11 and
confirmed that “[s]ame-sex couples are now being married in Kentucky and such marriages from
other states are now being recognized under Kentucky law.” 12 In these same pronouncements,
Governor Beshear stated that the “overwhelming majority of county clerks” are “iss[uing]
marriage licenses regardless of gender” and only “two or three” county clerks (of 120) were
“refusing” to issue such licenses due to their “personal beliefs” and “personal feelings.”
28.

In subsequent pronouncements, Governor Beshear has maintained that county

clerks must issue marriage licenses, including to same-sex couples, despite any clerk’s “own
personal beliefs.” 13 According to Governor Beshear, the only options available to county clerks
who oppose issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even due to conscience or sincerely
held religious beliefs, are to either issue the licenses in violation of conscience, or resign. 14
10

The document attached as Exhibit D was admitted into evidence at the hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 3 (“New version of
marriage license from KDLA after S.Ct. 6/26/15 decision”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).).
11
Press Release, Gov. Beshear Statement on Today’s Meeting with Casey County Clerk,
dated July 9, 2015, available at http://migration.kentucky.gov/Newsroom /governor/20150707
statement.htm (last accessed July 29, 2015).
12
Press Release, Gov. Beshear: No special session needed, dated July 7, 2015, available at
http://migration.kentucky.gov/Newsroom/governor/20150707statement.htm (last accessed July
29, 2015);
13
Gov. Beshear Tells County Clerks to Fulfill Their Duties or Resign, WMKY.com, dated
July 21, 2015, available at http://wmky.org/post/gov-beshear-tells-county-clerks-fullfill-theirduties-or-resign (last accessed July 29. 2015).
14
See supra, n. 13.
10

Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
Case: 15-5880 Doc
Document:
#: 34 Filed:
15-708/04/15
Filed: 08/19/2015
Page: 11 of 32Page:
- Page
12ID#: 755
(273 of 313)

29.

On June 27, 2015, Davis discontinued issuing marriage licenses in Rowan

County. This was not a “spur-of-the-moment decision” reached by Davis. Rather, after exhorting
legislators to provide conscience protection for county clerks upon taking office, Davis prayed
and fasted during the months leading up to Obergefell over how she would respond to such a
Supreme Court decision. Though Davis’s religious objection is limited to issuing licenses to
same-sex couples, she suspended the issuance of all licenses to ensure that all individuals and
couples in Rowan County were treated the same.
30.

On July 8, 2015, Davis sent a letter appealing to Governor Beshear to uphold her

religious conscience rights, and to call a special session of the Kentucky General Assembly to
legislatively address the conflict between her religious beliefs and Kentucky marriage policy as
effected by Governor Beshear. (A true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit
E. 15) Davis has received no response to her letter.
31.

During Davis’s entire tenure in the Rowan County Clerk’s Office, spanning

nearly thirty years, neither Davis, any deputy clerk, nor Davis’s predecessor in office ever
asserted a religious objection to performing any other function of the clerk’s office.
32.

The County Judge/Executive of Rowan County, Walter Blevins (“Judge

Blevins”), would raise no religious objection to issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples
under the authority of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.240. However, Judge Blevins has refused to issue a
marriage license to any of the Plaintiffs in the underlying action against Davis based on his belief
that Davis’s discontinuation of the issuance of all marriage licenses in Rowan County does not

15

The document attached as Exhibit E was admitted into evidence at the hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 5 (“7/8/15 Letter
from Kim Davis to Governor”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).).
11
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count as the “absence” of Davis for purposes of the issuance of marriage licenses under Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 402.40.
Effect of Governor Beshear’s Administration of Kentucky Marriage Policy
and the Need for Immediate Relief
33.

Governor Beshear took it upon himself after Obergefell to set and announce new

Kentucky marriage license policies, and command county clerks to abide by such policies.
34.

Governor Beshear’s policies and directives are specifically targeting clerks like

Davis who possess certain religious beliefs about marriage. This targeting is demonstrated by the
exemption Governor Beshear granted to Attorney General Conway when he was unwilling to
defend Kentucky’s marriage laws—after “pray[ing] over this decision”—pursuant to Conway’s
own personal beliefs and feelings about “doing what I think is right” and “mak[ing] a decision
that I could be proud of.” (See supra, n.4.)
35.

Governor Beshear is unlawfully picking and choosing the conscience-based

exemptions to marriage that he deems acceptable. For instance, when Attorney General Conway
refused to defend Kentucky’s marriage laws, Beshear did not admonish Conway that “Neither
your oath nor the Supreme Court dictates what you must believe. But as elected officials, they do
prescribe how we must act,” but Governor Beshear did so direct county clerks like Davis. (Ex.
C.) Beshear did not command Conway that “when you accepted this job and took that oath, it
puts you on a different level,” and “[y]ou have official duties now that the state law puts on you,”
but he did deliver this command to county clerks like Davis. (See supra, n.13.) Beshear did not
publicly proclaim that Conway was “refusing to perform [his] duties” and failing to “follow[] the
law and carry[] out [his] duty,” and should instead “comply with the law regardless of [his]
personal beliefs,” but he did make this proclamation (repeatedly) about county clerks like Davis
(See supra, nn. 11, 12.) Beshear did not instruct Conway that “if you are at that point to where

12
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your personal convictions tell you that you simply cannot fulfill your duties that you were
elected to do, than obviously the honorable course to take is to resign and let someone else stepin who feels that they can fulfill these duties,” but he did issue this instruction to county clerks
like Davis. (See supra, n.13.) Beshear did not ominously declare that “[t]he courts will deal
appropriately with” Conway, but he did so declare as to the “two or three” county clerks who are
not issuing marriage licenses. (See supra, n.12.)
36.

In no uncertain terms, Governor Beshear’s policies and directives are intended to

suppress religion—even worse, a particular religious belief. Thus, although Attorney General
Conway was given a pass for his conscience about marriage without any threats of repercussion,
clerks like Davis are being repeatedly told by their Governor to abandon their religiouslyinformed beliefs or resign. In doing so, Governor Beshear is forcing clerks like Davis to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting her position, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to keep her position, on the other hand.
37.

Citing Governor Beshear’s policies and directives to all county clerks to issue

licenses to same-sex couples irrespective of their sincerely held religious beliefs, the Plaintiffs in
the underlying action allege that they are entitled to Kentucky marriage licenses issued
specifically by Davis, and claim that Davis’s refusal to issue marriage licenses violates their
constitutional rights.
38.

Governor Beshear’s targeted and discriminatory marriage policy pronouncements

constitute government-imposed pressure on Davis to act contrary to her religious beliefs, and
expose Davis to potential liability if she refuses to compromise her religious beliefs and violate
her conscience.

13
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39.

Davis needs immediate relief from Governor Beshear’s unlawful policies before

this Court can properly adjudicate the Plaintiffs’ claims against Davis in the underlying action.
40.

At all relevant times, Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst acted under

color of state law.
41.

All conditions precedent to the commencement and maintenance of this action

have been satisfied, have occurred, or have been waived.
COUNT I
Third-Party Liability
42.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
43.

Plaintiffs’ claims against Davis in the underlying action are based on Governor

Beshear’s unlawful policies and directives to Davis with respect to issuing Kentucky marriage
licenses, including without limitation the failure of Governor Beshear to uphold and protect
Davis’s rights of religious conscience.
44.

Governor Beshear is liable to Davis for all of any relief obtained by Plaintiffs

against Davis in the underlying action.
45.

If the Court determines Plaintiffs are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license

issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to
provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to Plaintiffs which does not violate the
religious conscience rights of Davis.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
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COUNT II
Violation of Kentucky RFRA
Third-Party Liability
46.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
47.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
48.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, create government-imposed coercive pressure on Davis to change or
violate her religious beliefs.
49.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, chill Davis’s religious exercise.
50.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, expose Davis to liability to Plaintiffs and others.
51.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, impose a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise.
52.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, further no compelling government interest.
53.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to any compelling government interest.
54.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not the least restrictive means of furthering any interest of Kentucky.
55.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Kentucky RFRA.
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56.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Kentucky RFRA.
57.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
COUNT III
Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Free Exercise Clause
Substantial Burden
Third-Party Liability
58.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
59.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
60.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not neutral.
61.

Kentucky’s marriage

Commissioner Onkst, are not generally applicable.
62.

Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment

under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and
others.
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63.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, create government-imposed coercive pressure on Davis to change or
violate her religious beliefs.
64.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, chill Davis’s religious exercise.
65.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, expose Davis to liability to Plaintiffs and others.
66.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, impose a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise.
67.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, further no compelling government interest.
68.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to any compelling government interest.
69.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not the least restrictive means of furthering any interest of Kentucky.
70.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
71.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of
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the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
72.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
COUNT IV
Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Free Exercise Clause
Intentional Discrimination
Third-Party Liability
73.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
74.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
75.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, make it impossible for Davis to comply with both her religious beliefs and
Kentucky’s marriage policies.
76.

Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment

under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and
others.
77.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of the
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
78.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
79.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
COUNT V
Religious Discrimination—
Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses; Due Process and Equal Protection
Third-Party Liability
80.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
81.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
82.

By design, Governor Beshear allows some religious and conscientious objections

to compliance with Kentucky marriage laws but not others, resulting in discrimination among
religious objectors.
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83.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, vest Governor Beshear with unbridled discretion in deciding whether to
allow exemptions from compliance with Kentucky marriage law to some persons.
84.

Religious liberty is a fundamental right.

85.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, protect some religious objectors, but not Davis.
86.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
87.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
88.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
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COUNT VI
Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Freedom of Speech
Compelled Speech
Third-Party Liability
89.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
90.

Davis believes and professes that issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples

violates her religious beliefs.
91.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to cooperate in activities, through the issuance of
marriage licenses under her name and approval, that are violations of Davis’s religious beliefs.
92.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to state her identification, authorization, and approval
as “marriage” of same-sex relationships which cannot be “marriage” according to her religious
beliefs.
93.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.
94.

Kentucky’s actions, as effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst,

thus violate Davis’s right to be free from compelled speech as secured to her by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
95.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
21
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96.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
COUNT VII
Violation of Article VI of the United States Constitution
Religious Test
Third-Party Liability
97.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
98.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
99.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, require persons with religious beliefs like those of Davis to renounce such
beliefs as a condition to holding the office of county clerk, and thereby impose a religious test as
a qualification to hold the office of county clerk.
100.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by Article VI of the United States
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
101.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Article VI of the United
States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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102.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
COUNT VIII
Violation of Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution
Religious Freedom and Rights of Conscience
Third-Party Liability
103.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
104.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
105.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not neutral.
106.

Kentucky’s marriage

Commissioner Onkst, are not generally applicable.
107.

Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment

under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and
others.
108.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, create government-imposed coercive pressure on Davis to change or
violate her religious beliefs.
109.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

Commissioner Onkst, chill Davis’s religious exercise.
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110.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, expose Davis to liability to Plaintiffs and others.
111.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, impose a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise.
112.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, further no compelling government interest.
113.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to any compelling government interest.
114.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not the least restrictive means of furthering any interest of Kentucky.
115.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights of religious freedom and conscience secured to her
by Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution.
116.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1 and 5 of the
Kentucky Constitution.
117.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
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COUNT IX
Violation of Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution
Religious Discrimination
Third-Party Liability
118.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
119.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
120.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, make it impossible for Davis to comply with both her religious beliefs and
Kentucky’s marriage policies.
121.

Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment

under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and
others.
122.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights against religious discrimination secured to her by
Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution.
123.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1 and 5 of the
Kentucky Constitution.
124.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
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WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
COUNT X
Religious Discrimination—
Violation of Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution
Religious Preference; Equality
Third-Party Liability
125.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
126.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
127.

By design, Governor Beshear allows some religious and conscientious objections

to compliance with Kentucky marriage laws but not others, resulting in discrimination among
religious objectors.
128.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, vest Governor Beshear with unbridled discretion in deciding whether to
allow exemptions from compliance with Kentucky marriage law to some persons.
129.

Religious liberty is a fundamental right.

130.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, protect some religious objectors, but not Davis.
131.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights to equality and against religious discrimination and
religious preferences secured to her by Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution.
132.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
26
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Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the
Kentucky Constitution.
133.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief
COUNT XI
Violation of the Sections 1 and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution
Freedom of Speech
Compelled Speech
Third-Party Liability
134.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
135.

Davis believes and professes that issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples

violates her religious beliefs.
136.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to cooperate in activities, through the issuance of
marriage licenses under her name and approval, that are violations of Davis’s religious beliefs.
137.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to state her identification, authorization, and approval
as “marriage” of same-sex relationships which cannot be “marriage” according to her religious
beliefs.
138.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.
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139.

Kentucky’s actions, as effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst,

thus violate Davis’s right to be free from compelled speech as secured to her by Sections 1 and 8
of the Kentucky Constitution.
140.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1 and 8 of the
Kentucky Constitution.
141.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
COUNT XII
Violation of Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution
Religious Test
Third-Party Liability
142.

Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 41 above.
143.

Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise.
144.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, require persons with religious beliefs like those of Davis to renounce such
beliefs as a condition to holding the office of county clerk, and thereby impose a religious test as
a qualification to hold the office of county clerk.
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145.

Kentucky’s marriage

policies, as effected

by Governor Beshear and

Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by Section 5 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
146.

Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs

are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Section 5 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
147.

Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as

effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be
harmed.
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Davis respectfully requests that the Court:
a. Declare that Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, violate the Kentucky RFRA;
b. Declare that Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, violate the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and Article VI of the United States Constitution;
c. Declare that Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, violate Sections 1, 3, 5, and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution;
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d. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of Kentucky’s
marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, against
Davis;
e. Impose against or transfer to Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst any relief
obtained by Plaintiffs against Davis in the underlying action;
f. Award Davis the costs of this action and reasonable attorney’s fees; and
g. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Davis requests a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Roger K. Gannam
Roger K. Gannam (Fla. 240450)†
rgannam@LC.org
court@LC.org
Jonathan D. Christman (Pa. 306634)†
jchristman@LC.org
LIBERTY COUNSEL
P.O. BOX 540774
Orlando, FL 32854-0774
(800) 671-1776 Telephone
(407) 875-0770 Facsimile
†
Admitted pro hac vice
Attorneys for Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff, Kim Davis
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed via the Court’s
CM/ECF system, which will effectuate service through the Court’s transmission facilities by
notice of electronic filing to all counsel or parties of record:
Daniel J. Canon
L. Joe Dunman
Laura E. Landenwich
CLAY DANIEL WALTON ADAMS, PLC
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101
Louisville, KY 40202
dan@justiceky.com
joe@justiceky.com
laura@justiceky.com

Jeffrey C. Mando
Claire Parsons
ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN &
DUSING, PLLC
40 West Pike Street
Covington, KY 41011
jmando@aswdlaw.com
cparsons@aswdlaw.com
Attorneys for Rowan County

William Ellis Sharp
ACLU OF KENTUCKY
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40202
sharp@aclu-ky.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DATED: August 4, 2015

/s/ Roger K. Gannam
Roger K. Gannam
Attorney for Defendant Kim Davis
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the

Eastern District
__________
Districtof
ofKentucky
__________
April Miller, et al.
Plaintiff

v.
Kim Davis, et al.
Defendant, Third-party plaintiff

v.
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, et al.
Third-party defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 0:15-CV-00044-DLB

SUMMONS ON A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
To: (Third-party defendant’s name and address) Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 100
Frankfurt, Kentucky 40601

A lawsuit has been filed against defendant Kim Davis
, who as third-party plaintiff is making
this claim against you to pay part or all of what the defendant may owe to the plaintiff April Miller, et al.
.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff and on the defendant an answer to the attached complaint or a
motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the defendant or
defendant’s attorney, whose name and address are:
Jonathan D. Christman & Roger K. Gannam, Liberty Counsel, P.O. Box 540774, Orlando, Florida 32854
and
A.C. Donahue, Donahue Law Group, P.S.C., P.O. Box 659, Somerset, Kentucky 42502

It must also be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, whose name and address are:
Dan Canon, Joe Dunman, & Laura Landenwich, Clay Daniel Walton Adams, PLC, 462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101,
Louisville, Kentucky 40202, and
William Sharp, ACLU of Kentucky, 315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300, Louisville, Kentucky 40202

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the third-party
complaint. You also must file the answer or motion with the court and serve it on any other parties.
A copy of the plaintiff’s complaint is also attached. You may – but are not required to – respond to it.
Date:

08/04/2015

CLERK OF COURT

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
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Civil Action No. 0:15-CV-00044-DLB
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)
was received by me on (date)

Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky

.

’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)
on (date)

; or

’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date)

, and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or

’ I served the summons on (name of individual)

, who is

designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date)

; or

’ I returned the summons unexecuted because

; or

’ Other (specify):
.
My fees are $

for travel and $

for services, for a total of $

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date:
Server’s signature

Printed name and title

Server’s address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

0.00

.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the

Eastern District
__________
Districtof
ofKentucky
__________
April Miller, et al.
Plaintiff

v.
Kim Davis, et al.
Defendant, Third-party plaintiff

v.
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, et al.
Third-party defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 0:15-CV-00044-DLB

SUMMONS ON A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
To: (Third-party defendant’s name and address) Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 100
Frankfurt, Kentucky 40601

A lawsuit has been filed against defendant Kim Davis
, who as third-party plaintiff is making
this claim against you to pay part or all of what the defendant may owe to the plaintiff April Miller, et al.
.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff and on the defendant an answer to the attached complaint or a
motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the defendant or
defendant’s attorney, whose name and address are:
Jonathan D. Christman & Roger K. Gannam, Liberty Counsel, P.O. Box 540774, Orlando, Florida 32854
and
A.C. Donahue, Donahue Law Group, P.S.C., P.O. Box 659, Somerset, Kentucky 42502

It must also be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, whose name and address are:
Dan Canon, Joe Dunman, & Laura Landenwich, Clay Daniel Walton Adams, PLC, 462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101,
Louisville, Kentucky 40202, and
William Sharp, ACLU of Kentucky, 315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300, Louisville, Kentucky 40202

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the third-party
complaint. You also must file the answer or motion with the court and serve it on any other parties.
A copy of the plaintiff’s complaint is also attached. You may – but are not required to – respond to it.
Date:

08/04/2015

CLERK OF COURT

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
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Civil Action No. 0:15-CV-00044-DLB
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)
was received by me on (date)

Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky

.

’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)
on (date)

; or

’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date)

, and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or

’ I served the summons on (name of individual)

, who is

designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date)

; or

’ I returned the summons unexecuted because

; or

’ Other (specify):
.
My fees are $

for travel and $

for services, for a total of $

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date:
Server’s signature

Printed name and title

Server’s address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

0.00

.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-44-DLB
APRIL MILLER, et al.

PLAINTIFFS

vs.

ORDER

KIM DAVIS, both individually
and in her official capacity, et al.

DEFENDANTS

***********************
On August 17, 2015, this Court entered an Order (Doc. # 52) denying Defendant
Kim Davis’ motion to stay the Court’s August 12, 2015 Order (Doc. # 43) granting Plaintiffs
a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant Davis from enforcing her “no marriage
licenses” policy against Plaintiffs. However, in deference to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Court temporarily stayed its August 12, 2015 Order to give the appellate court
an opportunity to review, on an expedited basis, the August 17, 2015 Order denying the
motion to stay.
Upon review of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(2), governing stays of
injunctions pending appeal, the Court finds it necessary to set an expiration date for the
temporary stay. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Court’s temporary stay of its August 17, 2015 Order shall
expire on August 31, 2015, absent an Order to the contrary by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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This 19th day of August, 2015.

G:\DATA\ORDERS\Ashland Civil\2015\15-44 Order re Temporary Stay.wpd

2

